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Preface
Once again it is a pleasure to acknowledge the financial support of Touche
Ross Foundation that has made it possible to continue this series of biennial
auditing symposia at the University of Kansas. The 1982 symposium was the
sixth of the series, with about fifty invited practitioners and educators coming
together for two days to consider the eight papers that were presented.
As co-chairmen of the symposium and editors of these Proceedings, we
assume full responsibility for the selection of topics for both the invited papers
and those selected from the papers submitted in response to the call for papers
for the symposium.
With the exception of the paper on the evolution of audit reporting, which
continues the historical coverage of auditing that has opened each of the
symposia, the papers reflect no unifying theme or purpose, other than that the
topics addressed or the research reported hold promise of being of interest to
the invited participants from both practice and academe. All papers, except for
the traditional evening address on a more general topic, were distributed in
advance, making it possible for the preparer to limit comments to summary
remarks or observations about the paper so that more than an hour was
available for the prepared response of a selected discussant and the ensuing
open discussion. Although these discussions invariably have been one of the
highlights of the symposia, unfortunately it has not been feasible to attempt to
capture and report these discussions for the benefit of the wider readership of
the proceedings. For those who might like an opportunity to participate in the
discussions at a future symposium, however, we would be pleased to receive
an indication of your interest.
The proceedings of each of the six symposia are in print and may be
purchased from:
KANSAS UNION BOOKSTORE
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045
The title and prepaid price of each of the volumes is as follows:
1972 AUDITING LOOKS AHEAD
1974 CONTEMPORARY AUDITING PROBLEMS
1976 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM III
1978 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM IV
1980 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM V
1982 AUDITING SYMPOSIUM VI

$5.00
$5.00
$5.00
$6.00
$7.00
$7.00

In conclusion, we should like to acknowledge the encouragement, advice,
and personal support of the symposia so generously provided by Jerry Jackson,
partner in charge of the Kansas City office of Touche Ross & Co.
Donald R. Nichols
Howard F. Stettler
September, 1982
University of Kansas
Lawrence

1

The Evolution of Audit Reporting
D. R. Carmichael
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Alan J. Winters
Academic Fellow, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind.
—Rudyard Kipling
The words the auditor dispenses are a powerful drug. They influence
resource allocation in our society. Thus, the auditor's report represents a drug
that should be dispensed and used with great care. Its purpose and limitations
should be understood by users and they should be made aware of undesirable
side effects and the dangers of misuse.
Like all drugs the auditor's report should be subjected to continuous
scrutiny to evaluate its effectiveness over time. Perhaps steady use creates a
tolerance that reduces the report's potency. Perhaps it has uses beyond its
primary purpose.
Indeed the auditor's report has been evaluated and revised. Since the first
authoritative guidance for audit report wording was given in 1917, the report
has been revised seven times. This represents, on the average, a revision
every 10.6 years. Averages are deceiving, however. The last revision
occurred 33 years ago in 1949. What this statistic tells us is the report revision
occurred much more frequently in the early days of the profession and much
less frequently as the profession matured. A crucial question is why.
The auditor's report also has been used for purposes other than to assist in
the allocation of resources. The report has been used to stimulate change in
professional practice and to influence the auditor's legal liability. A crucial
question is how, if at all, these ancillary uses have affected the primary use.
This paper traces the evolution of audit reporting in the United States and
identifies the major forms of the auditor's standard report and the pivotal
events and circumstances leading to the development of those reports. It also
explains the evolutionary process that has shaped present reporting practice,
created reporting controversies, and that may influence future reporting
developments. The paper is organized around what we consider to be the
landmarks in audit report evolution, with discussion of what we consider to be
the primary environmental influences leading to the landmarks.
Landmark I—1917 Federal Reserve Bulletin
Until 1917 there were no authoritative accounting or auditing standards
established in the United States. In addition, no generally recognized standards
1

had evolved from professional organizations, statutory requirements, or
litigation. The lack of defined responsibilities applicable to the American auditor
resulted in a diversity of audit reporting practices.
Since the profession of accounting was introduced to the United States by
British accountants, the report form used in England formed a basis for
American auditors' reports. Although there was no predominant report form,
an example of a typical "certificate" of the early days is one given by Price
Waterhouse & Co. on St. Louis Breweries Ltd.
We have examined the above accounts with the books and vouchers
of the company, and find the same to be correct. We approve and
certify that the above balance sheet correctly sets forth the position of
the company.
The flexibility in reporting permitted by the lack of defined standards was
accentuated by the service-to-the-client philosophy that pervaded early ac
counting practice. In the absence of statutory requirements for an audit, early
practitioners of public accounting had to justify engagements on the basis of
economic benefits to the client. Since clients did not have to have audits, an
auditor was not in a position to dictate the extent of work that a client required.
The scope of the examination was flexible, but the auditor would, accordingly,
restrict the report wording to conclusions justified by the scope of the work
performed.
Inadequatefinancialreports and unsatisfactory audits were not uncommon.
Without authoritative guidelines, without control over the admission standards
of its members, and without disciplinary authority there was little control over
the quality of accounting or auditing. Thefinancialpanic of 1907 discredited big
business in the eyes of the public and created a political environment favorable
to government regulation.
The legislation that created the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in 1913 and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914 was of overriding importance to
the profession. The formation of these regulatory agencies started a move
ment that fostered standardization of auditors' reports.
Both the FTC and the FRB shared a dissatisfaction with financial state
ments audited by public accountants. The chairman of the FTC suggested
three steps to improve audited financial statements:
• The American Institute of Accountants (AIA) should formulate
uniform guidelines expressing its judgment as to how alternative
accounting principles should be handled.
• The FTC should develop a register of accountants acceptable to the
FTC and the FRB.
• The AIA should exercise greater disciplinary control over public
accountants.
To avoid political control of the profession, the AIA, through its committee
on federal legislation, conferred with the FTC and the FRB. The committee
successfully argued that it could provide guidelines for the conduct of
independent audits that would overcome the FTC's concerns. The committee
also persuaded the agencies that it could exercise control over its admission
2

requirements and the ethical conduct of its members, thus precluding the need
for a federal register of accountants. Finally, the committee suggested that the
FRB might recommend and give preference to commercial paper accompanied
by balance sheets "certified" by professional accountants. As a result of these
discussions came the first authoritative guide for the conduct of independent
audits, the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1917, "Uniform Accounting."
The committee seems to have taken advantage of the confusion between
uniform accounting and standard audit requirements. The Federal Reserve
Bulletin mixed the two concepts. The preface said "The following tentative
proposal for a uniform system of accounting to be adopted by manufacturing
and merchandising concerns . . . . is now reprinted for more general distribu
tion." However, the text of the bulletin consisted mainly of recommended
audit procedures. Literally, the publication had nothing to do with uniform
accounting systems.
The bulletin concluded with a suggested form of auditor's report, marking
the first way station in the evolution of auditors' standard reports.
1
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I have audited the accounts of Blank and Co. for the period from . . .
to . . . and I certify that the above balance sheet and statement of profit
and loss have been made in accordance with the plan suggested and
advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my opinion set forth the
financial condition of the firm at. . . and the results of its operations for
the period.
3

The reference to "accounts" in the report and the term "certify" likely
stemmed from the influence of the English report form. The term "opinion"
was also used, however, suggesting that certify may not have been intended to
connote as factual a representation as the literal meaning of the word suggests.
The reference to the FRB plan communicates adherence to a set of specific
guidelines and thus adds credibility to the statements.
This report was by no means in general use. Report wording varied and
included as alternatives to "in my opinion" such phrases as "correctly set
forth," "exhibit a true and correct view," "accurately record conditions,"
and "represent the truefinancialposition."
Although the recommended report was not a "standard" report in the
sense that it was required by an authoritative pronouncement, it was the first
report to emerge from the deliberations of the AIA and be recommended in a
widely circulated publication. Thus it marked the beginning of a series of
recommended reports that would ultimately lead to a "standard" report.
Although it must be conceded that the initial effort to recommend a report
form was partly in response to outside pressure, the Federal Reserve Bulletin
of 1917 marked the beginning of the profession's exercise of self-discipline
over the content of the auditor's report. The profession's initiative in response
to outside pressure resulted in the first landmark in the evolution of the
auditor's standard report.
Landmark II—1929 Revision of the Federal Reserve Bulletin
The march toward a standard report continued with the publication of a
revised edition of the 1917 Federal Reserve Bulletin in 1929. The revision was
3

initiated by a special committee of the AIA in 1928, prior to the stock market
crash, in recognition of the commercial growth and prosperity characterized by
industrial expansion, issuance of new securities, purchases, mergers and the
accompanying growth in the variety and complexity of financial reporting
practices.
The 1929 revision, titled "Verification of Financial Statements," ex
pressed concern that the 1917 bulletin might have failed to make clear that an
audit was not a complete examination of the details underlying financial
statements. Dispelling this notion was important to the profession. The
increasing size of businesses and the growing volume of their transactions
virtually demanded testing in an audit. The new bulletin stressed that the
auditor used tests instead of detailed verification when reliable controls existed
even though the link between control strengths and audit procedures was not
well established in practice. The revision suggested a report form, still
referred to as a certificate, that read as follows:
4

I have examined the accounts of . . . company for the period from
. . . to
I certify that the accompanying balance sheet and statement of profit
and loss, in my opinion, set forth thefinancialcondition of the company
at . . . and the results of operations for the period.
5

Although the 1929 bulletin emphasized testing in an audit, the suggested
report did not refer to testing or the use of auditor judgment. The major
difference between the 1929 and 1917 reports was the deletion of the
references to the "plan suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board"
and the "correctness" of the financial statements. In addition, the suggested
report was divided into two paragraphs that parallel the scope and opinion
paragraphs of the current standard report.
Landmark III—The Ultramares Case
The Ultramares decision erased what accountants had previously consid
ered to be a clean line between negligence and fraud. In substance the
decision held that accountants could be liable to third parties for gross
negligence from which an inference of fraud could be drawn.
The Ultramares case caused the accounting profession to rethink its
reporting practices. An editorial in the July, 1931 Journal of Accountancy
offered recommendations for auditors' reports based on the Ultramares
decision.
6

Every accountant's report will be addressed to the client only . . .
the accountant will divide his report into two sections, one dealing with
fact (that is, scope of examination) and one with opinion.
. . . The accountant perhaps should abandon certificates and merely
make reports . . . The word "certify" which has been used for many
years is quite inappropriate and should be abandoned . . . It is absurd to
speak of certifying an opinion.
7

Faced with the potential expansion of liability to third parties, accountants
began to follow the suggestions in the editorial. The word "certify" began to
4

disappear from reports to make clear that the report was an opinion and not a
guarantee. The typical report read:
We have examined the accounts of . . . for the year ended . . . In
our opinion the accompanying balance sheet and statement of profit and
loss set forth the financial condition of the company at . . . and the
results of its operations for the year then ended that date.
The suggested report revisions illustrate the use of the report as an
instrument of change. Removal of the term "certify" and emphasis on the
auditor's conclusion as an opinion preceded widespread acceptance of those
practices. Thus, the report itself was used to introduce specific changes before
those changes were readily accepted by practitioners, let alone the public.
Landmark IV—Correspondence with the Stock Exchange
The financial reporting abuses that led to the stock market crash in 1929
had not gone unrecognized by thoughtful members of the accounting profes
sion. As early as 1927, the Institute attempted to establish cooperative
relations with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to improve financial
reporting practices. However, it took the catastrophic market crash in the fall
of 1929 to excite the exchange's interest in financial reporting reforms and
cooperation with accountants.
Late in 1930 a special Institute committee on cooperation with stock
exchanges was formed. The committee undertook two major tasks: (1) to
educate the public in regard to the significance of financial statements, their
value and unavoidable limitations, and (2) to make the financial statements
published by corporations more informative and authoritative.
One of the committee's major recommendations aimed at achieving these
objectives was to require listed companies to adhere to broad, generally
accepted accounting principles within which they could select detailed methods
of accounting best suited to their requirements. Companies would be required
to disclose the methods employed to enable an investor to judge the degree of
conformity to standard usage. The companies also would be required to
consistently apply the adopted methods.
The committee also sought to define the auditor's responsibility for
financial statements prepared under these new accounting guidelines. It
recommended that the auditor's report specifically state whether the financial
statements were prepared on the basis of the accounting methods adopted and
disclosed by the company.
The committee's recommendations were approved by the NYSE with one
critical exception. It was not considered necessary or feasible for companies to
disclose the detailed accounting methods used so that users could judge the
conformity of the company's accounting methods with the broad, generally
accepted accounting principles the committee established. Instead, this re
sponsibility was shifted from the user to the auditor by requiring the auditor's
report to state whether the company was following these broad principles.
In January, 1934, the Institute published a pamphlet titled "Audits of
Corporate Accounts" that contained the correspondence between the In
stitute's committee and the Committee on Stock List of the Exchange. This
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pamphlet resulted in an evolutionary leap in audit report structure that distilled
and introduced major reporting responsibilities that would not be formally
recognized in auditing standards for another 15 years.
These responsibilities are highlighted in the recommended report form.
We have made an examination of the balance sheet of the XYZ
Company as at December 31, 1933, and of the statement of income and
surplus for the year 1933. In connection therewith, we examined or
tested accounting records of the Company and other supporting
evidence and obtained information and explanations from officers and
employees of the Company; we also made a general review of the
accounting methods and of the operating and income accounts for the
year, but we did not make a detailed audit of the transactions.
In our opinion, based upon such examination, the accompanying
balance sheet and related statements of income and surplus fairly
present, in accordance with accepted principles of accounting consis
tently maintained by the company during the year under review, its
position at December 31, 1933, and the results of its operations for the
year.
8

This report was in marked contrast to its predecessors. For the first time,
the report referred to the financial statements as the object of examination
rather than books or accounts. The concept of testing was explicitly mentioned
in the report and additional detail concerning the scope of the audit was
included.
The opinion paragraph continued to emphasize that an opinion rather than a
guarantee was being given. This paragraph also introduced the concept of
accepted accounting principles as a standard against which fair presentation
could be measured. In fact, the report would seem to resolve the rather recent
debate over the meaning of the phrase "present fairly in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles." In the above report it is clear that
the phrase "in accordance with accepted principles of accounting'' modifies the
term "fairly present," indicating that the committee was unwilling to use the
phrase "fairly present" alone. This lends historical legitimacy to the conten
tion that the phrase "present fairly in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles" in the current standard report defines a single standard
for judging accounting presentations.
The opinion paragraph also introduced a reference to consistency. Since
the adopted accounting methods were to be consistently applied under the
NYSE requirements, the auditor was given responsibility for reporting on
adherence to this requirement.
Another significant accomplishment of the Institute's committee was the
recommendation that the new form of report be adopted as a "standard"
report. The committee recognized a need for uniformity in the language of the
auditor's report. This uniformity was intended to accomplish two objectives:
(1) give a definite form to audit report language among audit firms, making the
reports comparable and reducing the possibility for misunderstanding arising
from vagaries in report wording, and (2) make qualifications in audit reports
more easily recognizable.
The publication of "Audits of Corporate Accounts" exemplified the
profession's desire and ability to exercise initiative in improving financial
6

reporting and auditing. Although the pamphlet's requirements could only be
enforced by the NYSE against listed companies and their auditors, it became
apparent that the financial statements and auditors' reports of unlisted
companies might be considered deficient unless the requirements had been
met. Thus, the audit report continued to be used as a force for change in
professional practice. The standard wording tended to be used in all audit
engagements
Landmark V—The Securities Acts and McKesson & Robbins
The efforts of the AIA and the NYSE during the 1932-1934 correspondence
occurred in an environment of severe public criticism of thefinancialcommu
nity and corporate management. In response to this concern the Congress
passed a series of securities acts and created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to administer them. The acts placed a new and substantial
responsibility on the accounting profession from both the standpoint of
increased legal liability and from the need to improve professional standards for
both accounting and auditing.
Although the SEC was vested with the authority to prescribe accounting
principles and the form and content of the auditor's report, it decided, partly
due to the persuasiveness of Institute representatives, to leave the initiative to
the profession. The SEC declined to prescribe the exact form of the auditor's
report: "Instead we ask for a certificate that shall be illuminating both as to the
scope of the audit and the quality of the accounting principles employed by the
registrant."
As part of its efforts to take the initiative in developing accounting and
auditing standards, the Institute revised the Federal Reserve Bulletin in 1936.
Although the bulletin expanded the discussion of internal control and its relation
to audit tests, no revision in the suggested form of report was made.
Practicing accountants had just begun to implement the guidance in the
revised bulletin when the McKesson & Robbinsfraudsurfaced. The SEC held
hearings to (1) determine the detail and scope of the audit conducted, (2) the
extent to which the prevailing standards of audit procedure had been followed,
and (3) the adequacy of accepted auditing procedures. One outcome of this
inquiry was an AIA requirement for confirmation of receivables and observation
of physical inventory taking.
The SEC's report was not released until 1940 and by that time the AIA had
adopted modifications of several positions taken in the 1936 bulletin. The
modifications were published in a pamphlet titled "Extensions of Auditing
Procedure" which was reissued as the first of a series of Statements on
Auditing Procedure (SAP No. 1) to be issued by the Institute.
The new statement, recognizing the results of the SEC's investigation,
modified the auditor's standard report as follows:
9

We have examined the balance sheet of the ABC Company as of
December 31, 1939, and the statements of income and surplus for the
fiscal year then ended; have reviewed the system of internal control and
the accounting procedures of the company, and, without making a
detailed audit of the transactions, have examined or tested accounting
7

records of the company and other supporting evidence by methods and
to the extent we deemed appropriate.
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and related state
ments of income and surplus present fairly the position of ABC
Company at December 31, 1939, and the results of its operations for
the fiscal year, in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding
year.
10

The substantive changes in the new report were in the scope paragraph.
However, what was intended as an editorial improvement in the opinion
paragraph would later prove to be a major subject of debate within the
profession.
The scope paragraph revision emphasized review of internal control as an
essential element in the audit and implicitly justified the auditor's reliance on
the system in lieu of detailed testing. This reference to internal control
preceded any widespread use of control strengths to reduce the extent of
testing. The new report wording acted as a catalyst to modify practice just as
much as it informed readers about an audit characteristic. In addition, the
concept of professional judgment was made explicit in the scope paragraph by
reference to the gathering of evidence by the auditing "methods" and extent
of testing deemed appropriate.
The opinion paragraph revision transposed the words "fairly" and "pres
ent" and separated "in conformity with GAAP" from "present fairly." The
reason for repositioning the reference to GAAP was to clarify the meaning of
the consistency reference. Some accountants apparently believed that "con
sistently maintained during the year," in the previous report, did not relate the
principles for the current year to those for the prior year. The changed wording
removed that confusion, but clouded the relationship between fair presentation
and GAAP.
The issuance of SAP 1 also introduced a new report category: the withheld
opinion. Prior to SAP 1 it was a common reporting practice to specify the
accounting deficiencies, omission of audit procedures or other similar limita
tions in the auditor's report and then introduce the final expression of opinion
with wording such as "subject to the foregoing." The report thus left to third
parties the decision as to what extent they could rely on the financial
statements as a whole.
With the issuance of SAP 1, accountants were prohibited from rendering an
opinion onfinancialstatements, taken as a whole, when the deficiencies in the
statements or the limitations on the scope of their engagement would not
warrant such an opinion. SAP 1 purged from practice the type of report in
which the auditor expressed an opinion on thefinancialstatements after stating
all the exceptions and limitations under which the opinion was expressed by
requiring the following:
The independent certified public accountant should not express the
opinion that financial statements present fairly the position of the
company and the results of its operations, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles, when his exceptions are such as to
negative the opinion, or when his examination has been less in scope
than he considered necessary.
11
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SAP 1 did not, however, preclude the type of report in which the CPA
indicated the extent of work performed and the findings as a result of that
work. In fact, the statement explicitly recognized this type of report by stating
that under the circumstances of a limited scope engagement:
. . . the independent certified public accountant should limit his
report to a statement of hisfindingsand, if appropriate, his reasons for
omitting an expression of opinion.
12

The phrase "if appropriate" permitted the auditor to issue a report that
neither expressed an opinion nor disclaimed one.
Landmark VI—The Introduction of GAAS
The McKesson case had focused the attention of the SEC on auditing more
sharply than before. In a 1939 speech before the Institute's annual meeting,
William Werntz, the chief accountant, noted:
In contrast to the time we have spent on accounting principles,
there have been few cases before us involving the question of whether a
reasonable audit was made.
He then went on to discuss the underlying concepts of independent auditing,
including the qualifications of the auditor, such as independence, the relative
responsibility of management and the auditor for financial statements, and
reliance on internal control.
The Committee on Auditing Procedure consulted with the SEC and agreed
that a distinction should be made between auditing standards and the pro
cedures necessary to meet those standards. It was believed that SAPs
contained both standards and procedures but that the distinction had not been
clearly drawn.
The committee immediately began work on a statement of formal auditing
standards. However, the committee's work was interrupted by the demands
made on the profession by World War II and the effort to establish standards
was not renewed until 1947.
Meanwhile, in 1941, the SEC amended Regulation S-X by requiring
changes in the auditor's report, one of which was a statement as to whether
"the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
applicable in the circumstances." Consequently the Institute recommended
adding the following words to the scope paragraph in the auditor's report:
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards applicable in the circumstances and included all
procedures we considered necessary.
Thus, the reference to generally accepted auditing standards appeared in the
auditor's report eight years before the Institute formally adopted them. Since
the reference to GAAS preceded any extensive development of the written
expression of these standards, the report wording served to spur that
development.
Shortly after the addition was made to the report, it was recognized that,
since auditing standards were of general application, the phrase "applicable in
9

the circumstances" was inappropriate in this context. Accordingly, this
sentence was changed to read:
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and included all procedures which we considered
necessary in the circumstances.
In 1948, after years of experience and after the Institute membership had
formally adopted auditing standards, a further revision of the report was
approved as follows:
We have examined the balance sheet of ABC Company as of
December 31, 1949, and the related statements of income and surplus
for the year then ended. Our examination was made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such
tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as
we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statements of
income and surplus present fairly thefinancialposition of ABC Company
at December 31, 1949, and the results of its operations for the year
then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.
13

The major distinction between this report and its predecessor was the
omission of the reference to reliance on internal control and testing and
sampling. Since these aspects of an audit were believed to be widely accepted,
it was no longer considered necessary to explicitly refer to them in the report.
The change in practice intended by the original wording had occurred.
During the ten years from 1939 to 1949, the profession's attention also
focused on modifications of the "standard" report. Although SAP 1 made clear
that the CPA should withhold an opinion in certain circumstances, a disclaimer
of opinion was not explicitly required. Many CPAs issued reports that recited
their procedures in considerable detail but did not say whether the audit
described was sufficient to express an opinion. The mere absence of remarks
concerning the statements presumably indicated that the auditor took no
responsibility for them.
In recognition of the need to clarify reporting responsibilities, SAP 23 was
adopted by the Institute in 1947. The statement modified SAP No. 1 as follows:
The independent certified public accountant should not express the
opinion that financial statements present fairly the position of the
company and the results of its operations, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles, when his exceptions are such as to
negative the opinion, or when the examination has been less in scope
than he considers necessary to express an opinion on the statements
taken as a whole. In such circumstances, the independent certified
public accountant should state that he is not in a position to express an
opinion on thefinancialstatements taken as a whole and should indicate
clearly his reasons therefor.
14

SAP 23 also specified the choices of report types available to the auditor:
(1) an unqualified opinion, (2) a qualified opinion, of (3) a disclaimer of opinion.
The statement indicated that the significance of the exceptions should be the
criteria used to select the appropriate report type.
10

Although the primary focus of SAP 23 was the requirement that a
disclaimer be expressly stated when no opinion could be rendered, the
pronouncement also contained the first authoritative recognition of unaudited
financial statements. The recognition was in the form of a dispensation to the
CPA regarding the requirement that a written disclaimer accompany financial
statements on which no opinion could be expressed. In setting forth the
disclaimer requirement, the Committee on Auditing Procedure stated:
However, when financial statements prepared without audit are
presented on the accountant's stationery without comment by the
accountant, a warning; such as "Prepared from the Books Without
Audit,'' appearing prominently on each page of thefinancialstatements
is considered sufficient.
15

This exemption was not contained in the exposure draft of SAP 23, but was
added to the final statement based on practitioners' comments on the exposure
draft. This exception pertained to unaudited financial statements only when
they were presented on the accountant's stationery without his comments.
Thus, the use of plain paper was tacitly permitted and a written disclaimer was
required only if the CPA commented on the financial statements prepared
without audit.
The evolution of a standard report had set the stage for the development of
other report forms that could be considered as having special significance. In
1954, in the Institute pronouncement Generally Accepted Auditing Standards,
the position set forth in SAP 23 was officially recognized as the fourth standard
of reporting.
Landmark VII—The Adverse Opinion
In 1961, formal recognition was given to a distinct new modification of the
standard report. SAP 31, "Consistency," created a new report category
under the caption "change to a principle or practice which lacks general
acceptance":
Where the effect of a change to a principle or practice which is not
generally accepted is material, the independent auditor should so state
in his report. Such statement requires either a qualification of the
independent auditor's opinion as to fair presentation in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles or, if the change is sufficiently
material, an adverse opinion on the financial statements taken as a
whole.
16

A year later, 1962, SAP 32 was issued which contained the following
definition of an adverse opinion and the criteria for when one should be issued:
An adverse opinion is required in any report where the exceptions
as to fairness of presentation are so material that in the independent
auditor's judgment a qualified opinion is not justified. In such circum
stances a disclaimer of opinion is not considered appropriate since the
independent auditor has sufficient information to form an opinion that
the financial statements are not fairly presented.
17
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This modification of reporting standards was aimed at prohibiting the auditor
from disclaiming an opinion to avoid the more definitive and perhaps, from the
client's viewpoint, more distasteful adverse opinion.
SAP 32 was not restricted to adverse opinions. It was a comprehensive
statement that sharpened the auditor's reporting responsibilities under the
fourth standard of reporting. In addition to defining the four types of audit
reports the statement discussed unaudited statements, piecemeal opinions,
negative assurance, reliance on other auditors and the distinction between the
"except for" and the "subject to" forms of qualification.
The distinction between "except for" and "subject to" qualifications had
particular significance. Prior to SAP 32, both types of reports were used
interchangeably for all types of exceptions. The difficulty this practice posed
for assessing the significance of qualifying phrases in the opinion paragraph was
undoubtedly a critical consideration in the SEC's conclusions in ASR 90:
A "subject to" or "except for" opinion paragraph in which these
phrases refer to the scope of the audit, indicating that the accountant
has not been able to satisfy himself on some significant element in the
financial statements is not acceptable in certificates filed with the Commission in connection with the public offering of securities. The
"subject to" qualification is appropriate when the reference is to a
middle paragraph or to footnotes explaining the status of matters which
cannot be resolved at statement date.
When the Committee on Auditing Procedure issued SAP No. 32, they
adopted a similar position. However, the committee was not merely endorsing
the SEC's view. Some time prior to the issuance of ASR No. 90, the
committee had submitted a draft of SAP 32 to the SEC that contained this
reporting guideline. Thus, the profession took the initiative in creating this
reporting distinction.
SAP 32 also was the first official pronouncement to contain a section
specifically devoted to unaudited statements. Although discussion of unaudited
statements was brief, several new guidelines and requirements were ad
vanced.
SAP 32 contained the first authoritative definition of unaudited financial
statements. In addition, the pronouncement required that such financial
statements with which the auditor is in any way associated be marked on each
page as unaudited whether accompanied by the auditor's comments or not.
The committee also expressed its preference that a disclaimer accompany all
unaudited statements and required a disclaimer when such statements were
accompanied by the CPA's comments.
These reporting requirements were virtually the same as those set forth in
SAP 23. The term "in any way associated," however, appeared for the first
time in SAP 32. Since association was not defined, many CPAs continued to
follow plain paper reporting practices under the view that, since the accoun
tant's name did not appear in connection with the statements, there was no
association with them.
Two years after the release of SAP 32, the subject of unaudited statements
was again on the agenda of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. Concern
arose because SAP 32 left unresolved certain questions concerning the
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term "association," the definition of unaudited statements, the propriety of
plain paper, and the CPA's association with false or misleading statements.
These concerns ultimately led to the publication of SAP 38 in 1967, the first
statement devoted entirely to unaudited financial statements.
SAP 32 was the culmination of a trend in the increasing explicitness of
reporting guidelines for audit reports that began with SAP 1. Specifying that an
opinion should be withheld in certain circumstances was not enough (SAP 1).
The need to disclaim also had to be specified (SAP 23). Requiring the auditor to
disclose the reasons for a disclaimer was insufficient. An adverse category of
reports had to be established to avoid concealment of important information
(SAP 32). A distinction in the types of qualifications was articulated to clarify
the category of exception being reported (SAP 32). This trend has continued to
develop in the reporting guidelines for limited assurance engagements.
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Landmark VIII—The Seven-Year Scratch
Although the 1949 version of the standard report underwent minor
modifications, such as substituting the term "retained earnings" for the word
"surplus" and adding the statement of changes in financial position as a basic
financial statement, no major efforts to revise the report occurred until 1965.
In that year an itch developed to revise the report that was scratched for seven
years.
The impetus for revision came from increased criticism of the accounting
profession due to widely publicized audit failures and growing litigation against
audit firms. Many accountants believed the criticism and litigation were based
on misunderstanding of the auditor's function and the meaning of the auditor's
report. In 1964, the AICPA's public relations counsel stated:
Too many stockholders haven't the foggiest idea what your certifi
cate means, and, if I may say so, I think the time is ripe for its revision
in layman's language and in the light of changed circumstances in the
past 30 years—particularly that of wide stock ownership.*
The Committee on Auditing Procedure focused on four major areas for
potential revision:
• The inherent limitations of financial statements and the nature of
generally accepted accounting principles.
• The description of audit scope.
• The distinction between the responsibilities of management and the
auditor.
• The meaning of "present fairly . . . in conformity with G A A P . "
Financial Statement Limitations and the Nature of GAAP. The committee
was concerned that the auditor's report did not adequately describe the
judgments required by GAAP and the resulting limitations on financial state
ments. Through a series of successive proposed SAPs, the committee
attempted to create standard report wording to capture these concepts.
* Note that over thirty years after "certificate" was taken out of the report, the AICPA public
relations staff still used the term.
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Ultimately, the committee abandoned the effort to describe GAAP and the
limitations of financial statements in the auditor's report. This decision was
rationalized on the basis of APB Statement No. 4 and APB Opinion No. 22.
Statement No. 4 presented the basic concepts and accounting principles
underlyingfinancialstatements. Opinion No. 22 required disclosure of signifi
cant accounting policies. The committee believed that these pronouncements
might be relied on to communicate the nature of GAAP andfinancialstatement
limitations. However, this judgment was undoubtedly colored by the difficulty
experienced by the committee in trying to agree on a concise description of
these matters in the auditor's report.
Description of Audit Scope. The committee was concerned with whether the
nature and limitations of an audit were adequately described in the auditor's
report. It proposed revisions in the scope paragraph in three major areas:
1. The phrase "We have examined" was believed to lack precision.
The committee recommended the phrase "We have audited."
2. The term "generally accepted auditing standards" did not, in the
committee's judgment, specify the particular standards being re
ferred to or their source. The committee suggested that the phrase
"of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants" be
added immediately following the term "generally accepted auditing
standards."
3. The committee believed that the phrase " . . . and accordingly,
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances" was
too ambiguous. It felt the concepts of testing, evidence and auditor
judgment needed greater emphasis in the report. The committee
proposed the alternative phrase "Accordingly, we applied auditing
procedures to thefinancialstatements and to the underlying data and
transactions selected by us from the company's records; we con
sider the auditing procedures to be of the nature and to the extent
sufficient to provide a basis for our opinion expressed below."
Distinction Between Management and Auditor Responsibilities. In the
committee's judgment, the scope paragraph did not adequately convey the
distinction between management's responsibility for the financial statements
and the auditor's responsibility for the conduct of the audit and expression of an
opinion. To overcome this defect, the committee recommended that the
phrase "these statements are based on the Company's records and other
representations of the Company's management" be inserted in the scope
paragraph.
"Present Fairly . . . In Conformity with GAAP." The repositioning of the
terms "present fairly" and "in conformity with GAAP," created an unfortu
nate legacy for the accounting profession. The committee believed that the
term "present fairly" was open to too many interpretations as reflected in
legal decisions and critical articles. The committee recommended the phrase
be deleted and replaced with "present in all material respects."
The culmination of the seven-year deliberation over the standard report
resulted in the following recommended report:
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of XYZ Company
as of December 31, 1972, and the related statements of income,
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shareholders' equity, and changes infinancialposition for the years then
ended. These statements are based on the Company's records and
other representations of the Company's management. Our audit was
made in accordance with the generally accepted auditing standards of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Accordingly, we
applied auditing procedures to the financial statements and to the
underlying data and transactions selected by us from the Company's
records; we consider the auditing procedures to be of the nature and to
the extent sufficient to provide a basis for our opinion expressed below.
In our opinion, the financial statements mentioned above present in
all material respects the financial position of XYZ Company at Decem
ber 31, 1972, and the results of its operations and the changes in its
financial position for the years then ended in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis.
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Although a substantial consensus existed within the committee that a
revised report would better communicate the auditor's responsibilities, the
efforts to arrive at a solution failed. Many committee members, based on the
advice of the AICPA's public relations division, believed that:
• Proposed revisions, while technically correct, had unacceptable public
relations implications for the public and regulatory agencies.
• Legal interpretations of the auditor's function, role and respon
sibilities would probably not be altered by a more precise description
of those attributes in the auditor's report.
• The increasing effect of "consumerism" presented an unacceptable
environment in which to attempt to describe limitations of the
auditor's responsibilities in a revised report.
The belief that the report needed revision to improve its communicative
abilities was overshadowed by concern that various segments of the public
might view the revision as an attempt by the profession to dilute its
responsibilities. The increased visibility of the auditor's report raised a new
obstacle to its revision. Proposed changes in the report, unlike those of
previous revisions, were beginning to fall under the scrutiny of financial
statement preparers and users. The profession now had to consider how these
parties might perceive not only the new wording but also the motives
underlying the proposed changes.
Landmark IX—SAS 5
In 1975, the auditing standard setting body took a somewhat different
approach to clarifying the auditor's standard report. Instead of changing the
wording in the report, an SAS was issued to deal with the persistent problem of
what was meant by "present fairly . . . in conformity with GAAP." Since
previous attempts to find substitute wording for this phrase were unsuccessful,
the issuance of an SAS in effect interpreted the meaning of the phrase while
leaving it intact in the report.
SAS 5 was intended to accomplish several objectives. First, it gave
guidance to the auditor in fulfilling the responsibility for forming an opinion as to
whetherfinancialstatements present fairly in conformity with GAAP. Second,
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a formal statement on auditing standards elaborating on this concept made
explicit what the accounting profession believed the auditor's responsibility
was. Finally, publication of a standard dealing with the concept provided a
limited means of informing other third parties, such as report users, what the
auditor intended in this part of the report.
Although SAS 5 defined generally accepted accounting principles, the
substantive guidance concerned how the auditor was to judge the "fairness" of
the overallfinancialstatements. The SAS specified that fairness should be
judged within the framework of GAAP and that this judgment involved
determining that:
• The accounting principles used have general acceptance.
• The accounting principles applied are appropriate in the circum
stances.
• Thefinancialstatements contain the appropriate disclosure.
• The financial statements present the substance of the events and
transactions within an acceptable range of approximation.
Although SAS 5 likely accomplished the objectives of providing guidance to
auditors about the meaning of "present fairly in conformity with GAAP" and
establishing the profession's interpretation of the phrase, it is doubtful if the
SAS contributed much toward educating report readers. The technical orienta
tion of an SAS and its limited distribution make it an ineffective tool for
communicating with report users.
Landmark X—Reports on Comparative Statements
SAS 15, issued in 1977, redefined the meaning of the reference in the
fourth standard of reporting tofinancialstatements "taken as a whole." The
SAS concluded that the phrase should be considered to apply not only to the
current periodfinancialstatements but also to the statements of one or more
prior periods presented on a comparative basis with those of the current
period.
This clarification introduced the concepts of "continuing auditor" and
"updating a report." The significance of this SAS was to require an auditor
who had examined the financial statements of the current period and one or
more consecutive periods immediately prior to the current period to reexpress a previous opinion or, if circumstances warranted, to express a
different opinion from that previously expressed on the prior year statements.
In effect, the auditor was explicitly required to consider information obtained
during the examination of the current-period statements as that information
might relate to prior-period comparative statements.
The resulting standard report was:
We have examined the balance sheets of ABC Company as of
December 31, 19X2 and 19X1, and the related statements of income,
retained earnings, and changes infinancialposition for the years then
ended. Our examinations were made in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the
accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we consid
ered necessary in the circumstances.
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In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present
fairly the financial position of ABC Company as of December 31, 19X2
and 19X1, and the results of its operations and the changes in its
financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis.
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The report change reflected the auditor's new reporting responsibilities for
comparative statements. However, the major revision in report wording was
to put appropriate phrases in the plural form. The basic wording of the report
remained unchanged.
Landmark XI—Another Seven-Year Itch
Seven years after the 1972 proposed revision, the Auditing Standards
Board (ASB) again began considering a revised standard report. The impetus
for this consideration stemmed from the recommendations of the Cohen
Commission. The commission, relying partly on research and partly on
congressional and regulatory studies, stated:
Evidence abounds that communication between the auditor and
users of his work—especially the auditor's standard report—is un
satisfactory . . . Recent research suggests that many users misunder
stand the auditor's role and responsibility, and the present standard
report only adds to the confusion.
Thus, it was largely the same reasons that caused the 1972 revision to be
considered that gave rise to the ASB's new deliberations.
After extensive research, public hearings and deliberation, the ASB issued
an exposure draft of a revised report. The recommended report was:
Independent Auditor's Report
The accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and
changes in financial position for the year then ended are management's
representations. An audit is intended to provide reasonable, but not
absolute, assurance as to whetherfinancialstatements taken as a whole
are free of material misstatements. We have audited the financial
statements referred to above in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards. Application of those standards requires judgment in
determining the nature, timing and extent of tests and other procedures
and in evaluating the results of those procedures.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present
thefinancialposition of X Company as of December 31, 19XX, and the
results of its operations and the changes in its financial position for the
year then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.
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The major changes from the existing form of report were:
• Add a title containing the word independent.
• Add an assertion that the financial stateents are the representations
of management.
• Add a statement that "an audit is intended to provide reasonable but
not absolute, assurance as to whether thefinancialstatements taken
as a whole are free of material misstatements."
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• Replace the word "examined" with the word "audited."
• Include in the scope paragraph a statement that "Application of
[generally accepted auditing standards] requires judgment in deter
mining the nature, timing and extent of tests and other procedures
and in evaluating the results of those procedures."
• Delete the word "fairly" from the opinion paragraph.
• Delete the reference to the consistency of application of accounting
principles.
Since several of these proposed revisions were the same ones considered
in 1972, there seems to be agreement that these aspects of the report should
be changed. The disagreement concerns how the changes should be made.
The ASB was no more successful than the Committee on Auditing Procedure
in reaching a consensus on the form of revision.
The board received an unprecedented number of comment letters on the
exposure draft. Although each of the proposed changes had merit for some
people, the total effect of the changes was apparently not seen as an
improvement. While the exposure draft stressed that the proposed report
would not change the auditor's responsibilities in conducting an audit nor alter
the basis for forming an opinion, many commentators and, ultimately, board
members decided that the proposed report would be seen as an effort to
reduce the auditor's responsibility. The overall reaction to the report was that
it was too negative.
Although many of the suggested changes faced opposition, the controversy
boiled down to deletion of the word "fairly" in the opinion paragraph. One of
the most frequent comments given in support of retaining "fairly'' was that it
provided a good way to convey the notions of GAAP's inexactitude and the
auditor's judgment. Others opposed deletion because they believed it would
make the auditor's report seem less like an endorsement of the financial
statements. Still others believed that "fairly" was meaningful both to the
public and to the courts and that its deletion would result in confusion rather
than clarification.
Those who favored deleting "fairly" believed it was the primary source of
confusion in the report. They felt the term implied that the auditor was taking
more responsibility than intended. That is, that the term suggested the auditor
was, in effect, forming two opinions: one as to fairness and another as to
conformity with GAAP. Others who favored deletion felt the term was either
redundant or so nebulous as to be meaningless.
The pivotal factor in the proposed revision was whether the lack of
precision in the term "fairly" was a fatal fault or an irreplaceable virtue.
Ultimately, a majority of the board preferred to retain "fairly." In view of that
preference, the board decided that it would not be worthwhile to consider
revising the scope paragraph if the opinion paragraph would retain "fairly."
The board believed that it was unlikely that further deliberations would result in
significant enough improvement of the report to warrant the cost of change.
Landmark ??
The auditor's standard report has remained essentially unchanged for the
last 33 years. The status quo has persisted in spite of what appears to be
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widespread agreement that the standard report is not understood by users and
could be improved to better communicate the role and responsibilities of the
auditor. Why?
One reason is the vehement disagreement over how the report should be
worded to achieve better understanding and communication. This is apparent
from the last two major efforts to revise the report.
Another perhaps less apparent reason might be that there is disagreement
over whether the major objective of the report is to communicate to users the
role and responsibilities of the auditor. Auditors may be more concerned with
the protective qualities of the report than with its communicative qualities. The
language in the current report has been interpreted in court decisions and has a
known effect. Readers, although they may not fully understand the significance
of the report, are at least accustomed to the wording. There may be little
direct value to auditors from better comunication, but a great deal of exposure
to unknown consequences if the report is changed.
There are no major calls for report revision from parties outside the
profession. The dormant nature of the report over the past three decades has
caused readers to view it as a symbol. Proposals to alter that symbol receive a
careful scrutiny from parties outside the profession who are concerned that
auditors may be redefining their responsibilities and shifting some of them to
others. The report is much more visible than it was in the early days of the
profession. Changes in the report no longer lie solely within the profession's
domain.
The next landmark in audit reporting probably will not focus on revising the
auditor's report on financial statements. Instead, it is likely that the report will
be expanded to cover financial information not currently included. Areas such
as supplementary information and current value financial presentations repre
sent possibilities. The only safe bet is that the evolution will continue.
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Discussant's Response to
The Evolution of Audit Reporting
J. Alex Milburn
Clarkson Gordon, Toronto
I read this paper, and then sat back and thought about how to go about
commenting on it. I had to recognize that I faced some formidable disadvan
tages. First, the subject of the paper is the evolution of audit reporting in the
United States—and I am an accountant from a remote foreign land. Second, the
authors could not be more knowledgeable on the subject. Doug Carmichael, in
particular, has been part of this evolution for quite some time. Who could know
better than the authors how the audit report has evolved? I can hardly
challenge their facts and they are clearly in a much better position than I to
interpret these facts.
Buoyed up by these thoughts, I began by asking myself some basic first
principle kinds of questions—like what am I doing here? I thought about
questioning the purposes of tracing this evolution in the first place. What is the
interest in it? What good can come of it? Perhaps I can set up some ideal
purposes that the paper cannot meet. Certainly, I need some basis for judging
whether this is a good evolution evaluation or not. Otherwise it is like trying to
judge "presents fairly" without " G A A P . "
Naturally, I turned to the FASB conceptual framework. (This is the beauty
of this developing framework—everything can be explained by it.) I think there
is some application of the FASB framework to this paper. In particular, I
presume that the paper attempts to present historical information in a way that
will help us evaluate the profession's past performance and future prospects.
Perhaps the paper's usefulness should be judged in terms of whether it helps
us to see what audit reporting may be evolving towards, and in terms of
whether it improves our basis for making decisions as to desirable future
efforts towards improving reporting standards. So we might ask whether this
paper is useful in this sense.
As I thought more about this, another basic question occurred to me—what
are the authors really trying to demonstrate here? Is there a hidden agenda? I
get the impression of a feeling of a little frustration, and perhaps a touch of
bewilderment, on the part of the authors. A basic message in the paper is that
there have been no significant improvement changes in the audit report in 33
years and that to them "a crucial question is why" (p. 1). They cite significant
evidence of misunderstanding of the audit report going back to the mid
1960's—and they describe two major attempts at revision since then that have
failed. Thus, they raise some serious concerns.
Focus of the Paper
I think it very important to identify the focus of this paper because I am
going to argue that it is too narrow. The authors have concentrated on the
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annual financial statement audit report. Their primary measure of progress
seems to be improvement changes in the wording of this audit report. They
trace the evolution from the undefined, diverse practices of the early 1900's
through various stages, which might be summed up as follows:
• Progress in defining and developing audit standards for an engage
ment—which came to be symbolized by the phrase "generally
accepted auditing standards" (GAAS).
• Steps towards trying to clarify the accounting basis for the financial
statements within the evolving concept of "generally accepted
accounting principles" (GAAP).
• Gradual specification of distinguishable reporting sub-types to cover
all possible signals that the auditor should give with respect to an
engagement—the unqualified opinion, types of qualified opinions, the
disclaimer of opinion and the adverse opinion.
In other words, the authors trace a process of definition, improvement of
concepts, standardization, solidification.
To me it is not too surprising to find that changes in the audit report took
place more quickly in earlier years, as the engagement itself was in the process
of being developed, and that increasing resistance to change arose as auditing
matured—became set in terms of legal requirements, precedents and profes
sional rules.
Within the framework chosen (the annualfinancialstatement audit engage
ment) I find the paper well done and interesting. I think it instructive and most
useful to have the knowledgeable and experienced perspective on events that
Doug Carmichael and Alan Winters bring to it.
A Broader Perspective
However, I suggest that the authors take too narrow a perspective of
"audit reporting." I will try to demonstrate that, had they taken a broader
view of audit reporting and its evolution, they would have ended up with a very
different and, I think, a more useful perspective on past events and future
prospects and opportunities.
When I saw the title "The Evolution of Audit Reporting,'' I expected the
paper would deal with all forms of attest reporting, rather than only the financial
statement audit. I presume, though, that the authors' orientation was valid in
the beginning—that the audit of annual financial statements was, in the early
stages of this evolution, the basic, if not sole, mission of the auditor. But audit
reporting began to evolve beyond this one engagement some time ago.
In fact, the paper does mention some evidence of this broadening. In my
view a key point in their analysis is Landmark VII. Its primary focus is the
1961-2 defining of the adverse opinion in SAP 32. The authors note in passing,
though, that the SAP also discussed unaudited statements, piecemeal opinions
and negative assurance. They end up their discussion of this Landmark by
pointing out that a "trend has continued to develop in the reporting guidelines
for limited assurance engagements." But they relegated this to a passing
reference and did not follow it up.
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I suggest that in passing by this area they have ignored evidence of the
formal beginnings of a major development in audit reporting. Some important
things began to come together in the early to mid 1960's. Perhaps the impetus
was the growing consumerism which was becoming evident then—and that this
resulted in pressures for increased accountability by corporate entities to a
wider public. In any event, there began to be pressures for public companies to
provide information beyond annual financial statements for various user
purposes. With this came commensurate pressures upon the public accounting
profession to provide some degree of independent assurance on certain of this
information. As pointed out by the Cohen Commission Report, the profession
first reacted cautiously and negatively to any expansion of the auditor's r o l e viewing any association with other than a GAAS financial statement audit as
fraught with dangers for user misunderstanding and legal liability. (This
negativism is in contrast with the authors' generalfindingthat the profession's
financial statement audit reporting tended to lead practice developments.) The
profession had good reason for concern in the US, as these were litigious
times. But despite this negative professional reaction, important changes
began to take place. At first these took ad hoc, diverse and somewhat
inconsistent forms, just as with the early editions of the financial statement
audit report. But this evolution has recently been taking a more comprehensive
general shape.
Some Evolutionary Developments
Let me cite some evidence of this wider evolution by reference to the then
emerging reporting approach referred to as "negative assurance." As far as I
can see, the concept of "negative assurance" reporting was first given official
recognition in the early to mid 1960's in the narrowly defined context of the
"comfort letter" for underwriters on unaudited financial information and
statistical data in prospectuses. This, and similar reporting forms, soon began
to spread to other areas. Three examples:
• Published interimfinancialinformation. (The evolution of professional
reporting in this area is a particularly interesting one. It first emerged
as a public issue in 1974 when Coopers & Lybrand stepped forward
and proposed that auditors should be willing, subject to certain
conditions, to provide limited assurance to shareholders on published
interim statements. The reactions throughout the rest of the profes
sion were so adverse that Coopers & Lybrand had to withdraw their
proposal, but look where we have evolved to since then!*)
• So-called "special reports" providing limited assurance on specified
items of financial information, and on compliance with contractual,
statutory or regulatory requirements (given recognition by SAS 14).
• Most recently, the development of a "review" engagement to
provide limited assurance on the financial statements of nonpublic
entities (in Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review
Services No. 1, December 1978).
* I traced the evolution of this, and other limited assurance reporting practices, to 1980 in Canada
and the US in Limited Audit Engagements and the Expression of Negative Assurance (Toronto: The
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants), Chapters 2-7.
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What were expressions of negative assurance trying to accomplish? I
suggest that they were the results of a groping by public accountants in
practice for a reporting response to situations where there seemed to be a
legitimate need for some useful degree of assurance, but where a full GAAS
audit was just not possible or was not practicable from a reasonable cost/
benefit viewpoint.
There are many examples of continuing pressures to broaden the audit
function beyond GAAP financial statements and a full GAAS audit—including
reports on internal control systems, assurance on the whole published annual
report, on forecasts, on supplementary oil reserve information, current cost
data, etc., etc.
I suggest that this broader perspective has some potentially interesting
implications for the evolution of audit reporting:
• I suggest that these developments expose a broader attest function
than the traditional financial statement GAAS perspective has allowed
us to see. Attest assurance may be defined in terms of adding a
degree of confidence that there are no material errors in a specified
representation (whether it be financial statements, or whatever).
This suggests that, conceptually, there is a continuum of possible
degrees of audit confidence ranging between one extreme of no
confidence whatsoever, to the other theoretical extreme of 100%
confidence that the particular representation is what it purports to be.
The traditional GAAS financial statement audit is a section of this
continuum, somewhere towards the upper end of the scale. In one
sense what has been evolving is the whole area below this GAAS
audit—the reporting of limited attest assurance. Underlying concepts
and standards in evolution deal with (1) appropriate minimum attest
effort for different types of situations, (2) user acceptance of the risks
of undetected errors in those efforts, and (3) effective communication
of the assurance which results.
• From this perspective, I think it becomes apparent that "generally
accepted auditing standards"—which had been developed as the basic
general attest standards—are incomplete and inadequate.*
In short, I suggest that this broader perspective strongly points to the need to
broaden our attest standards—that the so-called "generally accepted auditing
standards" are really a subset representing only one, albeit important, type of
attest engagement.
I introduce all this to try to support a basic point—that when the authors
implicitly assume audit reporting to be the GAAS audits of annual financial
statements, they lose, in my opinion, a significant aspect of the recent
evolution of audit reporting. They end up seeing a world in which there is little
apparent change, because they are focusing on one fairly mature engagement.
Words and Communication
But suppose we accept the approach of this paper—and it is certainly
legitimate, and potentially very useful, to trace the evolution of the audit report
* For one suggestion as to the direction in which attest standards should be evolving, see the
aforementioned CICA Research Study Limited Audit Assurance and the Expression of Negative
Assurance.

24

on the GAAS audit of annualfinancialstatements. I still have some concern with
the narrowness of their perspective within this approach. There would seem to be
some belief, not only by the authors but by the auditing profession in general, that
the auditor's report is the sole medium of communication with financial statement
users. If one believes this, it would seem to follow that it is essential to try to
perfect the words in that report, and that progress in audit reporting lies in
improving that wording. On the other hand, if one accepts that the report is
basically a symbol (a symbol of a GAAS level of auditor involvement to arrive at
a "positive opinion" level of assurance that the information accords with
GAAP), then one might be less concerned with the exact wording of the
report. Certainly it would be nice to get rid of words that may have different
layman's usage than the meaning intended by the profession—for example, the
word "fairly." Also, it would be nice if we could make more explicit the
independence of the auditor, the pervasiveness of judgment, and the respon
sibilities of management for the reported information. However, it may be
argued that the words themselves become less important if
1. The reporting symbol is recognizable as representing a particular
(GAAS) level of audit effort and auditor standards, and a particular
financial statement representation based on GAAP; and
2. The underlying standards are defensible and defined in a form that
reasonable users have access to and can be expected to be able to
understand.
(Perhaps some might even argue that these objectives could be met with the
reporting symbol being a number or a colour, i.e., without any words.) If one
accepts this reasoning, then the prime responsibilities of the auditing profes
sion become more oriented towards ensuring that:
• Attest standards are defensible and adequately defined, and
• Reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that adequate informa
tion is available to users on these standards and underlying concepts.
What I am suggesting then is that perhaps the authors are too preoccupied
with the wording changes in the report. I say "perhaps," because, in fact, the
paper is not solely preoccupied with report wording. It notes, for example, as
Landmark IX, that in 1975 standard setters took the step of clarifying
"presents fairly in accordance with GAAP" in SAS No. 5 instead of trying to
change the words in the report.
The authors note the resistance to changing the standard form of wording
of the auditor's report, and speculate as to what the reasons may be for this
resistance. I suspect that they are right in suggesting that once the reporting
form became reasonably set (i.e. became a symbol), attempts to change it have
tended to be viewed as attempts to change the meaning of the symbol (what it
is signalling), even if this was not intended.
We cannot ignore some very important concerns that the authors raise
about the understandability of the standard financial statement audit report.
They point to the Cohen Commission and other sources of evidence that the
standard financial statement audit report is misunderstood. But I think there
are at least three possible reasons for this misunderstanding that report
wording is not going to help.
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1. Users may not have done their homework.
2. The standards underlying the engagement may be uncertain, illogical
or contradictory.
3. The profession may not have taken adequate steps to educate its
public.
To the extent that the latter is the case, I suggest that it is unrealistic for the
profession to try to educate the public basically by making changes in the short
form report. In my view, there is just no way that a two-paragraph report can
serve as the sole means of communication with users—that it can adequately
portray such subtleties as judgment in the auditing process, the concept of
"fairness" within GAAP, or the responsibility of management for financial
information. One must look to the underlying body of standards and practices
underlying an engagement to understand these things.
In short, I suggest that we need to have a wider view of audit reporting
communication. Further, I suggest that the paper evidences some significant
developments within the past 33 years, basically in the area of improving and
codifying auditing standards and generally accepted accounting principles. But I
also suggest that a broader analysis that gets away from preoccupation with the
wording exposes deficiencies on the part of the profession in communicating its
standards to its user public, and in educating the public to understand its
reporting symbols.
Summary
In summary, the paper seems to this Canadian to do a good job of tracing
the evolution of the annualfinancialstatement audit report within the param
eters that the authors have assumed. But I think that this is too narrow a focus
within which to view the evolution of audit reporting generally—that we need to
stand back and look at audit reporting within a larger system that includes other
degrees of assurance and other representations, or we miss much of what has
been happening, and the broader implications of this for the future.
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How Not to Communicate Material and Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls*
Wanda A. Wallace
The University of Rochester
In the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) "Statement on With
drawal of Proposal to Require Reports on Internal Accounting Controls" (June
6, 1980) the SEC stated its desire that
. . . the action announced today will encourage further voluntary
initiatives and permit public companies a maximum of flexibility in
experimenting with various approaches to public reporting on internal
accounting control (and) . . . auditor association with such statements,
(p. H-1)
The Commission pointed out that the proposed Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS) on "Reporting on Internal Accounting Control" (issued
December 31, 1979 and adopted as SAS 30 in 1980) provides a framework for
such public reporting. However, while SAS 30 does outline the possible report
forms related to internal accounting control which can be prepared by the CPA,
including the necessity of disclosing material weaknesses and permission to
disclose immaterial weaknesses, if desired, it does not provide any directions
or illustrations of how these disclosures can be communicated in a meaningful
form—particularly to the general public. While experimentation may be
desirable as a means of improving disclosure practices, problems can be
created for companies and auditors alike if the results of these experiments are
misinterpreted.
This paper presents survey evidence which supports the likely diversity in
financial statement users' interpretation of the effect of internal control points
(possible disclosures of material or immaterial weaknesses) on report users'
assessment of management. This evidence, as well as the ranking of the
various possible report forms on internal accounting control which have been
discussed in the literature, provide some direction as to the preferred form and
content of future control disclosures. An analysis is given of the extent to which
prior beliefs may have influenced survey responses with respect to
(1) Auditors' present responsibilities.
(2) The limitations of internal control and audit procedures.
* This paper is based on a research project which was funded by a grant from the Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell Foundation through its Research Opportunities in Auditing Program. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell Foundation.

27

(3) The state of the art in the evaluation of internal accounting control.
(4) The expected costs of expanded study and evaluation of controls.
In addition, the content of disclosure in management reports regarding internal
control and related auditors' responsibilities is analyzed. The results are then
assimilated to draw policy implications for the profession.
Survey Methodology
Before the SEC withdrew its proposal to require reports on internal
accounting control, a survey was conducted of the primary "stakeholder
groups" with regard to internal control disclosure policies. Table 1 summarizes
the basis of selection, demographic characteristics of the groups sampled, and
the response rates. The selected sample is drawn from a number of different
stakeholder groups and different criteria of selection are applied within each
sample group to avoid the selection bias which is possible when only one group
is tested or when asset size of the respondent is the sole criterion of selection.
The demographics of the samples selected were investigated and found to be
similar to publicly reported data available through Heidrick & Struggles, Inc.
(1974 to 1980), other survey data, and casual empiricism regarding the
characteristics of the more general populations from which each sample was
drawn.
Table 2 reports significant differences of opinion across groups regarding
how internal control points which commonly appear in management letters
affect the evaluation of management.
1

Interpretation of Internal Control Points
Specifically, it is of interest that CPAs do not perceive the lack of internal
auditors to be as negative an influence on their assessment of management as
the other respondents. Similarly, CPAs' interpretation of how important the
presence of an audit committee is in evaluating management differs substan
tially from the other respondents. Government respondents are, in combina
tion with the pilot sample respondents, the most willing to accept a periodic
inventory system without penalizing management. Government is harsher in
its evaluation of the significance of all of the internal control points being cited
than all other groups. The repetition of the points between years is considered
a rather severe flaw by mutual fund, government, and management re
spondents. In assessing the effect the size of a company has in evaluating
management, in view of the listed internal control points, the common stock
insurance investment officers, CFAs, and private placement groups give least
attention to the size factor in evaluating a firm's control adequacy. In general,
the "yes" respondents' comments indicated that expectations for smaller
companies' controls are lower than for larger companies, e.g.,
Small companies, particularly privately-held firms may frequently be
managed effectively without many of the formal procedures and
practices described above. (private placement)
However, incomplete consensus on the rationale underlying the response is
indicated by the following marginal comment:
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3.42
(2.54)

1.7
(1.92)

# Audit Committees**
(Range = 0 to 5)

.17
(.39)

32.3
(7.63)

58.2
(10.6)

27. 3%

44

12

# Board of Directors**
(Range = 1 to 8)

CPA Experience
(1 = yes)

Experience
(years)

(δ)

v

Responses
Adjusted Sample

Age
(years)

100

RESPONSE PERCENTAGE =

ADJUSTED SAMPLE:

Questionnaires
Included in
Frequency Table

RESPONSES:

Board of
Directors
& Audit
Committee
Members

--

.069
(.258)

12.33
(5.7)

38.2
(6.5)

51.8%

56

29

Common
Stock
Investment
Officers
(Insurance)

--

0.0
(0.0)

17.9
(9.5)

40.14
(7.11)

47.4%

19

9

Certified
Financial
Analyst

.25
(.50)

16.3
(3.86)

39.0
(5.48)

44.4%

9

4

Mutual
Fund
Analyst

--

--

.75
(.50)

23.5
(9.11)

47.3
(10.3)

80%

5

4

GAO
Employees

--

--

0.0
(0.0)

17.8
(9.53)

46.0
(11.4)

65%

20

13

Commercial
Lending
Officers

SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS

TABLE 1

-

1.0
(0.0)

22.46
(9.68)

47.75
(9.401)

41.2%

34

14

Certified
Public
Accountants

--

--

.33
(1.63)

23.5
(10.61)

45.1
(7.92)

48%

25

12

Controllers
for DJIA
Companies

--

--

.114
(.323)

13.6
(6.6)

39.4
(7.34)

61.4%

57

35

Private
Placement
Investment
Officers
(Insurance)

1.7
(1.9)

3.42
(2.54)

.23
(.424)

18.0
(9.68)

42.94*
(9.89)

49.1%

269

132

Total
Sample

3.0
(2.83)

7.0
(1.41)

.50
(.52)

20.2
(16.5)

32.7
(11.9)

N/A

15

15

Pilot
Interview

©

NOTE:

•Board o f D i r e c t o r and A u d i t Committee members f o r the Dow Jones I n d u s t r i a l Average (DJIA) companies and a random
sample from the D i r e c t o r y o f D i r e c t o r s
•56 Common Stock Investment O f f i c e r s r e p r e s e n t i n g l i f e i n s u r a n c e companies h o l d i n g 80% o f a l l U.S. L i f e Insurance
Companies' a s s e t s
• A l l C e r t i f i e d F i n a n c i a l A n a l y s t members o f The R o c h e s t e r S o c i e t y o f S e c u r i t y A n a l y s t s Inc.
•9 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the s i x l a r g e s t mutual fund companies
•5 p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f members o f the G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e (GAO), who were knowledgeable c o n c e r n i n g i n t e r n a l
c o n t r o l and c u r r e n t SEC a c t i v i t i e s , as i d e n t i f i e d by a GAO s t a f f member
• S e n i o r Commercial Lending O f f i c e r o f the t e n l a r g e s t banks i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s based on permanent c a p i t a l funds,
and ten o f f i c e r s u t i l i z e d i n a p r i o r e x p e r i m e n t a l study who were i d e n t i f i e d as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f s o p h i s t i c a t e d
accounting i n f o r m a t i o n u s e r s by the Robert M o r r i s A s s o c i a t e s ( t h e author i s i n d e b t e d t o P r o f e s s o r Casey o f H a r v a r d
U n i v e r s i t y f o r t h i s sample)
•A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the l a r g e s t 37 CPA f i r m s as i d e n t i f i e d by t h e AICPA ( l e s s 3 f i r m s who i n d i c a t e d time c o n s t r a i n t s
would p r e c l u d e t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n )
• C o n t r o l l e r s o f the DJIA companies (30 l e s s 5 f i r m s t h a t responded t h e i r comments would be s u b m i t t e d d i r e c t l y t o the SEC)
•57 a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i r e c t placement a c t i v i t i e s , a l s o r e p r e s e n t i n g those l i f e i n s u r a n c e companies h o l d i n g 80%
o f U.S. L i f e Insurance Companies' a s s e t s (the author i s i n d e b t e d t o P r o f e s s o r s Benston and Krasney o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f
Rochester f o r t h i s sample)
•The p i l o t sample i n c l u d e d two common s t o c k investment o f f i c e r s o f a mutual fund, s i x managers and p a r t n e r s o f a CPA
f i r m , t h r e e commercial l e n d i n g o f f i c e r s , two c o n t r o l l e r s , and two a u d i t committee/board o f d i r e c t o r members--these
respondents were observed d u r i n g c o m p l e t i o n o f the t e s t i n s t r u m e n t and then i n t e r v i e w e d r e g a r d i n g problems i n
completing the q u e s t i o n n a i r e and s u g g e s t i o n s as t o p o s s i b l e r e v i s i o n s ; some adjustments r e s u l t e d

The b a s i s o f s e l e c t i o n o f the a d j u s t e d samples f o l l o w s :

•These demographic s t a t i s t i c s r e l a t e to the T o t a l M a i l Sample p l u s the P i l o t Sample.
**Numbers correspond t o the q u a n t i t y o f d i f f e r e n t companies on whose board (or a u d i t committee) the respondent c u r r e n t l y s e r v e s .

TABLE 2
EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT (A PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES)
INSTRUCTIONS: The following i s a l i s t of internal control points that might appear in a
management letter issued by an external auditor to a medium-sized client (i.e.,
total sales of the client are approximately $50 million). Please indicate
whether any of these points would affect your view of the quality of managementi.e., the degree to which management i s f u l f i l l i n g i t s responsibilities to
stockholders and creditors.
INTERNAL CONTROL POINTS
Consider each statement independently; c i r c l e your response.
Don't know
None
Slightly negative
Negative
Extremely negative
If i t i s not implemented,
management should be subject
to discipline (e.g., fined
under the foreign Corrupt
Practices Act)

(?)
(N)
(S-)

(-)
(E-)

(D)

Key
Board of Directors & Audit Committee Members
Common Stock Investment Officers (Insurance)
Certified Financial Analysts
Mutual Fund Analysts
Government Employees

(BD)
(CS)
(CFA)
(MUT)
(GOV)

Pilot Sample

(PI)

Commercial Lending Officers
Certified Public Accountants
Controllers for DJIA Companies
Private Placement Investment Officers
TOTAL SAMPLE (Mail)

(CL)
(CPAs)
(MGMT)
(PP)
(T)

Average
Standard Deviation

(μ)
(δ)
2
X

The client does not have an
audit committee.

8.3
3.4

-

-

s-

8.3
6.9
-

25
20.7
44.4

-

_

14.3
2.9
3.8

-

N

-

PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

96.5

60

• .002*

EFFECT ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT:
?**

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

-

35.7
5.7
7.6

50

-

8.3
41.4
33.3
50
25

44.4

33.3

53.8
28.6
25
22.9
28

23.1
21.4
50
40
34.1

E-

33.3
24.1
25
25

-

16.7
25.7
18.2

D

16.7
3.4
11.1
25

11.1

-

2.9
4.5

μ

6

4.0
3.9
3.8
4.8
3.8

1.6
1.1
1.0
.96
.96

3.8

1.0

11.1

3.3
2.6
3.9
3.9
3.7

.48
1.0
.7
1.1
1.13

23.1
8.3
3.8

2

No Response

11.1
-

* χ (chi-square) with i t s significance level i s interpreted as the probability of observing the
sample responses from the nine groups surveyed by mail given they a l l come from a population
with homogeneous attitudes about internal control information. This χ s t a t i s t i c was computed
based on frequency s t a t i s t i c s , although percentages are presented here for ease-of interpretation.
The degrees of freedom reflect the fact that BD had two subgroups: those directors who were
audit committee members and those who were not.
2

**Due to rounding, the percentages may sum to slightly more or less than 100.
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Although a l l officers and
employees take vacations,
control duties and functions
are not performed by other
persons during their absence,
i.e., work i s delayed for the
week.
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

2
χ = 113.7 @ .0000
60

N
3.4

-

8.3
13.8
22.2

-

8.3
27.6
22.2
25

-

PI

7.7

53.8

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

7.7

46.2
35.7
41.7
25.7
28.0

14.3

-

2.9
3.0

14.3
9.8

D

25
27.6
22.2
25
50

33.3
27.6
22.2
50
50

25

30.8

7.7

15.4
42.9
25.0
28.6
28.0

.

6.9

-

13.8
11.1

-

-

33.3
44.8
33.3
25
50

41.7
13.8
22.2
50
50

20.7
22.2
25

7.7

46.2

23.1

23.1

_

7.1

-

7.7
28.6
25.0
22.9
18.9

53.8
35.7
41.7
42.9
41.7

7.7
14.3
16.7
20.0
20.5

-

2.9
3.0

8.3
11.4
7.6

PI

.77

-

3.1
3.3
3.8
3.6
3.7

.60
1.14
.87
1.13
1.12

30.8

4.9
3.5
3.8
4.3
4.5

.79
1.12
1.04
.96
.58

3.6

.96

4.0
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.8

.50
1.24
.91
1.03
1.06

30.8
7.1
8.3

-

2.3

-

8.3
2.9
5.3

25

-

-

-

7.1

-

3.0

-

11.1

-

-

5.3

60

-

E-

D

μ

δ

No Response

8.3
6.9

16.7
44.8
33.3
75
25

41.7
41.4
44.4

25
3.4

4.7
4.4
4.3
3.5
4.8

1.2
.8
1.0
1.0
.5

11.1

-

8.3
3.4
11.1
25

7.7

7.7

38.5

30.8

7.7

_

_

23.1
21.4
16.7
14.3
12.1

23.1
21.4
25.0
34.3
32.6

15.4
7.1
41.7
45.7
36.4

_

-

28.6

-

_

3.0

14.3
8.3
2.9
6.1

-

X

3.4
11.1

-

PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

3.4

-

S-

No authorization procedures exist for the
purchase or sale of
investments.
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

11.1

N

?

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

-

No Response

1.24
1.15
1.2
.96
.58

2
χ = 133.2 @ .000

There i s no internal auditor
or audit staff.
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

-

7.1
25.0
25.7
23.5

_

PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

-

δ

4.6
3.6
3.5
4.3
4.5

2
X = 76.2,60@.08

Employees are not adequately
bonded.
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

μ

E-

S-

8.3
3.4

7.7

_

7.1

-

2.9
3.0

-

2.9
2.3

-

-

75

2

7.7

-

2.9
4.5

-

-

11.1
25

7.7

38.5

46.2

-

15.4
21.4

38.5
21.4
33.3
31.4
32.6

15.4
35.7
58.3
51.4
43.2

-
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1.1
1.4
1.0
.87
1.1

4.5
4.2
4.3
4.5
4.5

1.17
.99
1.6
1.0
.58

4.2

.93

4.0
4.1
4.6
4.3
4.3

.71
1.3
.51
.98
1.0

7.7
30.8
7.1
8.3

-

5.3

60

41.7
48.3
44.4

11.4
9.8

1.1

-

= 82.7 @ .03

25
37.9
11.1
75
50

8.3
6.9
11.1

3.3
4.1
2.6
4.1
4.3
4.1

-

50

16.7

-

-

7.1

-

3.8

-

11.1

-

-

30.8
7.1
8.3

-

5.3

2
The firm has no manual
of operating procedures.

X
?

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

8.3
3.4
11.1

-

PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

N

s-

8.3

8.3
24.1

-

11.1
25

-

2.9
5.3

-

41.7
27.6
33.3
25
25

16.7

7.7

1.6
.9
1.5
1.3
.5
1.0

46.2

15.4

30.8

-

3.7

-

30.8
28.6
25
22.9
21.2

30.8
35.7
33.3
40.0
37.1

7.7
14.3
33.3
34.3
28.0

-

3.7
3.2
4.1
4.0
3.9

.7
1.4
.8
.9
1.1

4.4
3.9
4.3
4.5
5.0

1.68
.96
1.2
.58
0.0

3.4

.96

4.2
4.3
4.3
4.0
4.2

.83
1.25
.79
.92
1.04

2.3

-

7.1

-

2.9
3.8

3.4
11.1

1.5

-

2.9
2.3

15.4

23.1

21.4

14.3
8.3

-

2.9
6.1

-

9.8

58.3
27.6
55.6
50
100

8.3
48.3
11.1
50

17.2
11.1

-

-

46.2

38.5

7.7

15.4
7.1
16.7
14.3
12.1

23.1
28.6
33.3
48.6
34.8

30.8
42.9
41.7
31.4
39.4

A perpetual inventory system
that continually records
purchases and costs of sales
throughout the year is not
used; instead, the company
uses a periodic system, updating i t s inventory records
? I
N I Sonce a year.
dating i t s inventory records
N
Sonce a year.
?
BO
8.3
25
25
3.4
27.6
CS
10.3
22.2
CFA
11.1
11.1
MUT
25
25
GOV
- 50

16.7

-

7.1

-

2.3

-

11.1

30.8

-

8.3

-

4.5

-

11.1

-

30.8
7.1
8.3

-

5.3

2

χ = 95.5 @ .002
60

-

I E- I

D

-

E-

33.3
34.5
11.1
50
25

D
8.3

24.1
33.3
25

23.1

15.4

7.7

-

46.2
7.1
58.3
34.3
29.5

15.4
42.9
16.7
31.4
29.5

7.7
7.1
8.3
31.4
18.9

A l l records maintained in
the branches are under the
supervision of the branch
managers.

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

-

4.3
3.9
3.8
3.5
4.3

60

PI

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI

-

No Response

2

16.7
3.4

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

-

δ

χ - 72.93 @ .12

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

PI

μ

D

16.7
44.8
33.3
25
75

Access to computer
f a c i l i t i e s i s not
limited.

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

@ .0009

7.7
_

21.4

60

E-

25

-

= 100

I

-

I

7.7

-

1.5

μ

I

δ

No Response

u
3.2
3.7
3.4
3.5
2.8

6
1.3
1.1
1.6
1.7
.96

No Response

2.7

1.3

15.4

3.7
3.0
3.3
3.9
3.5

1.1
1.4
.79
.96
1.16

23.1
7.1
8.3

-

11.1

-

-

-

4.5

2
X

16.7
13.8

25

-

7.7
21.4

-

5.7
9.8

8.3
27.6
22.2
25

25.0
24.1
22.2
..25

38.5

38.5

23.1
14.3
25
11.4
18.2

30.8
7.1
33.3
31.4
25

33

= 81.7 @ .033
60

33.3
8.3
13.8
17.2
22.2
11.1
75
-50___
15.4
_

50.0
25
20.0
23.5

7.7
15.4
7.1
8.3
28.6
16.7

8.3

-

-

-

.8

3.3
1.5
2.9
1.3
3.4
1.3
3.5
1.0
3.0 1.4
2.9
.95
2.9
3.1
3.2
3.6
3.2

1.3
1.4
.98
1.21
1.3

3.4
22.2
_

23.1
_

8.3
2.9
6.1

How would a management
letter issued by an
external auditor containing a l l of the above
internal control points

2

χ = 81.4 @ .03
60

of management? ***

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

?

6.9
11.1

-

16.7
3.4
22.2

-

23.1

PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

N

_

14.3

-

5.7
5.3

-

-

3.8

s-

-

E-

8.3
6.9

16.7
31.0
22.2
50
25

33.3
41.4
22.2
25
50

8.3
6.9
11.1
25
25

-

-

23.1

30.8

15.4

23.1
14.3
16.7
2.9
8.3

23.1
21.4
25
28.6
26.5

30.8
42.9
50
57.1
43.2

How would a management
letter containing a l l of
the above internal control
points affect your assessment of management, i f you
knew that each of the points
were also noted in the management letter issued last year?

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

X

3.4
11.1

-

PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

_

14.3

-

2.9
3.8

8.3
6.9
11.1

-

23.1

7.7

15.4

53.8

7.7

15.4
7.1
8.3
5.7
8.3

7.7
7.1
8.3
14.3
11.4

38.5
57.1
58.3
60.0
50.8

-

-

8.3
17.2
11.1

Would any of your responses
change i f the company i n volved was small (as opposed
to a medium-sized or large
company)?

δ

No Response

4.1
4.2
3.6
4.8
5.0

1.37
1.26
1.8
.96
.82

16.7
3.4
11.1

3.4

1.08

7.7

4.1
3.85
4.5
4.4
4.3

.88
1.46
.26
1.05
1.2

23.1
7.1

50

16.7
17.2
11.1
25

4.4
4.5
3.9
5.3

1.4
1.3
1.7
.5

16.7

4.0

1.29

4.3
4.2
5.0
4.7
4.6

1.3
1.6
.85
1.08
1.24

.50_

7.7
7.1
25
14.3
15.9

-

2.9
6.8

-

11.1

-

23.1
7.1

-

S.3

2

X

= 20.3 @ .06
12

No

μ

δ

58.3
44.8
11.1
75
100

25
41.7
55.6
25

.70
.46
.17
.75
1.0

.48
.51
.41
.50
0.0

PI

84.6

15.4

.85

.38

-

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

53.8
71.4
58.3
42.9
50.8

30.8
14.3
33.3
48.6
38.6

.64
.83
.64
.47
.57

.51
.39
.51
.51
.50

15.4
14.3
8.3
8.6
10.6

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

-

60

-

2.9
4.5

8.3
2.9
6.1

μ

= 52.6 @ .74

33.3
48.3
33.3
75

-

16.7
6.9
11.1

2

D

Yes

-

***The respondents were n o t c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r responses
comments were deemed to have more o f a n e g a t i v e e f f e c t
a l l o f the comments combined.
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No Response
16.7
3.4
33.3

-

i n the sense t h a t some i n d i v i d u a l
on how management's e v a l u a t e d than

It could even be worse for a smaller company that is not as financially
sound and a mere marginal participant in an industry. (private place
ment)
The observed diversity in the interpretation of internal control points
suggests that the report form of a management letter or a listing of material
weaknesses alone is inadequate to provide a basis for evaluation of a company's
management. In fact, several of the CPA respondents noted that it was
impossible to evaluate the points without knowing more about the company and
the context of the control suggestion, e.g.,
It is really impossible to answer these questions without some specific
context. (CPAs)
This requirement of more information is not as broadly recognized by other
respondent groups. However, the evidence is clear that uniform interpretation
of an internal control point will not occur. While uniform interpretation may not
be desirable, if the basis of any interpretation is less than full understanding or
knowledge, problems with such disclosures arise.
The accounting literature states
Informative disclosure to prudent investors presumes statement con
tent which is explicit, complete, and unequivocal. (Griffin and Williams,
1960, p. 46)
The SEC advises
A disclosure which makes the facts available in such form that their
significance is apparent only upon searching analysis by experts does
not meet the standards imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 as we
understand that Act. (SEC, 1948, p. 133)
The survey evidence on interpretations of internal control points suggests that
neither of these standards for disclosure would be met by such a listing of
material or immaterial weaknesses. The points listed in Table 2 demonstrate
how not to communicate weaknesses in accounting controls.
A Closer Look at the Disparity Between Users' and Producers'
Responses
If the CS, CFA, MUT, GOV, CL, and PP subgroups from Table 2 are
combined as users of control disclosures and BD, CPAs, and Mgmt. are
combined as producers of such disclosures, a test of the significance of the
differences in responses between these two principal groups can be per
formed. Such a comparison indicates that at a .05 level of significance:
• the producer group considers the absence of adequate bonding to be
much more negative than the user group (4.1 versus 3.7, where 1 =
? and 6 = D from Table 2),
• the user group considers the lack of an internal audit staff to be much
more negative than the producer group (4.3 versus 3.8),
• the user group considers the periodic inventory system to be less
desirable (3.7 versus 3.1), and
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• the producer group considers responses to be more dependent on the
size of the company than the user group (.73 versus .51, where 1 =
yes).
For all other items in Table 2, the differences of opinion across the user and
producer groups as to the effect of the control points on the evaluation of
management are observed to be insignificant.
Within the producer group, it is desirable to separately consider the BD
group, since the audit committee members act not only as reviewers of
external reporting issues on behalf of the company, but also act as users of
internal control disclosures by CPAs. A review of Table 2 suggests that, in
general, the BD group is harsher on management when reviewing the
individual control points, other than the two points concerning periodic
inventory and the maintenance of branch records. However, the combination of
the control points or the repetition of control points across years is not
evaluated as severely by the BD group as by other respondent groups. Some
additional insight regarding these differences in opinion is gained by reviewing
written comments received on the questionnaire instrument from BD re
spondents.
• R E : Periodic Inventory
Depends on monetary size and quantity of inventory
• R E : Branch's Records
Not if properly audited
• R E : Combined Points
I don't see external auditors as experts in control.
Depends on what the letter said.
As we have those controls as a matter of course, the lack of them
would have to cause a negative assessment of management—but
it could be misleading. Management may be maximizing return to
investors in terms of company growth and making efficient and
profitable use of resources.
• R E : Repetitive Points
This case would still have to be judged on its merits. The
company view is more meaningful than that of the auditor.
Would have negative assessment if management was aware of
these weaknesses but no attempt was made to correct them.
Overall, it appears that the BD group, many of whom are audit committee
members, are reasonably astute as to materiality considerations, substantive
testing alternatives, the absence of cost/benefit analyses by CPAs, the
importance of the context of internal control points, the central role of cost/
benefit evaluations, and the critical aspect of whether attempts have been
made or plans formulated to respond to past years' control suggestions. How
might control disclosures be structured to provide similar insight to other
respondent groups?
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Preference for Report Forms
Some direction on how disclosures concerning accounting controls should
be made can be provided from survey evidence that asks the stakeholder
groups to rank possible report forms. However, when focusing on the
preferences summarized in Table 3, it is necessary to qualify the results.
Several respondents indicated in marginal comments a preference for no
ranking, and in fact, no report on controls. It should also be noted that despite
directions to use each rank number 1 through 8 once only, some respondents
listed repeats, e.g., all 8's. The reason for emphasizing such comments and
responses is to remind the reader that a preference of 1 does not constitute
demand for internal control reporting; it simply represents that if reports are
going to be made available, this is the preferred form.
An evaluation of the underlying group responses indicates that commercial
lending officers prefer an audit opinion with materiality limits more than other
respondent groups; similarly, CPAs are most opposed to the auditor's report
without materiality limitations. Mutual fund and commercial lending officers are
proponents of the management letter provision while the Board of Director
members, CPAs, and controllers are opposed to this form of report (again,
relative to other respondents). Management is clearly a strong proponent of
providing its opinion on controls to the public. If the groups were combined
despite their significant differences, a general preference would be observed
for a summary opinion on control systems by the auditor relative to a detailed
listing of either controls or internal control points (the relative average rankings
are 3.1, 5.2, and 4.3 respectively). This preference for fewer "details," as
well as some question as to whether any such report should be made available,
were further emphasized in written comments on this section of the question
naire, as exemplified by the following quotes:
None of these reports would be particularly useful to the public. In fact,
they could be misleading in that the public might view them as an
auditor's assurance that fraud cannot take place within the firm.
Too much information is worse than not enough. (private placement)
I cannot rate these. And do not wish to. Most stockholders and
probably most investors would not read a report including so much
additional and technical comment and could easily misinterpret them.
(common stock investment officer)
The whole concept of 'a report' is foolish and the concept of trying to
synthesize the conditions prevailing in our 1,500 legal entities produces
an exercise in madness.
Please, SIRS, SUMMARIZE THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITTANICA
IN ONE SENTENCE. (Board of Directors and Audit Committee
Member)
These comments combined with those reported at the end of Table 3 suggest a
general attitude that reports concerning internal controls should not be made
available. The responses to the questions regarding the potential harm and
perceived value of control reports reinforce this interpretation.
37

TABLE 3
PREFERENCE FOR REPORT FORMS (A FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES)
INSTRUCTIONS:
Listed below are eight possible report forms related to internal control which have been proposed for public dissemination.
Please rank these in order of preference (1 = most preferred,
8 = least preferred); costs related to each report should
be considered in your ranking. Use each of the rank numbers 1, 2,
8 one time only per column. The reporting alternatives are listed in alphabetical order.

Key
Board of Directors 5 Audit Committee Members
Common Stock Investment Officers (Insurance)
Certified Financial Analysts
Mutual Fund Analysts
Government
Employees
Pilot'Sample
Commercial Lending Officers
Certified Public Accountants
Controllers for DJIA Companies
Private Placement Investment Officers
TOTAL SAMPLE (Mail)
Average
Standard Deviation

A.

Auditor's opinion that a company's internal
accounting control system adequately provides
reasonable assurance that there is control
over errors or irregularities that could be
material to the financial statements.

(BD)
(CS)
(CFA)
(MUT)
(GOV)
(PI)
(CL)
(CPAs)
(MGMT)
(PP)
(T)
(μ)
(δ)

X
1**
16.7
37.9
33.3
25

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

-

PI

30.8
38.5

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

-

8.3
40
28.0

2

3

2

= 92.2 @ .26*
84

4

5

6

8.3
6.9
-

16.7
17.2
-

8.3
10.3
-

6 9

25
15.4 15.4
15 4 15.4
14 3 21.4
33.3
14 3 5.7
15 2 11.4

25
7.7
7.7
21.4
8.3
11.4
12.9

15.4
7.7
7.1
25.0
11.4
9.8

25
7 7

41 7
10 3
22 2
25

7

3.4

-

7 1

-

2 9
3 8

-

5.7
2.3

8

μ

8.3
3.4
11.1
25

3.0
3.0
2.5
3.7
4.3
2.8
2.2
4.3
3.6
2.7
3.1

-

-

-

14.3

-

4.5

δ

No Response

2.0
2.1
2.7
3.8
1.1
1.8
1.4
2.1
1.3
2.0
2.0

3.4
33.3
25
25
7.7
15.4
14.3
25.0
8.6
12.1

* χ2 (chi-square) with its significance level is interpreted as the probability of observing the sample responses from
the nine groups surveyed by mail given they all come from a population with homogeneous attitudes about internal
control information. Note that the underlying assumption of χ2 is independence and that these responses are expected
to be intercorrelated due to the fact that they represent ranking statistics. Therefore, the mean values for the 8
responses (A through H) for the 9 groups surveyed by mail were analyzed by calculating the Kendall Coefficient of
Concordance. The results are reported below:
W value
χ2 value
Probability of exceeding this
X value i f the null hypothesis of independence is
correct
Kendall S--sums of squares
of deviations from expected
sums of ranks
df

.379
23.856
7

2

.001
1,278

The conclusion is that significant differences do exist among the groups' rankings. As noted in Table 2, the
reported χ statistics were generated from frequency data, although percentages are reported herein for ease
of interpretation. The board of directors were again subdivided into two groups for the
computation.
2

**Due to rounding, the percentages may sum to slightly more or less than 100.
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B.

Auditor's opinion that a company's internal
accounting control system adequately provides
reasonable assurances of achievement of each
of the objectives of internal accounting control
(i.e., cost-benefit considerations are not
limited to amounts material to the financial
statements).
1

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAS
MGMT
PP
T

C.

25
6.9
22.2

X

I

I 3

2

CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

6.9
22.2

8.3
6.9

13.8

-

-

23.1
7.7
15.4
7.7
14. 3 14.3
33.3
8.3
8.6 14.3
12.1
9.8

84

16.7
25

25
7.1
8.3
8.6
6.8

14.3
8.3
8.6
8.3

7.1
11.4
6.8

2
_

20. 7 10
11.1
25
25
23.1
15.4

15
23
-

20
12.9

8
14
9

7.7
7.7 23.1
14. 3 7.1
8.3
5.7 28.6
9.1 15.9

2

= 85.9

3

4

8 3
8.3
3 20 7 6.9
22 2 22.2
25
25
4 15 4 15.4
1 30 8
21 4
3
25.0
3 14 3 11.4
8 16 7
9.8

84

3.4
11.1

7.7

-

20.7

-

25

-

7.7

-

-2.9

25.7

3.0

12.9

10.3
11.1
25

3.4
11.1

-

25
7.7
7.7
14.3

7.7
15.4

-

8.3
11.4
9.1

39

-

5.7

6.1

23.1
15.4
8.3
5.7
6.1

6

8 3 25
6 9 10.3
-

-

-

50

15.4

-

8 6
4 5

2

84

δ

No Response

2.5
1.7
2.6
2.1
6.2
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.5
1.6
2.0

6.9
33. 3
25
25
23.1
15.4
14.3
25
11.4
13.6

6.7
5.0
4.3
5.3
5.7
6.9
6.4
4.8
5.4
4.8
5.2

1.7
2.4
2.9
2.1
6.9
1.3
1.5
2.5
2.5
2.2
2.3

3.4
33.3
25
25
15.4
15.4
14.3
25.0
8.6
12.1

-

7.7
7.1

-

.8

25
7.7
15.4
35.7
16.7
2.9
11.4

25
10.3
11.1
25
25
15.4
7.7
21.4
33. 3
8.6
15.2

41.7
24.1
11.1

7

8

25
38.5
30.8
14.3
8. 3
14.3
19.7

-

42.9
25.0
5.7
14.4

6

8. 3 33 3
10.3
6 9
11 1

-

7.7

-

11.4
6.8

-

15
7
21
16
5
11

4
7
4
7
7
4

6.3
3.8
3.8
2.3
5.0
3.6
3.2
5.8
5.3
3.7
4.3

1.7
2.4
2.3
1.5
1.9
2.4
2.3
1.9
2.0
2.3
2.3

6.8
4.7
4.3
4.3
6.3
6.0
4.5
6.0
6.4
4.4
5.1

1.1
2.2
2.3
3.2
3.3
1.5
2.0
.4
1.7
2.2
2.1

No Response
8.3
6.9
33.3
25
25

-

15.4
14.3
25.0
8.6
13.6

@ .65

16.7
10.3
22.2

-

μ
3.7
3.6
2.8
4.3
4.7
4.8
4.8
6.4
5.6
3.8
4.2

@ .43

5

X = 78.6

8
16.7
3.4
11.1

@ .79

20.7
11.1

25

Listing of primary strengths and weaknesses
of the internal accounting control system
by the auditor (assume the length is constrained to five pages of an annual report).
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

8.3
13.8
11.1

-

25

2

X

E.

25
15.4
23.1
14.3
16.7
17.1
17.4

7

10. 3
-

-

χ = 73.6

External Auditor's Letter of Recommendations
(i.e., Management Letter).
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

6

16.7
6.9
25

-

Description of the existing internal
accounting controls by management
(assume the length is constrained to
five pages of an annual report).
BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV

D.

-

25.7
15.9

@ .13

84

Is

8.3
27.6

-

17.1
12.9

- 98.7

I 4

8. 3 25
20.7 17.2
22.2 11.1
25
25
15.4
23.1
-

2.9
6.1

2

7.7j
15.4
28.6
8.3
8.6
12.9

16.7
24.1

-

-

-

23.1
15.4
7.1
16.7
17.1
15.2

33.3
13.8

-

25
30.8
15.4
14.3
16.7
14.3
15.2

33.3
6.9
11.1
25
25
7.7

-

21.4
25.0
5.7
12.9

_

6.9
33. 3
25
25
15.4
15.4
14.3
25.0
8.6
12.9

2

χ = 143.8 @ .0000
84

F.

Management's opinion on the adequacy of the
internal accounting control system.

4

5

6

7

8

8.3
3.4

_

25.0
13.8

8.3
3.4
22.2

10.3

16.7
51.7
33.3
50

25
23.1
7.7
50
50

7.1
33.3

15.9

5.3

7.7

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAS
MGMT
PP
T

-

-

-

50

15.4
15.4

-

14. 3
8.3
2.9 11.4
6.1
4.5

-

-

6

-

7.7
7.1

15.4

23.1
15.4

11.4
11.4

5.7
6.1

8.6
6.1

7.7
23.1
7.1
51.4
33.3

3.9
6.5
6.2
6.7
3.7
4.1
5.8
2.3
1.6
6.8
5.3

2.6
2.2
2.7
2.3
4.1
2.7
2.2
2.2
.7
1.7
2. 7

3.3
4.4
4.7
4.3
3.0

3.0
2.9
2.8
4.2
3.8

2.0
1.8
2.9
3.1
2.7
1.2
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.0

4.3
4.9
5.2
4.0
3.3
4.2
5.5
5.1
5.3
5.1
5.0

2.4
2.3
3.0
2.6
6.9
2.1
2.1
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.3

No Response
.

6.9
33.3
25
25
15.4
15.4
14.3
8.3
8.6
11.4

2

χ = 68.6 @ .60
72

16.7
3.4
22.2
25
25

33.3
13.8

8.3
10.3

8.3
17.2
25

30.823.1

23.1
15.4
21.4
16.7
5.7
12.1

Management's opinion, attested to by an
independent auditor, that a company's
internal accounting control system
adequately provides reasonable assurances
of achievement of each of the objectives
of internal accounting control ( i . e . ,
cost-benefit considerations are not
limited to amounts material to the
financial statements).

If you could select some
combination of the above
report forms, you would
prefer***

3.4

7.7

Management's opinion, attested to by an
independent auditor, that a company's
internal accounting control system
adequately provides reasonable assurance
that there is control over errors or
irregularities that could be material to
the financial statements.

30.8
35.7
25.0
14.3
18.9

7.7
7.7
7.1
8.3
11.4
8.3

7.7
7.1
16.7
20.0
13.6

16.7
13.8
11.1
25
25
7.7

8.3
24.1

15.4
7.1

7.7
14.3

8.3
10.3
33.3
25

2.4
8.3
11.4
9.8

22.9
14.4

8.6
11.4

6.9
33.3
25
25

7.7
15.4
7.1
25
5.7
11.4

2

χ = 77.3 @ .69
84

1

I 2

3

16.7
17.2
11.1 11.1
25
25
25
7.7
7.7
7. 7 7.1
7.1
8.3
11.4
2.9
12.9
3.0

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

21.

-

3

25

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

H.

16.7

25
6.9
11.1

BP
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAs
MGMT
PP
T

G.

2

2

χ =
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25
6.9

-

-

23.1
7.7
14.3
8.3
8.6
9.1

15.4
7.7
7.1
8.3
17.1
12.1

- 480 @

A

B

C

25
51.7
44.4
25
25
38.5
30.8
14.3
16.7
54.3
38.6

25
34.5
33.3
25

8.3
37.9
22.2

4
25
13.8

5

6

6.9

-

25

7.7
7.7
7. 1
8.3
2.9
5.3

7

8

8.3
13.8
22.2
25

8.3
31

-

25
7.7
30.8
35.7
8.3
28.6
23.5

7.7
15.4

-

16.7
14.3
12.9

-

u

6

16.7
3.4
22.2

7.7
7.7
7.1
16.7
8.6
9.1

.54

D

E

44.8
22.2
25

8.3
24.1
22.2
50

3875
7.1

7.7
7.1

40.0
27.3

28.6
18.2

F

16. 7
6.9

G

H

25

25
6.9
22.2
25

25
6.9
11.1
25

38.5
15.4
21.4
25
5.7
11.4

23.1
23.1
7.1
8.3
8.6
12.1

5.7
6.8

25
30.8
15.4
7.1
8. 3
31.4
24.2

30.8
7.1
8. 3
48.6
28.8

***Percentages indicate how many respondents mentioned a given report within the combination listed on the
questionnaire; since a number of combinations were indicated, the sum of the percentages is not equal
to 100%.
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No Response

6.9
33. 3
25
25
15.4
15.4
14.3
25.0
5.7
12.1

22.

Would you consider public
dissemination of any of the
above report forms to be:
Of l i t t l e or no value?

x

A

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAS
MGMT
PP
T

8. 3
10.3
22.2
25

23.1
23.1
35.7
41.7
11.4
18.2

2

=

4 6 7 . 7

360 @ .

B

C

D

8.3
10.3
22.2
25
25

66.7
31.0
33.3
25
25
61.5
46.2
71.4
83.3
37.1
46.2

33.3
17.2
33.3

38.5
30.8
35.7
58.3
11.4
21.2

χ2 = 3 2 9 . 8

Harmful ?

BD
CS
CFA
MUT
GOV
PI
CL
CPAS
MGMT
PP
T

6.9
22.2

8.3
3.4
22.2

-

-

30.8
15.4
28.6

38.5
15.4
42.9

8.6
9.8

5.7
10.6

8.3
3.4
22.2
25
25
23.1
7.7
35.7
8. 3
8.6
12.1

0

0

0

1

38.5
46.2
57.1
50.0
17.1
28.8

240

E

41.7
24.1
11.1
25
25
76.9
38.5
64. 3
83.3
20
34.8

F

G

H

33.3
37.9
33.3
25

16.7
17.2
22.2
25

25
31
22.2

-

-

-

46.2
53.8
28.6
33.3
45.7
37.9

46.2
30.8
35.7
41.7
25.7
25

38.5
38.5
50
58.3
34. 3
34.1

3.4
33.3

6.9
22.2

8. 3
6.9
22.2

@ .0001

41.7
27.6
22.2
25
25
46.2
23.1
50
8.3
31.4
29.5

33. 3
24.1
22.2
25

30.8
38.5
57.1
16.7
28.6
29.5

-

-

-

23.1
15.4
28.6

23.1
23.1
28.6

30.8
23.1
42.9

8.6
9.8

-

-

11.4
11.4

11.4
13.6

Is there some other report form not l i s t e d that
you would prefer to the above alternative?
Board of Directors
&

The SEC's insistence on more reports w i l l tend to dilute more
important information in annual reports.

Audit Committee Members

The auditor's c e r t i f i c a t e is a l l the reassurance needed.

Common Stock Investment
Officers (Insurance)

A management statement l i s t i n g uncorrected management
comments.

Pilot Sample

N/A:

Commercial Lending Officers

No report should be offered.

Certified Public Accountants

SEC proposal for Phase I only.

Controllers for DJIA Companies

Compliance is a matter of law under FCPA.

Private Placement Investment Officers

Some standard established by accounting profession.

letter

Question was not included on p i l o t survey instrument.

In our view no additional reports should be required.
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With respect to potential harm, several respondents stated that such
disclosures would be
Dangerous to make . . . public due to (their) proprietary nature.
(private placement)
Hence, some general consensus that internal control reports are not desired is
reflected by marginal comments, and if such reports are made available, the
respondents clearly do not prefer the most extensive or most expensive report
forms. In general, for the total sample, the auditor's report on internal
controls, perhaps accompanied by management's opinion, limited to materiality
considerations, is the preferred report form if control reporting is required.
A Second Look at the Disparity Between Users' and Producers'
Responses
When the same user/producer dichotomy described for Table 2 is applied to
Table 3, the following significant differences (at a .05 level) are observed:
• the user group prefers reports
A (2.8 versus 3.6),
B (3.8 versus 5.1),
C (3.7 versus 5.8), and
D (4.6 versus 6.4)
relative to the producer group and
• the producer group prefers reports
F (2.6 versus 6.4) and
G (3.0 versus 4.1)
relative to the user group.
Obviously these difference statistics are not strictly appropriate for the data,
given they are intercorrelated rankings, but they do provide insight as to which
reports influence the overall significance of the Kendall Coefficient of Concor
dance, reported in Table 3.
Of particular interest, as suggested earlier, are the responses of the BD
group, a continuing user of internal control disclosures by CPAs. As reported
in Table 3, the BD group ranks public disclosure of either the external auditor's
letter of recommendations (report D) or a listing of strengths and weaknesses
in the internal accounting control system by the auditor (report E) extremely
low relative to the other respondents (6.3 and 6.8 respectively, versus an
overall mean for the total sample, including BD, of 4.3 and 5.1). It would
appear that as frequent users of management letters, the BD members would
oppose making such reports public. As reflected in the comments already
cited, the BD group, as well as the other respondents, generally opposed the
concept of such potentially long and complicated disclosures. A comment by
one BD respondent reflects the overall message:
The auditor's certificate is all the reassurance needed.
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The Effect of Prior Beliefs on Observed Attitudes Related to Internal Accounting Control
The survey instrument was constructed to provide a means of gaining some
understanding of the extent to which the survey responses are affected by the
• misunderstanding of current audit responsibilities,
• lack of awareness that internal control adequacy does not preclude
fraud, and
• tendency of respondents not to consider cost factors in such policy
issues.
This study utilizes an "attitude-behavioral intention" framework (see Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975 for a detailed theoretical discussion). Prior beliefs about
internal accounting control systems or extended reporting responsibilities and
their related costs are assessed as a basis for explaining the attitudes of
respondents regarding
• the desirability of extending internal accounting control reporting
responsibilities,
• internal accounting control report preference rankings, and
• the effect of internal accounting control points, reported in an
auditor's management letter, on the evaluation of the degree to which
management is fulfilling its responsibilities to stockholders and credi
tors.
The results are reported in Exhibit A of the Appendix.
Exhibit A first outlines the operational questions used to assess beliefs
regarding auditors' present responsibilities with respect to internal control,
limitations of internal control and audit procedures, the state of the art with
respect to evaluating controls and management's implementation of controls,
and the expected costs of expanded study and evaluation of controls. The belief
codes are then related to respondents' attitudes regarding the desirability of
auditors' involvement, preference for internal control report forms, and the
evaluation of internal control points in management letters.
The key findings, as reported in Exhibit A include the following:
• respondents' beliefs regarding auditors' present responsibilities ex
plain a substantial amount of the observed variation in opinions
concerning
—whether management's opinion on the adequacy of the internal
accounting control system is preferred (72%),
—whether a management letter point which indicates that employees
are not adequately bonded would have an effect on how manage
ment is assessed (56%), and
—whether one's responses regarding the effect of internal control
points on the assessment of management would change if the
company involved was small (as opposed to a medium-sized or large
company) (64%);
• respondents' beliefs regarding the limitations of internal control and
audit procedures explain a substantial amount of the observed
variation in opinions concerning
43

—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how
management is assessed (54%),
—whether a management letter point which indicates that all of the
current year's comments were also noted in the management letter
issued last year (60%), and
—whether one's responses regarding the effect of internal control
points on the assessment of management would change if the
company involved was small (as opposed to a medium-sized or large
company) (61%);
• respondents' beliefs regarding the state of the art with respect to
evaluating controls and management's implementation of controls
explain a substantial amount of the observed variation in opinion
concerning
—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how
management is assessed (40%),
—whether a management letter point which indicates that although all
officers and employees take vacations, control duties and functions
are not performed by other persons during their absence, i.e.,
work is delayed for the week, would have an effect on how
management is assessed (44%), and
—whether a management letter containing all of the management
letter points cited would affect the assessment of management
(39%);
• respondents' beliefs regarding the expected costs of expanded study
and evaluation of controls explain a substantial amount of the
observed variation in opinion concerning
—the desirability of auditors' involvement in the evaluation of internal
controls (32% due to expected costs; 17% due to the expectation
that fraud would be deterred; 31% due to the expectation that the
public will be misled) and
—whether a management letter point which indicates that a client
does not have an audit committee would have an effect on how
management is assessed (16% due to expected costs; and 20% due
to the expectation that the public will be misled).
The implication which can be drawn from interpreting the main effects in the
analysis of variance models that are reported in Exhibit A is that the profession
can influence the various respondent groups' attitudes on control-related
reporting issues by providing public information that will have an effect on
these individuals' beliefs regarding the auditor's current activities, inherent
limitations in control systems, available technology, and the costs of expanding
both auditors' responsibilities and disclosure requirements. The information
responsibilities of the profession are substantial, and "miscommunication,"
particularly as to auditors' current activities, can be expected to influence
attitudes on disclosure issues.
"Misinformation" About Internal Control in Management Reports
One potential source of "misinformation" on auditors' responsibilities is
the management report. The profession should, in light of the evidence
presented in Exhibit A, exercise considerable care in reviewing management's
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disclosures to ensure that auditors' activities, as well as the limitations of
control systems and the cost considerations in establishing such systems, are
accurately represented.
Management reports were suggested by The Committee on Auditors'
Responsibilities (1978, p. 76), and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants' Special Advisory Committee issued "Tentative Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Reports by Management," providing examples of
wording. However, no standard language is presented; per discussion with an
AICPA representative, the Committee wanted to avoid a letter format that
would result in "boilerplate" application. However, as demonstrated in the
following content analysis of management reports that are being issued, there
are hazards of not prescribing a standard report.
2

A Growing Concern
Increased concern over the problems of imprecise language in manage
ment's reports is warranted in light of the growing number of companies
including such representations in their financial statements; Business Week
reported in its April 16, 1978 issue that
a surprising 38% of the (annual) reports (reviewed) carried such a note
(companies acknowledging management's responsibility for developing
thefinancialfigures)compared with only four companies a year ago.
This number has grown in apparent response to the Financial Executives
Institute's (1978) endorsement that a management report be furnished in
annual reports to shareholders. Beresford et al (1980) report from a sample of
305 companies drawn from the Fortune top 1000 companies, 40% issued
management reports in 1979 relative to 23% in 1978. Similarly, Price
Waterhouse & Co. reports that 56% of a sample of large electric, gas, and
water companies issued 1980 management reports, compared to 39% in 1979
(Smartt, 1981).
If the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposal to require a
Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control (1979), postponed
by the SEC in its June 6, 1980 withdrawal, were to be implemented, the scope
of the problem with "misinformation" about internal controls would increase.
Loose language concerning auditors' responsibilities could not only persist in
management reports, but could be carried over to statements by management
on internal accounting control.
Such imprecision could have liability implications for both companies and
auditors (particularly with respect to "perceived" attestations of compliance
with the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(b)(2)]. In past litigation, auditors' internal
control work has been liberally interpreted in its scope.
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law and
statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First Securities' internal
control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to
prepare for filing with the Commission the annual report of its financial
condition required under Section _ 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule 17a-5,
17 CFR _ 240.17a-5.
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While responsibilities for Securities brokers or dealers include a review of
internal controls according to audit procedures prescribed by the jurisdictional
agency, such statements of expanded scope are not recommended to be
included in reports to the public (Committee on Auditing Procedure, "Audits of
Brokers or Dealers in Securities"). The above quote from Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder extends the review responsibility to include the auditor/customer
relationship, in spite of potential problems with the customer's knowledge of
the nature of the review conducted, or understanding of its limitations.
In the Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. case (1976, 195, 683), Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. faced the claim (among others) that the proxy
statements were deficient for
3

failure to disclose that Chadbourn (a company with whom Standard
merged) had continuing serious deficiencies in its data processing
systems that jeopardized its business future and cast substantial doubt
upon internally generated business statistics.
It is clear that the courts are contesting the limited evaluation and reporting
responsibilities of auditors regarding internal controls. The common issuance
of management reports that claim an extended audit function is likely to provide
added impetus to litigation disputes.
An additional ramification of "misinformation" is its potential effect on
individuals' decision-making. If creditors and investors believe the attest
function extends to internal controls, they may not assess the risk profile of
individual companies properly. This implies misallocations of resources and
wealth transfers which would not occur in the absence of such erroneous
beliefs.
Methodology
From the population of annual reports on file at the Graduate School of
Management Library, at the University of Rochester, the latest available
report for 88 of the 1980 top Fortune 100 companies was examined and a
sample of 49 management reports was identified. Exhibit B of the Appendix
summarizes the results of the content analysis which was performed for six of
the companies providing management reports. Similar information for the other
43 companies can be obtained by contacting the author, who is now at Southern
Methodist University. Exhibit C of the Appendix lists those "latest" annual
reports reviewed for the sample that contained no management report, as well
as those 12 companies of the Fortune 100 for which no annual report was
available.
Results
Although Exhibit B indicates that many of the management reports contain
similar content and tend to concern the topics generally described in the
literature, "misinformation" is present in many of the reports regarding
• the requirements of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS),
and
• the nature of internal control.
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Under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) an auditor is
permitted to make an economic choice between reliance on internal controls or
non-reliance. If the auditor believes a more effective and efficient audit can be
performed without testing the control system, or if the system has such
significant weaknesses that reliance is unwarranted, the auditor may only
perform substantive tests.
In addition, GAAS apply to internal accounting controls as distinct from
internal controls. Operating controls like quality of production checks are not
subject to the auditor's review. In addition, only administrative controls that
directly affect the accounts are required to be considered in the normal course
of an audit. This emphasis on internal accounting controls is a very small subset
of a firm's internal controls, i.e., the nervous system that activates overall
operating policies and keeps a business within practical performance ranges.
Furthermore, any reference to an auditor's review of such elements as
"timeliness of disclosure" suggests an efficiency orientation to an audit which
misrepresents the general nature of the audit function. Other than meeting
regulators' time limits, there will be no specific attention paid to whether
production reports or other disclosures are prepared in a timely manner.
Not only do Generally Accepted Auditing Standards not require a compre
hensive review of an entire system of internal accounting controls, they do not
provide a basis for reporting on the adequacy of internal accounting controls
(let alone internal controls). Communication of material weaknesses in internal
accounting control that come to an auditor's attention during an examination of
financial statements is required.
However there is no requirement under generally accepted auditing
standards to evaluate each control or to identify every material
weakness. (Statement on Auditing Standards No. 20, ¶3).
In addition, the criterion applied by an auditor to identify a material weakness is
whether reasonable assurance is provided that "errors or irregularities in
amounts that would be material in thefinancialstatements being audited would
be prevented or detected within a timely period by employees in the normal
course of performing their assigned activities." (Statement on Auditing
Standard No. 1). These criteria may be broader than those that may be
appropriate for evaluating weaknesses in accounting control for management or
other purposes.
Auditors differ as to their policies regarding the recommendation of internal
control modifications and improvements. There is no requirement that they
make such recommendations, and when the suggestions are verbalized, they
are not analyzed on a cost/benefit basis to determine the propriety of the
changes. The frequent absence of comprehensive internal control review and
written control suggestions by auditors and the responsibility of management
to select a control system based on cost/benefit estimates suggest that regular
duties of auditors are being exaggerated and the management decision process
for selection of controls is not being appropriately communicated in representa
tions by managers.
"The work of internal auditors cannot be substituted for the work of the
independent auditor" (Statement on Auditing Standard No. 9). While internal
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auditors' procedures affect the nature, timing, and extent of the independent
auditor's work, such internal audit functions are a supplement to, not a
substitute for, the work of the independent auditor. The independent auditor
will duplicate the efforts of internal auditors in the sense that tests of some of
the work of internal auditors will be performed. Obviously, if significant
defalcations by management occurred, there could be an incentive for internal
auditors to concentrate their "work" in that area in an attempt to deter the
external auditor from testing that area of control and/or set of transactions.
While an independent auditor does not expect or search for fraud, the
independence issue precludes clear substitution of internal audit work in an
examination by an external auditor.
Exhibit B illustrates phraseology that could be misleading to report users in
understanding GAAS. Confusion already exists with respect to auditor respon
sibility for the detection of fraud, as reported in survey results by Professor
Richard E . Ziegler. Ziegler reports that bankers, financial analysts, and
individual shareholders agree
That an examination made in accordance with GAAS means that the
auditor conforms to GAAS; evaluates the adequacy of the accounting
system; (and) uses procedures specifically intended to detect fraud or
other irregularities (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities,
1977, pp. 174-175).
Furthermore, the nature of internal control, particularly its limitations, is not
adequately discussed in most management reports. An analysis by a re
searcher at the AICPA concerns problems with discussions of internal
controls, other than the auditor's role, infifty-eightmanagement reports (56
from 1977 annual reports and 2 from 1978 reports). Zuber (1978) found only
five of the fifty-eight reports referred to "internal accounting control" as
opposed to internal control or financial control. Only nine of the fifty-eight
reports discussed cost/benefit considerations and even fewer (five) referred to
"inherent limitations" of internal accounting control. Other evidence accumu
lated by Zuber on the elements contained in the internal control references
found in annual reports clearly demonstrates "misinformation" on current
design and implementation practices and the general nature of internal control
systems. While the results of my own study demonstrate some improvement
relative to Zuber'sfindings,"misinformation" is still apparent. A key problem
is that discussions of the adequacy of internal accounting controls are
frequently loosely coupled with descriptions of independent auditors' activities.
While much literature has discussed the frequency of management reports and
their general content (see, for example, Brown and Kintzele, 1980 and
Financial Analysts Journal, 1980), to my knowledge, other than the Zuber
(1978) research cited above, little attention has been given to the detailed
disclosures that can "miscommunicate."
Implications for Disclosure
The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 and Exhibits A and B has several
implications for the auditor:
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• Although SAS No. 30 permits disclosure of both material and
immaterial weaknesses in public reports that express the auditor's
opinion of internal accounting control as of a specified time period, the
auditor should refrain from short listings of internal control points
such as those summarized in Table 2
—to avoid misinterpretation,
—to avoid disclosing proprietary information, and
—besides, users appear to prefer an opinion, in contrast to detailed
information.
• While SAS No. 30 specifies that reports on an entity's system based
solely on a study and evaluation of internal accounting control made as
part of an audit is intended for "restricted use," such use includes
"other specified third parties"; since it is probable such parties will
include some of the stakeholder groups sampled in this study, a mere
listing of control points could cause problems similar to those typically
anticipated for reports on which no restrictions are placed on use.
• If a description of a control weakness is required, such description
must explicitly describe the risk exposure from such a weakness;
otherwise users will draw their own inferences concerning risk, some
of which are likely to overstate or understate the actual risk faced by
the entity.
• When conferring with a client who is preparing a management report
on controls, the auditor should make management aware of the
observed diversity of interpretation of such disclosures and the
possibility of disclosing proprietary information, as well as the
importance of accurately describing the auditors' limited involvement
with internal accounting controls and the inherent limitations and cost/
benefit dimensions of a control system.
• When requested to provide services related to the evaluation of
controls, the CPA can discuss the reported preferences for control
disclosures, and thereby assist the client in selecting the preferred
type of engagement.
• When asked to advise a client as to whether resources should be
allocated to a report on internal accounting controls, the general lack
of interest in such reports indicated in this study can be discussed, as
can the regulatory threat by the SEC of requiring such reports in the
absence of voluntary disclosure; presumably, a cost/benefit analysis
could then be performed by the entity as to its preferred disclosure
strategy.
To meet desired standards of disclosure, Table 2 with the reported
diversity of interpretation demonstrates how not to disclose weaknesses;
additional direction to the profession beyond SAS 30 as to the form of
disclosure which would at least narrow the range of the perceived effects of a
particular weakness would be useful in avoiding possible ill effects of experi
menting with control disclosures. Furthermore, Exhibit B suggests some
potentially misleading disclosures in management reports which warrant
attention by the profession.
My analysis presented in Exhibit A of the Appendix suggests one approach
to improving the consistency with which existing disclosures and future
proposals for additional disclosures, particularly those related to internal
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accounting controls, are evaluated by market participants. By informing the
public as to the state of the art of audit technology, the requirements of GAAS,
the current responsibilities of CPAs, and the verifiable costs of proposed
requirements, market participants' beliefs on such matters will be more
consistent with observed auditing practices, and, in turn, their attitudes
involving disclosure policies can be expected to be less diverse than would be
the case if erroneous beliefs as to auditing practices were permitted to persist.

Footnotes
1. A wave analysis comparing early and late respondents, as well as a paired-sample t-test of
original responses with those received from a post-questionnaire study were performed as tests
for nonresponse bias. No significant differences were observed.
2. Beresford et al (1980) provide a useful comparison of the subjects which have been proposed
for inclusion in management reports by the Financial Executives Institute, the Cohen Commission,
and the AICPA.
3. While this case was appealed and decided in favor of the accountant, as was the Hochfelder
case, the mere claim in past litigation that auditors be held responsible for assessing the adequacy
of internal controls suggests that litigious concerns are warranted.
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EXHIBIT A
ANOVA Results Concerning the Relationship of Beliefs and Attitudes Related to Internal Accounting Control

BELIEFS
Operational Questions
•Auditors' Present Responsibilities
This series of statements is
designed to determine your views
about the nature of internal
accounting control and its
current relationship to the
external audit function. For
each item, please answer by
circling one of the following
categories:
Definitely True
(DT)
More True than False (MTF)
Uncertain
(?)
More False than True (MFT)
Definitely False
(DF)

•Limitations of Internal Control
and Audit Procedures
[Same Directions As Above]

•State of the Art

A l l internal accounting controls that have a significant bearing on the prevention and
detection of material fraud are tested by the external auditor annually.
The auditor's unqualified audit report implicitly indicates that no material weakness
exists in the internal accounting controls of the client.

B

The determination of whether or not recommended internal accounting controls are
justified on a cost/benefit basis is the responsibility of the auditor.

C

Special examinations specifically designed to detect defalcations w i l l uncover a l l
current defalcations.

D

If a financial statement item can be substantiated with less effort by not relying on
internal accounting control, the auditor may omit testing of the related control
E

If a current internal accounting control system is deemed adequate, it is reasonable
to project the future adequacy of such controls.
Most embezzlement losses are due to lack of compliance with prescribed procedures or
circumvention of the internal accounting control system, rather then the ineffectiveness of the system design.

BB

Internal accounting control systems border on impotence when standing guard against
collusion of management.

CC

A fraud such as occurred at Equity Funding is possible without the auditor being at
fault.

DD

[Also applicable.]

EE

The evaluation of internal accounting controls is a highly subjective process in which
knowledgeable individuals can arrive at different conclusions concerning adequacy.

AAA

[Same Directions As Above]
Weaknesses in internal accounting control w i l l cause unaudited financial statements to
be misleading.

BBB

Management should accept and implement recommendations by the auditor for improvements
in the internal accounting control system.

CCC

•Expected Costs of Expanded Study
and Evaluation of Controls
Below is a l i s t of possible
effects of extending auditors'
internal control responsibilities. Please indicate whether
effect of extended responsibilities.
(Yes or No)

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF EXTENDING AUDITORS' INTERNAL CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES
-Cost Effects

Audit costs will increase by 30%.
Companies on average w i l l increase the investment in their internal accounting control
systems in excess of the level of investment that can be justified on a cost/benefit
A2
The increased controls w i l l be cumbersome, resulting in lower efficiency of operations.
The internal accounting controls are extended beyond the firm's cost/benefit
order to cover the l i a b i l i t y risk to directors and external auditors.

A3

point in

Public disclosure of internal accounting control information (e.g., material weaknesses)
will create a competitive disadvantage to the reporting companies.

A5

-Financial Statement Effect

The risk of error in year-end financial statement balances w i l l increase.

A6

-Fraud Deterrent Expected

Substantially greater protection against material fraud is not provided.

-Less Information

Information items currently in annual reports, e.g., accident records, hiring and management training programs, w i l l be deleted, i . e . , replaced by a "boiler-plate" report.

A8

Managers will be unwilling to respond to analysts' direct questions concerning internal
control; the analysts w i l l simply be referred to the public "boiler-plate" reports.

A9

-Misled Public

The extension and related disclosures w i l l mislead the public.
Users of internal accounting control reports w i l l project over the long-term future that
such controls w i l l be adequate.

A11

Users of internal accounting control reports believe fraud is thereby precluded.

A12

52

53

1

(1.01)

1.01

1

1.71
(1.7)

df

Sum of Squares
(Mean Square)

(.016)

6.10

10.24
(.002)

F
(Signif.)

5

(1.53)

7.63

5

7.63
(1.53)

(.000)

9.19

9.19
(.000)

Main Effect
SS
F
(MS)
(Sig.)

1

4.29
(4.29)

20.73
(.000)

1

1.05
(1.05)

4.43
(.038)
2

1.89
(.942)

3.97
(.022)

1

6.43
(6.43)

(.000)

36.18
3

7.33
(2.44)

(.000)

13.74

.45

.44

.43

.45

.45

Grand
Mean

Expectations that the Public W i l l be Misled Explain .31 of the Variation in Attitude

A10

Less InformationExpectationsExplain .08 of the Variation in Attitude

A9

Expected Fraud Deterrent Explains .17 of the Variation in Attitude

A7

Expected Cost Effects Explain .32 of the Variation in Attitude

A2

A1

Belief
Code
Interpretation

More desirable by +.21 i f no; -.35
if yes

More desirable by +.1 i f no; -.7
if yes

More desirable by +.17 i f no; -.24
if yes

Less desirable by -.3 i f yes

More desirable by +.2 i f no; -.2
i f yes

--Auditor's opinion that
a company's internal
accounting control system adequately provides
reasonable assurance
that there is control
over errors or irregularities that could be
material to the financial statements.
(.046)

4.08

8.24
(.005)
5

46.6
(9.32)

1.84
(.114)

3.08

4.66

4

24.22
1

A2

1

19.45

A7

(.031)

4.77

4.60
(.035)

(.031)

4.79

3.97
(.01)

5

5

(9.002)

4 5 . 0 1

(9.002)

45.01

18
(5.76)

1 0 3 . 7

1

1.68

7

8

(.125)

.

(.125)

1.78

(.11)

Expected Fnaud Deterrent Explains .04 of the Valuation in Attitude

(19.45)

1

23.24
(23.24)

A4

(24.22)

54.38
(13.60)

E

.

6

0

4

2

9

4.18

.

4.29

tests

3

Expected Financial Statement Effect Explains .04 of the Valuation in Attitude

(17.05)

1

17.05

A6

1

41.76
(41.76)

A4

are

y

e

s

f

y

e

s

More preferred by +.10 i f no; -1.51

f

l

i

y

e

s

f

y

e

s

Less preferred by -.35 i f no; +.52

f

More preferred by + .24 i f no; -.23

lf yes

Less preferred by -.31 if no; +.52

More preferred by+1.2 i f believe
not
omitted

i

i

More preferred by +.5 i f no; -.5

-Listed below are eight possible report forms related to internal control which have been proposed for public dissemination. Please rank these in order
of preference (1 = most preferred, . . . . 8 = least preferred); costs related to each report should be considered in your ranking. Use each of the rank
numbers 1, 2
8 one time only per column. The reporting alternatives are listed in alphabetical order.

•Preference for report form
Operational Questions

-Are you in favor of
auditors being required
to issue some form of
report on internal
accounting controls to
the public that would
require a more extensive
study and evaluation of
a system of internal
accounting controls than
is performed in an examination of financial
statements? Yes No

•The desirability of
auditors' involvement
Operational Question

Attitude

54

--Management's opinion on
the adequacy of the internal accounting
control system.*

--Listing of primary
strengths and weaknesses of the internal
accounting control
system by the auditor
(Assume the length is
constrained to five
pages of an annual
report).

--External Auditor's Letter
of Recommendations (i.e.,
Management Letter)

--Description of the existing internal accounting controls by management (assume the length
is constrained to five
pages of an annual
report).

Attitude

23.27
(23.27)
25.37
(25.37)

A2

A7

3

4

6

4.73
(.032)

5.37
(.023)

(.030)

.

F
(Signif.)
1 9

5

(8.58)

4 2 . 8 9

(6.46)

1 2 2 . 7 0

1

9

8

(.09)

.

(.10)

1.72

(Sig)

Main Effect
(MS)

3

23.7
(23.7)
1

42.08
(42.08)

A2

A7

10.14
(.002)

6.06
(.012)

3.15
(.04)

5

32.0
(6.40)

18
(5.3)

9 5 . 4

.

3

1

(.26)

1.77
(1.27)

1

3 8 . 0 9

3
(12.70)

3

8

2

(.022)

.

6.11
(.001)

3.21
(.029)

8

1 8

8

18
(12.38)

2 2 2 . 8

- 18
(12.38)

2 2 2

(12.38)

2 2 2

3

.

3

7

3

3

(.001)

7

(.001)

,

3.73
(.001)

5

5

.

5

5

4

.

9

4

5

,

5

5.5

5.0

3.74

.

4.3

.

7

Mean

1

85.18

1

29.06
(29.06)

(85.18)
4.15
(.044)

(.000)

13.09

2

39.57
(19.79)

2.83
(.064)

1

44.0
(44.0)

7.04
(.009)

9 4 . 5 6

3
(31.52)

5

.

0

5

(.003)

5

.

8

Expectations that the Public Will Be Misled Explain .13 of the Variation in Attitude

A12

4

5.43

5.39

Less Information Expectations Explain .05 of the Variation in Attitude

A9

A7**

Interpretation

More preferred by +1.1 i f believe
special exams will not uncover all
fraud

More preferred by +2.2 if believe
clean audit report does not mean
no material weakness

More preferred by +2.53 i f believe
auditors do not test all controls

Less preferred by -.39 i f no; +.77
if yes

More preferred by +.35 i f no; -.61
if yes

More preferred by +.6 i f believe
special exams will not uncover all

Less preferred by -.39 if no; +.61
if yes

Less preferred by -.45 if no; +.75
if yes

More preferred by +1.5 i f uncertain
-.8 i f believe special exams will
not uncover all fraud

More preferred by +.82 if no; -.88
if yes

More preferred by +.4 i f no; -.8
if yes

More preferred by +.73 i f no; -1.06
i f yes

Beliefs RegardingAuditors'Present Responsibilities Explain .72 of the Variation in Attitude

D

4

81-24
(20.31)

B

4

42.71
(10.68)

A

Expected FraudDeterrentExplains .09 of the Variation in Attitude

1

38.28
(12.76)

D

Expected FraudDeterrentExplains .11 of the Variation in Attitude.

1

1

- 3
(12.94)

8 2

3 8

df

Sura of Squares
(Mean Square)

EE

Belief
Code

55

1

(15.34)

(19.01)

1

19.01

df

Squares

(Mean Square)

Sum of
F

4.00
(.048)

(.028)

4.99

(Signif.)

3
(8.29)

2 4 . 8 7

2

.

1

6

(.098)

if

(Sig)

Main Effect
{MS)

3

.

7

6

3.78

if

Mean

AAA
4

(21.62)

86.48
(.006)

4.36
11

(9.75)

107.23
(.066)

1.97

4.58

Expectatcons that the P u b l i c Will Be Misled Explain .06 of the Variatioon in Attitude

A10 15.34

A7

Belief
Code
Interpretation

More preferred by+3.6 if no

M ore preferred by+.34 i f no; -.6
yes

yes

More preferred by + .34 if no; -.51

--The client does not have
an audit committee.
BB

Don't know (co ed 1)
None
Slightly negative
Negative
Extremely negative
If it is not implemented, management
should be subject to discipline (e.g.,
fined under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act) (coded 6)

EFFECT ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT:

4

(2.64)

10.58

(D)

(?)
(N)
(S-)
(-)
(E-)

Consider each statement independently; circle your response.

INTERNAL CONTROL POINTS

(.05)

2.70

19

(1.92)

36.39

(.049)

1.94

3.98

Less negative by -.65 i f uncertain
as to whether embezzlement is typically due to circumvention; even
less negative by -.98 i f do not
believe this

-The following is a list of internal control points that might appear in a management letter issued by an external auditor to a medium-sized client (i.e.,
total sales of the client are approximately S50 million). Please indicate whether any of these points would affect your view of the quality of management--i.e., the degree to which management is fulfilling its responsibilities to stockholders and creditors.

•EvaluationofManagement
Operational Questions

--Management's opinion,
attested to by an independent auditor, that a
company's internal
accounting control system
adequately provides reasonable assurances of
achievement of each of the
objectives of internal
accounting control (i.e.,
cost-benefit considerations are not limited to
amounts material to the
financial statements).

--Management's opinion,
attested to by an independent auditor, that a
company's internal
accounting control system
adequately provides reasonable assurance that
there is control over
errors or irregularities
that could be material
to the financial statements.

Attitude

56

-Although all officers and
employees take vacations,
control duties and functions are not performed
by other persons during
their absence, i . e . ,
work is delayed for the
week

Attitude

S

u

m o

(3.44)

4

13-78

f s q u a r e s

df
(Mean Square)

(.018)

3.49

F
(Signif.)

(1.92)

36.39
19

(.049)

1.94

Main Effect
(MS)
3.98

Grand
Mean

44

3

(3.74)

11.23

(4.33)

17.33

(.021)

3.66

4.23
(.006)

(.027)

2.32

(2.37)

11

26.07

2.32
(.027)

11

(2.37)

26.07

Less negative by -1.0 if uncertain
or do not believe management should
accept recommendations

3.98

1

4.89

4 . 8 3

1
(4.83)

(4.89)

(4.05)

(.030)

5

20.27

4.86

5

(4.05)

20.27

4.93
(.029)

(.002)

4.09

(.002)

4.09

5.44
(.022)

(.001)

10.80
3

3

(7.67)

23.01

(7.67)

23.01

(.027)

2

5.48
(2.74)

5.00

(.000)

8.69

(.000)

8.69

(.078)

2.61

28.58

(2.60)
(.012)

11

19
(1.51)

2 8 . 6 7

3.70

2.79
(.043)

1

.

3

0

(.011)

2.72

(.26)

3

.

4

3.94

9

Beliefs Regarding the State of the Art Explain .44 of the Valuation in Attitude

(3.53)

4

14.12

BBB

4

13.03
(3.26)

More negative by +1.1 i f believe
control weaknesses cause misleading unaudited statements; -.7 i f

Less negative by -.7 i f uncertain
as to Equity Funding being
possible without the auditor being
at fault

More negative by +.29 if do not
believe public will be misled;
-.32 if do believe

More negative by +.29 if do not
believe public will be misled; -.5
i f do believe

3.79

3.79

Less negative by -.1 if do not believe information will be deleted;
+ .36 if do believe

More negative by +.35 if do not
believe controls will cover liability risk; -.34 if do believe

3.80

3.73

3.73

that the Public Will Be Misled Explain .20 of the Variation in Attitude

1

4.77
(4.77)

DD***

Expectations

A12 **

(9.53)

1

9.53

A10 **

1

5.24
(5.24)

A8 ***

Expected Cost Effects Explain .16 of the Variation in Attitude

A4 *

A3

More negative by + .27 i f do not
believe increased controls will be
cumbersome; -.4 i f do believe

More negative by +2.0 i f uncertain
or i f do not believe evaluation of
controls is highly subjective

3.98

Beliefs Regarding the State. the Art Explain .40 of the Variation in Attitude

CCC

AAA

Interpretation
Less negative by -.65 i f uncertain
as to Equity Funding being possible
without the auditor being at fault

Regarding the
Beliefs Regarding
theLimitation
Limitations, of Internal Control Explain .54 of the VARIATIOn in Attitude

DO

Belief
Code

57

--No authorization procedures exist for the
purchase or sale of
investments

--There is no internal
auditor or audit staff

--Employees are not
adequately bonded

Attitude
1

13.72
(13.72)

df

Sum of Squares
(Mean Square)
12.85
(.001)

F
(Signif.)
5
(4.38)

2 1 . 9 2

(.002)

1

7.34
(7.34)

(.008)

7.25
2

(3.71)

7.41
(.029)

3.66

1

11.23
(11.23)

12.33
(.001)

3
(6.32)

1 8 . 9 7

6

.

9

4

(.000)

3

3

7

4

.

8

0

3.79

.

Grand
Mean

8.973
(2.99)

4.16
(.01)

18
(1.57)

2 8 . 1 9

2

.

1

8

(.03)

4

.

1

4

1

1

7.77
(7.77)

(4.87)

4.87

(2.63)

10.51

7.49
(.007)

(.033)

4.69

(.019)

3.45
19

5

5
(2.61)

1 3 . 0 5

(2.61)

13.05

(1.42)

26.90

2

1.86

5

1

7.72
(7.72)

(.012)

6.49

1

6.67
(6.67)

(.001)

10.65

2

(3.58)

7.16

(.004)

5.71

3

1

7.12
(7.12)

(.010)

6.84

3

(3.25)

9.75

(.03)

3.12

8

5

4.15

4.38

4.14

.

3.85

4.1

Expectations that the Public Will Be Hilled Explain .08 of the Variation in Attitude

A10

Less Information Expectations Explain .10 of the Variation in Attitude

A9

Expected FraudDeterrentExplains .06 of the Variation in Attitude

A7**

1

(.035)

.

(.035)

2.51

(.061)

Expected Cost Effects Explain .12 of the Variation in Attitude

A4

A2

BB

Interpretation

More negative by +1.1 if believe
auditors assess cost/benefit

More negative by +.29 if do not
believe public will be misled;
-.55 i f do believe

More negative by +.18 i f believe
management is willing to answer
questions; -.4 i f do not believe

More negative by +.4 i f do not believe increased controls will be
cumbersome; -.6 i f do believe

More negative by +.2 i f do not believe public will be misled; -.4
if do believe

More negative by +.2 i f believe
management is willing to answer
questions; -.4 if do not believe

More negative by +.22 if do believe fraud protection is provided
-.32 i f do not believe

More negative by +.25 if do not
believe controls will cover liability risk; -.24 if do believe

Less negative by -.05 i f do not
believe investments will be beyond
cost/benefit level; +.08 if do
believe

More negative by +1.2 i f believed
embezzlement is typically due to
circumvention

Beliefs Regarding Auditors' Present Responsibilities Explain .56 of the Variation in Attitude

C

Expectations that the Public W i l l Be Misled Explain .17 of the Variation in Attitude

A10

Less Information Expectations Explain .06 of the Variation in Attitude

A9***

4.11

(Sig)

Main Effect
(MS)

Expected Colt Effects Explain .18 of the Variation in Attitude

A3**

Belief
Code

58

--All records maintained in
the branches are under the
supervision of the branch
managers

--A perpetual inventory
system that continually
records purchases and
costs of sales throughout
the year is not used; instead, the company uses a
periodic system, updating
its inventory records
once a year

--Access to computer
facilities is not
limited

—The firm has no manual of
operating procedures

Attitude
1

7.43
(7.43)

df

Squares

(Mean Square)

Sum of

8.17
(.005)

F
(Signif.)
5
(2.74)

1 3 . 7 1

3

0

1

6.46
(6.46)

6.042
(.015)

3

4

3.08

9

Mean
.

1

9.05
(9.05)

(.006)

8.011

1

1

10.56
(10.56)

(3.03)

3.03

(6.74)

9.66
(.003)

(.044)

4.16

(.008)

7.48

3.57
(.023)

2.74
(.046)

5

2

5
(2.98)

1 4 . 9 2

(1.53)

3.05

(1.64)

8.19

11
(1.77)

1 9 . 4 9

19

26.32
(1.39)

2

1

4.74
(4.74)

(.033)

4.68

2

5.71

(2.85)

3

(.064)

2.82

3

4

1

7.32
(7.32)

(.03)

4.85

Expected fraudDeterrentExplains .04 of the Variation in Attitude

A7

0

4.21

2

6

2

3.68

.

4.28

.

4.24

3.89

3.26

Less Information Expectations Explain .05 of the Variation in Attitude

A8

7

(.02)

.

(.13)

2.09

(.12)

1.82

(.12)

1.66

1.23
(.295)

Expected Cost Effects Explain .12 of the Variation in Attitude

A3

A9

6.74

A3
1

11.42
(3.81)

CCC
3

12.33
(3.08)

AA
4

ExpectedFraudDeterrentExplains .07 of the Variation in Attitude

A7

Expected financial StatementEffectExplains .05 of the Variation in Attitude

A6

1

(.015)

.

Main Effect
SS
F
(MS)
(Sig)

Expected Cost Effects Explain .12 of the Variation in Attitude.

A3

Belief
Code
Interpretation

Less negative by -.21 i f do believe fraud protection is provided and +.31 if do not believe

More negative by +.32 i f believe
information will be deleted

More negative by +.28 if believe
increased controls will be cumbersome; -.41 i f do believe

questions; -.22 i f do not believe

More negative by +.12 i f believe

More negative by .22 if do not believe increased controls will be
cumbersome; -.32 i f do believe

Less negative by -2.2 if uncertain
whether management should accept
recommendations

More negative by +1.1 if believe
you can project the adequacy of
controls

More negative by +.23 i f do believe fraud protection is provided; -.34 if do not believe

More negative by +.06 i f do not
believe risk increases; -.93 i f do
believe

More negative by +.27 i f do not
believe increased controls will be
cumbersome; -.41 i f do believe

59

--How would a management
letter containing all of
the above internal control
points affect your assessment of management, i f you
knew that each of the
points were also noted in
the management letter
issued last year?

--How would a management
letter issued by an external auditor containing
all of the above internal
control points affect your

Attitude

(.007)

7.49

8.44
(.005)

F
(Signif.)

(6.4)

3

19.32

3
(6.4)

1 9 . 3 2

(.003)

4.91

(.003)

4.91

Main Effect
SS
F
(MS)
(Sig)
3

3

4

3.34

.

Grand
Mean

4

4

3
(4.17)

1 2 . 5 0

(3.47)

1 3 . 8 7

(3.62)

1 4 . 4 9

3

3

2

0

8

4

(.017)

.

(.024)

.

3.11
(.031)

11

30.46
(2.77)

11

30.46
(2.77)

19

36.96
(1.95)

2.55
(.017)

2.55
(.017)

1.68
(.105)

4.27

4.27

4.27

9.36

A5
1

1

(.004)

8.61

8.28
(.005)

5

(3.79)

18.97

5
(3.79)

1 8 . 9 7

3

.

4

9

(.006)

3.49

(.006)

1

3.76

4

(4.48)

17.93

(3.76)

(.007)

4.38

(.047)

4.03
2

7

1 9

(2.31)

4 3 . 9

(2.76)

5.51

(.023)

2.26

(.056)

2.96

4

3

3

4.61

4.39

4.33

.

4

(3.24)

1 2 . 9 7

2.

(.042)

75

1 1

(3.24)

2 8 . 2 0

2

.

7

5

(.042)

4

.

5

9

Beliefs Regarding State of the Art Explain .39 of the Variation in Attitude

AAA

Interpretation

Less negative by -2.6 i f believe
embezzlement is not typically due
to circumvention

More negative by +.29 i f do believe information will be deleted

Less negative by -.19 i f do not
believe a competitive disadvantage
will result; +.25 i f do believe

More negative by +.22 i f do not
believe increased controls will
be cumbersome; -.33 i f do believe

Less negative by -2.27 i f uncertain whether management should
accept recommendations

More negative by +1.7 if uncertain
or do not believe evaluation of
controls is highly subjective

More negative by +1.1 i f believe
embezzlement is typically due to
circumvention; -2.27 i f do not
believe

Less negative by -.32 i f do not
believe users will project; +.23
if do believe

Less negative by -.2 if do not believe public will be misleading;
+.38 if do believe

More negative by +1.4 if uncertain
or i f do not believe evaluation of
controls is highly subjective
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BB

A8

Expected Colt Effects Explain .15 of the Variation in Attitude

(9.36)

9.0
(9.0)

A3

Beliefs Regarding State of the Art Explain .44 of the Variation in Attitude

CCC

AAA

BB

Expectations that the Public W i l l Be Misled Explain .13 of the Variation in Attitude

(9.84)

1

9.84

All

1

11.09
(11.09)

df

Squares

(Mean Square)

Sum of

A10

Belief
Code
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7.49

A4

1

11.58
(11.58)

(7.49)

10.81
(.001)

(.01)

6.99

5.33
(.023)

F
(Signif.)

5

5
(4.55)

2 2 . 7 2

(4.55)

22.72

5
(4.55)

2 2 . 7 2

4

4

2

2

3

1.64
(.55)

3.65
(.025)

18
(.40)

7 . 1 0

2

4

.

6

(.01)

3

(.002)

.

(.002)

4.24

4

4

.

.

3

6

.

59

3

4.63

6

Mean

Less likely to change by -.4 if
believe special exam will uncover
fraud; +.4 i f believe it will not

Less negative by -.20 i f do not
believe a competitive diadvantage
will result; +.26 i f do believe

More negative by +.25 i f do not
believe controls will cover liability risk; -.24 i f do believe

3

4 43
(1.48)

8.77
(.000)

19
(.37)

6 . 9 5

2

.

1

8

(.032)

.

57

Less likely to change by -.35 i f
believe special exam will uncover
fraud; +.37 i f believe it will not

1

2.08
(2.08)

(.003)

9.00

Less likely to change by -.21 i f
do believe fraud protection is
provided; +.16 i f do not believe

The interpretation of how the belief differs within each group is beyond

2

NOTE: All belief codings above the italicized description of the R values, which are not separated by lines, are significant variables in the ANOVA model.
If beliefs are separated by lines, with no R provided, the reported separate effects are significant at a .05 level, but the main effects are not.
When main effects are not reported, they can be assumed to be identical to the reported separate effects, since only one variable was included in
those ANOVA models.

2

***The main effect of group for this question is significant at a .05 level, and results in the insignificance of the main effect of this questionnaire
item. The implication is that either groups are more important than the belief or that the beliefs are, in effect, group-dependent. Further investigation
of how the belief differs across groups is beyond the scope of this paper.

**The main effect of group for this question is significant at a .05 level.
the scope of this paper.

.57

The interpretation of how this belief differs within each

Expected Fraud Deterrent Explains .08 of the Variation in Attitude

A7

BeLiefs Regarding the Limitations of Internal Contfiot Explain .61 of the Variation in Attitude

EE

Interpretation
More negative by +.21 if do not
believe increased controls will be
cumbersome; -.24 i f do believe

Beliefs Regarding Auditors' Present Responsibilities Explain .64 of the Variation in Attitude

D

4

(.002)

.

(Sig)

Main Effect
(MS)

Expected Cost Effects Explain .17 of the Variation in Attitude

A5

1

1

5.71
(5.71)

df

Squares

(Mean Square)

Sum of

A3

Belief
Code

*The chi-square for this item and the group classification is significant at a .05 level.
group is analyzed in the manuscript.

--Would any of your responses
regarding the effect of the
internal control points on
your assessment of management change i f the company
involved was small (as
opposed to a medium-si2ed
or large company)?
Yes No

Attitude

61

1980

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ethics Policy Exists

No

Internal Audit Department
Exists

Considerations
No

Cost/Benefit

WeBelieveCost/Benefit
Relationships Appropriately Balanced

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

" i n a l l material
respects"

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

1981
Prepared F/S

InherentLimitationsof
Internal Control

No

Yes

Yes

1981
Prepared F/S

Beatrice

No

No

1980
Prepared F/S

AshlandOil,
Inc.

No

Yes

Yes

Prepared F/S

Armco

Depend

Yes

Yes

Prepared F/S

1980

Aluminum Company
American
of America
Bnands, Inc.

COMPANY

Effective Systems
Upon ...

Maintains System of
Controls

Controls Designed for
Reasonable Assurance ...

Management Responsibilities

AnnualReportReviewed

EXHIBIT B
A Content Analysis of Management Reports

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Prepared F/S

1980

Bendix
Corporalion
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to Board

No

With Respect

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

-GAAS Only Requires
Tests of Controls to
the. Extent Deemed
Appropriate

-Internal Accounting
Control vs. Internal
Controls
-Issuanceof Mgmt.
Letter vs. Report
on Adequacy

"selective tests of
i n t e r n a l accounting
controls"

No

No

No

No

Coopers & Lybrand

No

-GAAS Includes
Study&Evaluation

to Contnols

lities

No

Fairness of
financial Statements
•Limited Responsibi-

Coopers & Lybrand

•Responsible for

External Auditors

•Other Activities are
Described
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

•Recommend Auditor

Yes

Yes

•Member are not
Internal
•MeetWith Auditors

Yes

Yes

Audit Committee Exists

Aluminum Company
American
of America
Brands,
Inc.

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

D e l o i t t e Raskins
& Sells

Yes
No
Approved Mgmt's
Recommendation
Yes

Yes

Yes

Armco

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Ernst & Whinney

No

"review and make
appropriate tests
of the systems of
i n t e r n a l accounting c o n t r o l . . . to
the extent they
consider necessary"
Yes

Yes

Yes

Bendix
Corporation

No

Yes

"GAAS, which require a
review of the system o f
i n t e r n a l accounting
controls i n order to
express the opinion
shown below."
No

No

No

D e l o i t t e Haskins
& Sells

Yes
No
"selects the independent
public accountants"
No

No
"Internal accounting
controls are also
monitored and tested
by a program of i n t e r n a l and external
audits "
No

Yes

Peat, Marwick,
M i t c h e l l & Co.

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Beatrice

Yes

Yes

Ashland Oil,
Inc.
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Form and Express

(1)

(2)

Chrmn. of
Board & CEO
Exec. V P Finance

No

Managers Regularly
Appraise Controls

Signatures Provided

No

-Specific Reference
to Material Weaknesses

None

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

"discuss t h e i r
(internal auditor's
and independent
CPAs') evaluation
of i n t e r n a l
accounting controls"

Management's Involvement in Replying to
Management Letter
Suggestions

Replaced by Internal
Auditing Work

Auditors' Work is

Auditors Regularly
Reporton Modfications and Improvements
in Internal Control

Opinions on the
AdequacyofInternal
Control

Aluminum Company
American
of America
Brands, Inc.

VP—Corp.
Finance & I n f o .
Resources

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Armco

None

No

No

No

No

No

No

Ashhland Oil,
Inc.

None

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Bendix
Corporation

(1) Pres. & CEO
(2) Exec. VP & Chief
Financial Officer

The a c t i v i t i e s of
the i n t e r n a l auditors
and independent public
accountants are coordinated to obtain
reasonable audit
coverage with a m i n i mum of d u p l i c a t e
e f f o r t and c o s t .

No

No

Beatrice

EXHIBIT C
No Management Report Included in Annual Report Reviewed

Year

Auditor

A l l i e d Chemical
American Can Co.
American Home Products Corp.
Atlantic Richfield

1980
1980
1980
1976

Price Waterhouse & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand

Boeing
Borden, Inc.

1973
1979

Touche Ross & Co.
Price Waterhouse & Co.

Caterpillar
Champion International Corporation
The Charter Co.
Chrysler Corp.
The Coastal Corporation
Consolidated Foods Corp.
CPC International

1978
1977
1980
1978
1980
1975
1977

Price Waterhouse & Co.
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Touche Ross & Co.
Touche Ross & Co.
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Main Lafrentz & Co.

Deere & Co.
Dow Chemical Co.

1979
1973

Deloitte Haskins & Sells
Deloitte Haskins & Sells

Esmark
Exxon

1981
1979

Arthur Young & Co.
Price Waterhouse & Co.

Farmland Industries

1981

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

General Dynamics
The Greyhound Corp.
Gulf 4 Western Industries,

1977
1976
1974

Arthur Andersen & Co.
Touche Ross & Co.
Ernst & Ernst

International Paper Co.
ITT
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.

1977
1976
1978

Arthur Andersen & Co.
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Touche Ross & Co.

Johnson & Johnson

1978

Coopers & Lybrand

The LTV Corp.
Litton Industries,

1975
1976

Ernst & Ernst
Touche Ross & Co.

McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing

1977
1977

Ernst & Ernst
Coopers & Lybrand

Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Owens-Illinois

1976
1977

Arthur Andersen & Co.
Arthur Young & Co.

Republic Steel

1980

Ernst & Whinney

The Signal Companies
Standard O i l Company (Indiana)

1976
1977

Haskins & Sells
Price Waterhouse & Co.

Tenneco

1979

Arthur Andersen & Co.

Union O i l Co.
Union Pacific Corp.

1979
1975

Coopers& Lybrand
Deloitte Haskins 4 Sells

Weyerhaeuser

1977

Arthur Andersen & Co.

Xerox Corporation

1977

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Company

Inc.

Inc.

No Annual Report Available to Researcher

Amerada Hess
CBS
Gulf O i l
International Business Machines
Marathon O i l
Phillips Petroleum
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Standard O i l (Ohio)
Texaco
Texas Instruments
TRW
United Brands
US Steel

Discussant's Response to
How Not to Communicate Material and
Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls
Alan N. Certain
Price Waterhouse
Born, I believe, in response to the SEC's post-FCPA proposal to require
management and auditor reporting on internal accounting controls, principally
to provide the Commission an objective summary of the likely results of any
rule it might adopt, Dr. Wallace's survey lives on to explain the difficulties
management and auditors face when trying to describe internal accounting
controls to the "stakeholders" of a business enterprise.
To cynically summarize the survey (in words somewhat different from
those of Dr. Wallace), I read it to give evidence supporting four points:
Point one—When given facts about control conditions within an enter
prise, people—even such sophisticated users offinancialand accounting
data as the nine groups surveyed—place greatly varying interpretations
on the facts.
Point Two—Point One doesn't matter, because people—even such
sophisticated users offinancialand accounting data as the nine groups
surveyed—don't want the facts. They want a summary overview or
opinion from someone else.
Point Three—-When"someoneelse"—and so far this has been manage
ment, through the new breed of responsibility reports that proliferated
after the recommendations of the Cohen Commission and the FEI—
does summarize an enterprise's control responsibilities, it is likely to be
in language that is sometimes technically incorrect and always subject to
the same varying interpretations as are the underlying facts.
Point Four— Point Three is not surprising, since the survey evidence
supporting Point One demonstrates a great diversity of opinion about
the facts of the effectiveness of internal controls and about the effects of
various so-called control weaknesses, even among the preparers
themselves, the preparers of the responsibility reports cited in Point
Three.
Overall, Dr. Wallace's survey and analysis bear out the title of her paper.
None of the methods implemented so far to disclose information about an
enterprise's internal accounting control—whether a recitation of control
weaknesses, a report by management of strengths and weaknesses, or an
opinion by management—is likely to be successful in communicating a uniform
message. One suggested communications device—an auditor's opinion—has
yet to be tested in practice, but I'll have more to say about that device.
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Future Prospects
However, this entire issue of the best methodology to report on internal
accounting controls may be moot today. I say that because of current SEC
inactivity in the area, and because of my belief in two points of human nature.
The points are, first, people tend to devote a majority of their attention to
those matters they believe are most important to their well-being, with balance
between long-term and short-term effects. My belief in this point leads me to
the conclusion that, by and large, in the period immediately before the SEC's
post-FCPA proposal, managements were satisfied that there was a proper
cost/benefit relationship for control documentation and disclosure.
The second point of human nature I believe in is that, in the short term at
least, criticism from others, particularly critics who have the power to enforce
their views on the individual, diverts the individual's attention to quelling those
criticisms. My belief in this point is consistent with observed activity during the
years since enactment of the FCPA of 1977. The SEC's proposal to require a
management report on internal accounting controls, together with an audit
opinion on such report, stimulated activity in the early part of this period.
However, with the release of ASR 278 in June 1980,1 believe we began to see
a diminution of management's concern with this subject and of management's
devotion of resources to strengthening internal accounting control. ASR 305,
issued in January 1982, states, in essence, that the SEC is satisfied that the
private sector has responded appropriately and that no regulatory disclosures
are required. In my view, we have already seen the majority of developments
in public disclosures of internal accounting control. I doubt that we'll see much
auditor attestation in public reports.
And in my view, the current status of public disclosure of internal
accounting control is not deficient. Dr. Wallace's survey tells me that peopleeven sophisticated users—aren't really interested in knowing a lot about
internal accounting controls in business enterprises. And if I'm wrong—if
knowledgeable users of internal accounting control data really want it, and
really want auditor involvement—I believe the forces of the market will bring
forth the level of disclosure wanted by the users.
Half of the top 100 companies and a significant percentage of other large
companies do have management responsibility reports addressing internal
accounting control. The SEC, in ASR 305, expresses satisfaction, not dismay,
with the diversity of language found in these reports. A few of these companies
have already included auditor opinions. If such information is truly useful, this
fact should become apparent to other providers and they should raise their
standards. In other words, I don't believe Gresham's Law applies to public
financial reporting. But the cost/benefit ratio must be positive.
Let's assume, for purposes of further discussion, that users do want more
reporting on internal accounting controls. What form should the reporting take?
Report Preferences
Dr. Wallace's survey presented eight possible forms. The preferences of
preparers and users, I think, are interesting. Dr. Wallace presented the
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alternatives alphabetically. I've rearranged them in ascending order from least
expensive to most expensive and compared the preference rankings. (See
Exhibit.) You might take some minor exception to the precise order of least
expensive to most expensive, but I expect that in most cases you wouldn't
want to alter an item by more than one place in the table.
Exhibit
A Cost/Benefit Comparison of
Internal Accounting Control Reports
Reporting Basis

Preference Rank
Preparers
Users

Least Expensive
F. Management's opinion without auditor in
volvement
C. Management's description of controls, without
auditor involvement
D. Auditor's Letter of Recommendations (weak
nesses)
E. Auditor's listing of both strengths and weak
nesses
G. Management's opinion, with materiality limits,
attested to by auditor
A. Auditor's opinion with materiality limits
H. Management's opinion without materiality
limits, attested to by auditor
B. Auditor's opinion without materiality limits

1

4

6

2

7

6

8

7

2
3

5
1

4
5

8
3

Most Expensive
In my view, the preferences of the preparer group are the most telling
ones. I say that, of course, because I'm a member of the preparer group. My
interpretation of the preference ranking for preparers is that preparers believe,
first of all—and this is supported by Dr. Wallace's analysis, also—that an
overall summary or opinion, rather than details, is preferred. But, second, my
analysis says preparers believe that the benefits are of such doubtful quantifica
tion, that the less costly the approach, the more desirable the results. I agree.
In other words, the rankings one to five of the preparer group are all summary
disclosures, leading from least expensive to most expensive. And their last
choices are the ones which involve a lot of details.
The user group is less clear in its message. But, except for the anomaly of a
preference ranking of 2 for report Form C, the users also demonstrate a
preference for summaries or opinions, rather than for details.
At the present time, the form and extent of internal accounting control
disclosure is controlled by the preparer groups, and the present predominant
67

disclosure of internal accounting control is Form F. If we're going to have more
disclosure, in the present voluntary climate, it will be the preparers—the board
of directors, management and auditors—who determine the form of such
expansion.
Looking again to the preference ranking, it seems most likely that the next
step might be auditor attestation of a management opinion with materiality
limits (Rank 2) and this, I believe, was Dr. Wallace's conclusion as well, from
much more rigorous analysis.
Possibilities if Auditors Involved
If we are going to have more involvement of auditors, what form should it
take? In my view, auditor involvement has four aspects which I call "Documen
tation," "Evaluation," "Verification," and "Attestation."
Statements on Auditing Standards, particularly SAS No. 30, provide a good
starting point for auditor involvement. However, I note that little published
reporting has appeared so far. I've seen no comprehensive surveys, but
anecdotal evidence suggests that existing reports have been issued in conjunc
tion with audits that already were compliance-test oriented and where the
incremental cost was in the range of 5-10%. In other cases, where greater
expansion of effort would be required (say in the 25% and more of audit fees
range) auditors have not been retained to report on controls.
I do believe, though, that while it's a good foundation, SAS 30 rests in part
on the pragmatic fact that control systems, by and large, are inadequately
documented. This comes out in the provision of SAS 30 that mandates a
method of documentation as a basis for common understanding between
management and the auditor, while acknowledging this documentation might be
prepared by the auditor himself. While this approach works for reporting on the
past, it offers no comfort as to expectations for the future.
Internal control reporting is clearly future oriented. While it has been
correctly said that the projection of evaluation into the future is subject to the
risks that conditions will change and that the degree of compliance will
deteriorate, and while these are valid risks, they simply point up the
importance of proper documentation. Without proper documentation, the
internal accounting control system is, as I call it, "personage dependent."
Documentation makes the system "personage independent." Without docu
mentation of the system, the loss of a key employee—that is, the only one with
knowledge of the workings of systems or subsystems within that person's
sphere of responsibility—creates a void in the control system that must first be
recognized by others before it can be corrected. Since, in most organizations,
people tend to not fully understand what other people do outside their
immediate proximity, the absence of a procedure completed by a departed
person may, in fact, not even be noticed until the condition has become
irretrievably lost. With proper documentation, the system is personage
independent and can recover, though its proper functioning may suffer for a
time.
Importance of Documentation
For these reasons, I believe documentation of control systems is by far the
number one requirement for the reliability of control systems with a future
orientation.
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Documentation should have four dimensions:
First, there should be documentation of each type of transaction, showing
each procedure and control step to be performed all the way from inception to
ultimate recording in the enterprise records. The typical flow chart is
representative of this kind of documentation.
Second, a proper evaluation depends on consideration of all the accounting
and control functions performed by an individual. This documentation is often
called a job description. We might consider these to be individual inclusionary
controls.
Third, and of equal importance, are exclusionary controls. To illustrate:
Jones may reconcile the bank account and have no other assigned cash
responsibilities. This would seem to be a good segregation of duties and a
strong control. However, if Jones could obtain blank check stock without
detection, the control is abrogated. The fact that the organization chart and job
description indicate that Jones is independent loses its significance. This is why
exclusionary controls, such as locked cabinets, restricted access areas and
computer terminal ID's and passwords are so important. And without complete
documentation of the system, these flaws can be overlooked for years.
Work Plans are the fourth dimension of the control documentation process.
Work Plans outline procedures to be carried out or reports to be prepared on
each day of the accounting period. A quarterly closing schedule, which is used
to assure management that all the analyses and judgments required for
preparation offinancialstatements have been completed, is a prime example of
such a Work Plan.
Internal Control Evaluation and Verification
The evaluation stage of the process is adequately described in Statements
on Auditing Standards, also. It consists of a searching contemplation of existing
conditions looking for weaknesses. A common approach to the search is for the
auditor to ask, "If I wanted to circumvent the system without detection, how
could I do it?" The underlying rationale of this approach is that, by identifying
all avenues to deliberately defeat the system, the auditor will also have covered
accidental exposures. I observe without further comment that the enunciation
of this "how can I beat it" view is probably a major contributor to the
continuing view of many users that the detection of fraud is a primary purpose
of an audit—a view that is apparent in responses to Dr. Wallace's survey.
Evaluation can be made of a system that is poorly documented. But that
evaluation is much more biased toward the past than an evaluation of a welldocumented system of internal accounting control Further, evaluation of a
poorly-documented or undocumented system is a process that must be
repeated from the ground up each time a conclusion is needed. The evaluation
of a well-documented system, on the other hand, increases in reliability each
time it is done because the auditor is able to build upon prior knowledge,
perhaps exploring relationships between duties that were previously over
looked.
The verification phase, likewise, is adequately covered in Statements on
Auditing Standards. While extensive compliance testing is certainly not
employed in all audits, the procedures are familiar and the implications of the
test results are understood.
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Reporting on Internal Control
The attestation or reporting phase is the final one, and is one where, in my
view, more information than provided by SAS 30 should be conveyed. The user
should have access to more information than simply the final statement that the
auditor is satisfied there are no material weaknesses in the internal accounting
control system. By this, I don't mean we should remove materiality considera
tions, but rather, I mean the user should be told a little more about the basis of
the opinion.
Again, in my view, the most significant factor is the extent of documenta
tion, and the report should include information about it. One approach might be
to define a term "gross transaction volume" as the sum of all debit and credit
changes in all accounts during the period under examination and then to
address an opinion to the adequate documentation of systems controlling X
percentage of gross transaction volume.
In conclusion, I believe Dr. Wallace's survey and analysis clearly summa
rize the diversity of viewpoints between users and preparers and within groups
on the subject of internal accounting control reporting. I agree that the
approaches studied in the paper show clearly "How Not to Communicate
Material and Immaterial Weaknesses in Accounting Controls." If further
expansion of disclosure does develop, auditors stand ready to participate, but
there is a great need for better systems documentation to provide a basis for
future-oriented evaluation.
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Human Information Processing Research in
Auditing: A Review and Synthesis
Robert H. Ashton
New York University
The importance of individual decision making to the audit process is
increasingly being recognized. Decisions involving the collection, interpretation
and integration of audit evidence are receiving attention from auditing firms
concerned with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of audits. Concur
rent with the profession's interest in audit decision making, a growing body of
knowledge about decision making by practicing auditors is being generated by
academic researchers. This body of knowledge, based on human information
processing research, focuses on the understanding, evaluation and improve
ment of audit decision making. It offers great potential for identifying shortcom
ings of audit decision making, and for reducing or eliminating those
shortcomings.
This paper reviews and synthesizes human information processing re
search in auditing. Its purpose is to introduce this body of knowledge to
readers who are relatively unfamiliar with it. Coverage of the topic is fairly
broad, emphasizing the questions of why this research is conducted and what
its implications are, and de-emphasizing methodological issues of experimental
design and analysis. The discussion proceeds in four parts: (1) some
background information on human information processing research in auditing,
(2) an explanation of the reasons for conducting this type of research, (3) an
overview of the research evidence, and (4) a consideration of some of its
practical implications.
1

Introduction and Background
Human information processing research in auditing focuses on several
decision-related activities of practicing auditors. Although a large audit may
entail hundreds of judgments and decisions, it is useful for research purposes to
abstract audit decision making to four basic types of decision-related activities:
(1) evaluations or judgments of current information, (2) predictions of future
outcomes, (3) assessments of the probability that particular outcomes will
occur (and revisions of such probabilities), and (4) choices among alternative
courses of action.
For example, auditors collect, interpret and combine various types of
evidence in order to evaluate internal control system design, the materiality of
an item, and the implications of sample outcomes. Auditors may predict errorrate levels in audit populations, or the future going-concern status of a client, or
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they may assess probability distributions over error-rate levels or goingconcern status. Auditors make choices among alternatives when selecting
sample sizes, the type of opinion to issue, and disclosure alternatives.
Obviously, these are only a few of the areas in which auditors make
evaluations, predictions, probability assessments and choices. Moreover,
these four types of decision-related activities are not necessarily practiced as
distinct phases of audit decision making. For example, an auditor might use the
results of internal control evaluation and preliminary testing to predict the
specific error-rate level in a population or to assess a probability distribution
over several possible error rates, and then combine these evaluations,
predictions and assessments with additional information in order to choose
among alternatives types or amounts of subsequent testing. For research
purposes, however, it is convenient to regard these four decision-related
activities as relatively distinct, because rigorous research methods exist for
studying each of the four.
These decision-related activities are studied by human information process
ing research in controlled experimental settings designed to mirror the realworld decision contexts of interest. This type of research does not rely on
auditors' self-reports of their decisions (e.g., through surveys or interviews),
and does not rest on anecdotal evidence about decision making. Instead, it
takes advantage of the primary strength of the experimental method—the
control over confounding variables, which, in other types of research methods,
make it difficult to draw reliable scientific inferences.
Human information processing research is guided by decision-making
paradigms (or models, or theories, or "world views") which provide opera
tional frameworks for choosing variables to be examined, for forming expecta
tions about relationships between independent and dependent variables, for
designing particular studies, and for interpreting and integrating research
results. In addition to providing comprehensive perspectives from which to
conduct and interpret research, the paradigms also entail criteria for evaluating
and improving human performance in information processing, judgment and
decision making. These paradigms were developed primarily in the discipline of
cognitive psychology, but they also were developed in economics and statis
tics.
From a methodological standpoint, human information processing research
in auditing can be traced directly to earlier developments in cognitive
psychology. For all practical purposes, the interest in human information
processing research began less than 30 years ago with the appearance of Ward
Edwards' classic article on decision making. To appreciate the enormity of the
literature that has appeared since then, consider that in the past 20 years the
Annual Review of Psychology has published five reviews of this research, with
each review covering the empirical studies published since the previous
review. The number of studies cited has ranged from about 140 to about 320
for these five reviews. A complementary line of research that comes from
psychology (as well as from business and economics) has been pursued since
the mid-1950s by Herbert Simon and his colleagues.
More to the point, however, is the sizable amount of human information
processing research conducted in accounting and auditing contexts. This work
has been done by researchers with training in accounting and auditing,
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psychology, and statistics, and has been published in the accounting and
auditing literature (and, increasingly, in the psychology literature). The
research in accounting and auditing began approximately 10 years ago, and
both its quantity and quality have grown significantly since then. By 1976/77,
there were enough studies in accounting and auditing to warrant a literature
review, and enough interest in the future development of the area that an
American Accounting Association committee was formed to evaluate its
potential contributions. After the appearance of the committee's report and
the literature review, the number of human information processing studies in
accounting and auditing increased dramatically. My own recent review identi
fied some 100 published articles or unpublished working papers in this area.
The human information processing studies in our literature relate to a wide
variety of issues infinancialaccounting, managerial accounting, and auditing.
However, the studies devoted to auditing are the most extensive and realistic
of all. I am aware of approximately 50 articles or working papers which report
empirical results on audit decision making. It is important to recognize that the
people whose decision making was examined in these studies were practicing
auditors, not college students or other surrogates for auditors. More than
2,500 auditors from national, regional and localfirmshave participated in these
studies, and they represent all levels in these firms. Further, in many cases the
researchers had the advice of practicing auditors in designing their research
studies. While some of the studies might be considered "basic" research,
since they relied on abstract and simplified representations of the audit
process, most have had an applied orientation. Taken as a whole, the set of
human information processing studies in auditing is an invaluable source for
understanding audit decision making, and for drawing practical implications.
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Reasons for Studying Audit Decision Making
Before reviewing the research results and their potential implications, it
may be useful to consider explicitly the reasons for doing human information
processing research in auditing. The ultimate goal of this research is to
improve audit decision making. Before decision making can be improved,
however, it is useful to evaluate the current quality of decision making, and
before decision quality can be evaluated, decision making must be understood.
Thus, three reasons for studying audit decision making are to understand,
evaluate and improve audit decisions.
Understanding Audit Decision Making. Before audit decision making can be
evaluated or improved, it must be understood. The research in this area
focuses on such general questions as: How do auditors make evaluations,
predictions, probability assessments and choices? What items of information,
or "cues," influence their decisions? Can their decision making be systemat
ically explained by some information-processing biases or by some aspects of
the decision setting?
Efforts to understand audit decision making involve attempts to describe
audit decision making. Most such attempts rely on representational models of
decision making; that is, models that represent the relationships among the
multiple cues that serve as inputs for information processing and decision
making, and the decisions that result. This type of "input-output" modeling is
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frequently operationalized by constructing a linear multiple regression model
that represents the auditors' processing of information. This is done by
providing the auditor with several (experimentally controlled) combinations of
values on each of certain cues that are used for making decisions, and recording
the auditor's decision for each combination of cue values. The decisions
(evaluations, predictions, etc.) are then regressed on the cue values. Other
possibilities are to attempt to represent the auditor's intuitive probability
revisions via Bayes Rule for probability revision, or to attempt to represent
choices among alternatives via an expected utility model. Bayesian, regres
sion, and utility models can then be used as starting points for describing, and
understanding, audit decision making.
Evaluating Audit Decision Making. A second reason for doing human
information processing research in auditing is to evaluate audit decision
making, and, accordingly, much of the research goes beyond simply trying to
understand audit decision making as it exists. Decision making in auditing has
been evaluated against six criteria: (1) accuracy, (2) normativeness, (3)
stability, (4) consensus, (5) insight, and (6) consistency with professional
auditing standards.
The accuracy criterion implies that an auditor wants his or her decisions to
be correct. This criterion can be used for evaluations or predictions if an
external reference point is available, or will become available in the future. For
example, an accuracy criterion can be used in going-concern evaluations by
seeing whether firms predicted to go bankrupt actually do go bankrupt. An
accuracy criterion can be used for evaluating subjective probability assess
ments if relative frequency information is available. However, the number of
audit decision contexts in which an accuracy criterion can be used appears to be
extremely small.
The criterion of normativeness can be (and has been) used more extensively
in the research on audit decision making. Use of this criterion implies that an
auditor wants his or her decisions to correspond with those prescribed by
normative or statistical standards of decision making. For example, choices
among alternatives might be evaluated in some contexts against the normative
standard of expected utility maximization. Probability revisions can be evalu
ated against the statistical standard of Bayes Rule, a logical consequence of
conditional probabilities that prescribes the optimal revision of prior proba
bilities upon the receipt of new data. Subjective probability assessments can be
evaluated against several types of normative standards, including the proba
bility axioms that relate to the combinatorial properties of probabilities. As a
final example, an auditor's interpretations of sample outcomes can be evaluated
by the extent to which these interpretations reveal an appreciation for (1) the
inverse relationship between sample size and sampling variability, or (2) the
impact of data reliability.
Three other criteria for evaluating audit decision making which are
frequently employed in the research literature are stability, consensus and
insight. Stability refers to the question of whether one auditor, given the same
data at different points in time, will make the same decision. Consensus
addresses the question of whether different auditors, given the same data at
one point in time, will make the same decision. Insight refers to the degree of
understanding that an auditor has into his or her own decision process as
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represented by a model of that process. These three criteria can be employed
in addition to accuracy and normativeness, but they are most often used when
accuracy and normativeness cannot be employed. One rationale for stability is
that perfectly stable decisions have no random component, which has a
detrimental effect on decision accuracy. A rationale for both stability and
consensus is that the cost and/or quality of an audit may fluctuate needlessly if
decision making is inconsistent over time or across auditors. The rationale for
insight involves the importance of an auditor's understanding his or her own
decision making if he or she attempts to train other auditors in decision making.
A sixth criterion for evaluating audit decisions, which is rarely mentioned in
the research literature but would appear to be extremely important, is the
extent to which decisions are consistent with professional auditing standards. In
some cases, auditing standards may be sufficiently precise that they can serve
as criteria for decision evaluation. Examples include the SAS 39 statement that
the extent of substantive testing required to obtain sufficient evidence should
vary inversely with the auditor's reliance on internal control, and the SAS 31
statements that evidence based on the auditor's direct personal knowledge or
obtained from independent sources outside the client entity should ordinarily
be considered more reliable than evidence obtained indirectly or secured solely
within the entity.
Improving Audit Decision Making. When research finds shortcomings in
audit decision making vis-a-vis any of these six criteria, attention naturally
turns tofindingways of improving audit decision making. Five possibilities have
been considered: (1) increasing the auditor's awareness of his or her
information-processing shortcomings, (2) feedback, (3) changing the data set,
(4) education/training, and (5) the use of decision models. Obviously, these
possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
The first alternative, increasing awareness, may be a prerequisite for the
application of the other four. It may also be a useful alternative in its own right.
If auditors are aware of the possibility that their decision making may
sometimes involve shortcomings, and if the nature of these shortcomings is
made explicit, then they may be willing to monitor their decision making.
Monitoring could involve the provision of feedback information about the
outcomes of past decisions so that a "track record" could be established. It
could also involve the provision of information about the auditor's own decision
process or about data relationships in the environment. Such monitoring could
also lead to changing the data set on which audit decision are based. This could
involve a search for additional data to include in the decision process, as well as
the elimination of data that already are included.
A fourth possibility for improving audit decision making is education and
training. This could be undertaken in both university courses and in-house
training modules in auditing firms, and could include training in statistical and
probabilistic concepts as well as exposure to the results of human information
processing research studies. Finally, decision models could be used to supple
ment or replace intuitive decision making in repetitive audit decision contexts.
This alternative could entail the use of optimal models such as Bayes Rule,
statistical models based on environmental data relationships, and models of the
auditor's own decision process. One feature that these five decision-improve
ment alternatives share, to a greater or lesser extent, is that of providing
10
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structure for intuitive decision making. Establishing some type of structure may
be necessary if audit decision making is to be improved.
Justifying or Defending Audit Decision Making. Although it is not explicitly
addressed in the research literature, a fourth reason for doing human
information processing research in auditing is to provide a sound basis for
explaining, justifying or defending audit decision making to parties who might
question the auditor's application of "professional judgment." These parties
could include an auditor's superiors, peers or subordinates, as well as
regulatory agencies and the courts. While the literature's overriding concern
with improving audit decision making implies that it needs improving (and the
research results generally support this contention), many studies have found
auditors to be rather good decision makers vis-a-vis the six decision-evaluation
criteria mentioned earlier. In addition, decision making by auditors has been
found to be relatively good compared to that of other groups of experts such as
physicians and clinical psychologists. Thus, auditors may wish to use the
results of human information processing research as a basis for defending, as
well as improving, audit decision making.
The Research Results
Most of the research has focused on understanding and evaluating audit
decision making. A sufficient number of studies has appeared in four areas to
permit some generalizations: (1) materiality/disclosure judgments, (2) internal
control evaluation, (3) probability assessment, and (4) evaluation of sample
outcomes and other types of audit evidence. A few studies have been reported
in other areas.
Materiality/Disclosure Judgments. Some studies have addressed mate
riality/disclosure issues directly, while others have addressed such issues
indirectly as part of a study devoted primarily to some other topic. Many of
these studies have focused on the type of disclosure recommended for specific
items (e.g., an inventory write-down) of varying sizes, while others have dealt
with the specification of overall pre-audit materiality levels for planning
purposes. Still others have examined the interaction between materiality and
uncertainty.
One consistent finding is that simple linear models based on a small number
of cues explain a large proportion of the variance in materiality/disclosure
judgments of individual auditors. For virtually all auditors studied, impact on
net income has been the most important factor in such judgments, but there
has been little agreement on the importance of other factors, resulting in only
moderate levels of consensus among different auditors. Differences in mate
riality and disclosure judgments have been found between auditors and other
professional groups (e.g., investment analysts and lending officers) and among
auditors from different firms and different levels of experience. The amount of
uncertainty about the proper valuation of an item has been found to influence
materiality/disclosure judgments, and, conversely, an item's materiality has
been found to affect judgments about acceptable levels of uncertainty.
Internal Control Evaluation. More studies have been devoted to internal
control evaluation than to any other topic. Most of these studies have simply
asked auditors to rate the strength of an internal control system (in a particular
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area such as payroll or the sales/collections cycle) as certain internal control
indicators changed. Others have studied the effects of changes in internal
control strength on the allocation of audit work to different types of testing, or
the effects of such changes on the judgmental selection of sample sizes for
substantive testing.
As with materiality/disclosure judgments, the research has found that the
internal control evaluations of individual auditors can be represented well by
simple linear models based on a small number of cues. Consensus across
auditors has been found to be relatively high for ratings of internal control
strength, but moderate to low for the allocation of audit effort and the selection
of sample sizes in response to internal control changes. Stability and selfinsight have been found to be high.
Internal control cues related to separation of duties have been found to
dominate internal control evaluations. Moreover, the number of hours planned
for audit testing in specific areas has been found to vary inversely with the
rated strength of internal control, and sample-size specifications have been
found to change in the appropriate direction in response to changes in the
strength of internal control. Finally, the evidence on firm and experience-level
effects has been mixed: Some studies have noted small effects on consensus,
insight and the importance of separation-of-duties cues, while other studies
have found no effects.
Probability Assessment. Studies of probability assessment and revision have
been conducted in both attribute and variables contexts. Most studies have
provided the participating auditors with some background information and then
asked for subjective probability assessments over error-rate levels or popula
tion values of account balances. Some studies, however, have focused on the
revision of probabilities after new data are received, and others have investi
gated the impact of subjective probability assessments on sample sizes and on
the chances of making Type I and Type II errors.
The studies have shown that auditors can understand and use several
probability elicitation methods. In attribute contexts, however, low consensus
in probability assessments has been found across auditors when the same
elicitation method is used, and low convergence in probability assessments has
been found when one auditor uses different elicitation methods. Different
methods have also been found to result in different sample-size specifications.
In addition, judgmentally-revised distributions have been found to be more
diffuse and to result in larger sample sizes than distributions revised via Bayes
Rule.
In the variables contexts studied, the variability in fractile assessments
across auditors was greater for the more extreme fractiles assessed, and the
variability for given fractiles was greater across individual auditors than across
three-person teams of auditors. Also, the teams assessed higher probabilities
near the actual population values, and lower probabilities elsewhere, than the
individuals did. Studies in both attribute and variables contexts have found that
internal control strength has some effects on probability assessments. For
example, distributions assessed by individual auditors have been found to be
tighter, and to be less variable across auditors, for stronger internal control
systems.
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Evaluation of Sample Outcomes and Other Types of Audit Evidence. Another
set of studies has focused on some decision "heuristics," or rules-of-thumb,
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that auditors might use to reduce the complexity of certain types of audit
decisions. Heuristics may be beneficial since they reduce the time and effort
required for decision making, and in many cases they may result in "good"
decisions. On the other hand, they may also lead to systematic biases in
decision making by causing the auditor to ignore relevant information and/or to
process irrelevant information. The studies in this group have attempted to
demonstrate the existence of such biases across a variety of audit-related
decision contexts.
Some studies suggest that many auditors are insensitive to the importance
of sample size when evaluating sample outcomes, and do not have sufficient
appreciation for the inverse relationship between sample size and sampling
variability. Other studies have suggested that auditors are not sufficiently
sensitive to the reliability of information or to the importance of prior
probabilities. Still others have found that auditors' evaluations and probability
assessments are influenced by irrelevant information.
Other Studies. Human information processing studies have been conducted
in several additional auditing areas, but not in sufficient quantity to allow
generalizations about the results. Topics addressed include: (1) analytic
review, (2) review of financial forecasts, (3) evaluation of the competence of
internal audit departments, (4) audit seniors' performance evaluations of their
subordinates, (5) predictions of going-concern status, (6) perceptions of the
messages intended by different types of audit reports, (7) perceptions of
auditors' independence, and (8) the applicability of expected utility theory as a
framework for audit decision making.
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Implications for Practice
Given the goal of improved decision making, the practical implications of
human information processing research in auditing are suggested by the five
decision-improvement alternatives discussed earlier: increasing awareness,
education/training, feedback, changing the data set, and using formal models.
This final section of the paper elaborates briefly on some of these alterna
tives.
It seems reasonable to believe that auditors will be better able to improve
decision making if they are aware of the information-processing shortcomings
that affect their decisions. Therefore, efforts to communicate to auditors the
results of human information processing research are important, and have been
undertaken in some instances. Such efforts could lead to the inclusion of
training materials on judgment and decision making in formal in-house training
programs. Auditing researchers are beginning to develop materials which
might be useful for this purpose. Another possibility is to include such
materials in auditing courses in universities, and some efforts in this direction
have been made. The need for auditors to be trained in decision making, as
well as in auditing, is one of the principal implications of this research.
Other important implications relate to structuring the audit decision
process. This could involve the provision of checklists or other types of explicit
guidance to assist auditors in both the selection of relevant information and the
integration of multiple items of information to reach a decision.
A national auditing firm has recently implemented a structured approach for
computing sample sizes for substantive testing when statistical sampling is not
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used. Actual sample sizes that depart from the computed sample sizes by
more than 20 percent must be explicitly justified, the approach relies on a
combination of equations and decision tables to mechanically process six types
of information. This information is based on auditors' judgments related to
expected monetary error in an account and the strength of internal control, in
addition to information about the size of the account, materiality, the level of
stratification of the sample, and the existence of overlapping substantive tests.
In effect, this method specifies the variables to be used, the weighting factors
for these variables, and the way in which the variables are to be combined to
arrive at sample sizes. There is some arbitrariness in the weights for the
variables, but the appropriate variables are included, and the directions of their
impact on sample size are correctly specified. A large body of analytical and
empirical research has shown that selecting the appropriate variables and
weighting them in the appropriate directions is often more important to
decision quality than is refinement of the weights themselves. Moreover, the
use of such a method should substantially reduce inconsistencies across
auditors in the selection of sample sizes.
The structured approach just described relies on a formal model to aid the
auditor in processing information and making decisions. The research evidence
suggests that other types of formal models would also improve audit decision
making. Examples include models for weighing and combining internal control
indicators in order to quantify the strength of an internal control system,
models for analytical reviews, and models of bankruptcy prediction to aid in
going-concern evaluations. The evidence strongly supports the use of
statistical sampling and the statistical evaluation of sample results.
In conclusion, I believe the results of human information processing
research have important implications for the practice of auditing. Some of these
implications are at the level of the individual auditor (e.g., the need for
awareness and education), but most are at the level of the auditing firm (e.g.,
the need for training programs and formal models). Indeed, some firms have
already shown significant interest in potentially changing some aspects of their
practice in response to the research results. At the very least, the evidence
generated in this area is consistent with, and can be used to support, activities
such as providing structure for decisions and using formal models, although
these activities may not have been directly motivated by the research results.
In addition to having practical implications at the individual and firm levels,
human information processing research can produce results that are relevant at
the standard-setting level. For example, the Auditing Standards Board revised
the exposure draft of SAS 39 to eliminate a suggested probability-assessment
method which human information processing research had shown to result in
excessive Type II errors. While it would be an overstatement to claim that
human information processing research is sweeping the auditing profession like
wildfire, it does seem to be kindling some interest among practitioners and
policy makers. Hopefully, this interest will increase as more people become
familiar with its potential benefits.
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Footnotes
1. Recent books by Ashton (1982) and Libby (1981) analyze human information processing
research in auditing, and in other areas of accounting, in great detail. This research is also
reviewed by Libby and Lewis (forthcoming).
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2. The two major paradigms that have guided human information processing research in
auditing are the "lens" and "probabilistic judgment" paradigms. The former, which is closely
linked to the decision-related activities of evaluation and prediction, emphasizes the construction of
linear models as representations of information processing by individuals. This paradigm further
emphasizes the relative accuracy of intuitive predictions versus those made by formal informationprocessing models, as well as the "weights" that decision makers (implicitly) attach to various
pieces of information in making evaluations or predictions. The probabilistic judgment paradigm
(which is also called the subjectively expected utility, or SEU, paradigm) is more closely linked to
choices among alternative actions and to the assessment, revision and use of probabilities in
decision making. It emphasizes the relationship between intuitive assessments, revisions and
choices and those prescribed by formal models. These paradigms are discussed at length by
Ashton (1982) and Libby (1981).
3. Edwards (1954).
4. Edwards (1961); Becker and McClintock (1967); Rapoport and Wallsten (1972); Slovic,
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1977); Einhorn and Hogarth (1981).
5. This research is summarized in several papers by Simon (1955, 1956, 1959, 1978, 1979a,
1979b).
6. Libby and Lewis (1977).
7. Ashton, Barrett, Elliott, Libby, Vasarhelyi and Wright (1977).
8. Ashton (1982).
9. Several aspects of basic and applied research in auditing are discussed by Kaplan (1977) and
Ashton (1981b).
10. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1982, Sec. 350.19 and Sec. 326.18).
11. Boatsman and Robertson (1974), Firth (1979), Messier (1979), Moriarity and Barron
(1976, 1979).
12. Lewis (1980), Newton (1977), Schultz and Reckers (1979), Ward (1974, 1976).
13. Ashton (1974a, 1974b), Ashton and Brown (1980), Biggs and Mock (1980), Gaumnitz,
Nunamaker, Surdick and Thomas (forthcoming), Hall and Zimmer (1981), Hamilton and Wright
(1977, 1980, 1981), Joyce (1976), Mock and Turner (1979, 1981), Reckers and Taylor (1979),
Weber (1978).
14. Corless (1972), Crosby (1980, 1981), Felix (1976), Kinney and Uecker (1982).
15. Solomon (forthcoming), Solomon, Krogstad, Romney and Tomassini (forthcoming).
16. Bamber (1980), Biddle and Joyce (1979, forthcoming), Gibbins (1977), Joyce and Biddle
(1981a, 1981b), Kinney and Uecker (1982), Uecker and Kinney (1977).
17. The references for these eight areas follow: 1—Blocher, Esposito and Willingham (1981).
2-Danos and Imhoff (1982). 3-Gibbs and Schroeder (1979). 4-Wright (1980). 5-Kida (1980).
6-Libby (1979). 7-Shockley (1981). 8-Ashton (1980, forthcoming), Lewis (1980), and Ward
(1974, 1976).
18. Practical implications of this research are also discussed by Holstrum (1980), Joyce and
Libby (1981), Libby (1981), and Messier and Snowball (1981).
19. An example is Holstrum (1980).
20. An example is Waller and Felix (1981).
21. Ashton (1981a).
22. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1980). Libby (1981) reports that Deloitte, Haskins & Sells
and Touche Ross & Co. have developed similar approaches for certain types of decisions.
23. For elaboration, see Ashton (1979).
24. Altman (1982) reports that Arthur Andersen & Co. is testing a bankruptcy-prediction
model for this purpose.
25. See Kinney and Uecker (1982) for elaboration.
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Discussant's Response to
Human Information Processing Research in
Auditing: A Review and Synthesis
Gary L. Holstrum
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells
My comments on this paper and on the underlying research are in three
categories: (1) a very favorable overall evaluation of the paper, (2) differences
in emphasis regarding specific areas of research described in the paper, and (3)
suggestions of tentative guidelines for using the implications of this research to
improve auditor judgments.
Overall Comments
The paper does an excellent job of accomplishing its stated objective of
reviewing and synthesizing the research in a manner designed to "introduce
the body of knowledge to readers who are relatively unfamiliar with it." As
mentioned in the paper, readers who wish to investigate the area in greater
depth should refer to the recent monographs by Ashton (1982) and Libby
(1981).
In this paper, Ashton provides helpful descriptions of six criteria used by
researchers to evaluate auditors' judgments: accuracy, normativeness, sta
bility, consensus, insight, and consistency with professional auditing standards.
The distinction between accuracy and normativeness is important. Although
auditor judgments are very rarely susceptible to evaluation by an accuracy
criterion (because of the unavailability of external, verifiable reference points),
they can often be evaluated on the basis of their degree of correspondence with
normative or statistical standards. Furthermore, when neither accuracy nor
normativeness criteria are feasible in the circumstances, researchers often
utilize consensus, stability, or insight. Such criteria are helpful because
evidence of lack of consensus or stability provides an indication of the lack of
accuracy and normativeness. However, the converse does not logically
follow—a high degree of consensus or stability does not necessarily indicate a
high degree of accuracy or conformity with normative standards.
The issue of whether auditors' judgments are more accurately described as
rather good or rather poor is not as important as the issue of how such
judgments can be improved. I agree with Ashton's conclusions that the
ultimate goal of this research is to improve auditors' judgments and that the
most salient common feature of efforts to improve such judgments is the
establishment of suitable structures for the decision making process.
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Differences in Emphasis Concerning Specific Research Findings
1. Materiality judgment research has been limited to public industrial
companies. In discussing the research on auditors' materiality judgments,
Ashton describes some of the general findings, and notes that "for virtully all
auditors studied, impact on net income has been the most important factor in
such judgments." However, the fact that virtually all of this research was
limited to public industrial companies effectively restricts the ability to
generalize the research results. I question whether the impact on net income
would have the same predominance for a nonpublic company (where primary
users are likely to be creditors with an interest in using various financial
statement relationships to predict future solvency) as it has for a public
company (where the primary users are likely to be investors with a primary
interest in using income and cash flows from continuing operations to predict
future cash flows). It is also doubtful whether this research (concerning public
industrial companies) could be validly generalized to financial institutions or
nonbusiness entities.
2. Auditor consensus regarding internal control evaluation may not be
"relatively high." In discussing the results of research (including his own) on
auditor evaluations of internal control, Ashton concludes, "Consensus across
auditors has been found to be relatively high for ratings of internal control
strength." Categorizing auditor consensus in this area as "relatively high,"
however, may not be appropriate. The research that demonstrated a higher
degree of consensus for such judgments than had been found generally for
other professions (see Ashton, 1974) reported an average correlation of .7
between pairs of auditor judgments. Although the average correlation was
generally higher than for other professions, it still explained only 49% of the
variability in judgments. Furthermore, the correlations between judgments of
some pairs of auditors in the Ashton study were as low as .04, and the
introduction of a more realistic degree of complexity in the internal accounting
control information presented to auditors resulted in a much lower degree of
consensus (see Reckers and Taylor, 1979).
Suggested Guidelines for Improving Auditor Judgments
The goal of this research is to improve auditor decision making. Based upon
the research findings, Ashton offers five decision-improvement alternatives
and discusses some audit-practice examples that introduce a structured
mechanism to improve auditor judgments. Although the alternatives and
examples Ashton offers are helpful, the profession also has a need for general
guidelines for utilizing this research to improve the audit judgment process.
Accordingly, I believe the audit judgment process can be improved through an
organized program that meets the following guidelines:
1. Recognize the capabilities as well as the limitations of individual
experts in making audit judgments.
2. Identify potential decision aids.
3. Identify areas of comparative advantage of both the individual
experts and the decision aids.
4. Develop structured frameworks that integrate the best features of
both individual experts and decision aids.
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The most difficult step in this process is the identification of the areas of
comparative advantage of individual experts and decision models. The Ashton
paper provides a good summary of the limitations of individual experts in
making audit judgments, and the statistical and operations research literature
identifies many potential decision aids. However, the research literature does
not provide as clear or definitive directions regarding areas of comparative
advantage. Nevertheless, I believe some general tendencies of comparative
advantage can be identified, at least tentatively, as described below.
In identifying areas where individual experts do a better job than models
(and conversely), it is helpful first to distinguish between unstructured and
structured judgment situations. In unstructured situations, most decision
models cannot effectively be applied, and individual experts are superior in
identifying potential patterns and bringing about some type of structure. In
structured situations, individual experts tend to be better at collecting and
coding information relevant to the judgment, and decision models tend to be
superior at combining and integrating the information.
For example, consider the process of confirming accounts receivable to
form a judgment about the validity of recorded receivables. This situation is
susceptible to being structured and successfully modeled in the sense that an
appropriate sample size can be determined—given certain information such as
required precision (tolerable error), required reliability, and expected error
rate. After the sample of confirmations has been taken and the individual
confirmation responses have been analyzed, the model can also be used to
make inferences about the population of recorded receivables by computing an
upper confidence limit. In this situation, the individual experts (auditors) can
most effectively be used to collect the information (by preparing, reviewing,
and sending the confirmation requests) and to code the information (by
determining which sample items represent errors or invalid recorded receiv
ables). The research has generally shown that the decision model is superior to
individual experts (auditors) at combining and integrating the information in
such audit situations. An effective and efficient audit process, therefore, will
include a structured framework that provides the auditor with the decision
model as an aid in the judgment process and thereby integrates tasks that are
performed best by the individual expert with those that are performed best by
a decision model.
Some recent trends have occurred in audit practice concerning the
development of a structured approach for making audit judgments in areas that
were previously regarded as being unstructured. Such approaches have tended
to use decision models, statistical formulas, and other structured frameworks
for combining and integrating information that has been gathered and coded by
auditors. The above discussion concerning confirmations is an example related
to tests of details. For analytical reviews, various structures (including the use
of regression analysis) have been introduced to aid the auditor in integrating
data. For evaluations of internal accounting control, decision tables and
network analyses have been developed to evaluate the adequacy of segregation
of duties. Audit risk models, such as the one described in SAS No. 39, have
been utilized to aid the auditor in integrating the information from the various
audit components—internal accounting control, analytical review, and tests of
details. These examples not only indicate recent trends in practice, but they
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also provide an indication of the likely directions for future improvements in the
audit judgment process.
Conclusions
In summary, I believe the Ashton paper provides an excellent introduction
to the research on auditor judgment. This research can also be used as a basis
for developing tentative guidelines for future improvements in auditor judg
ments.
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Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors:
Implications for the Practitioner
1

Robert E. Hylas
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Financial statement errors are of great concern to the CPA and the financial
executive alike. The auditor applies procedures attempting to ensure that all
material errors in a client's financial statements are detected and adjusted.
Numerous errors detected during an audit can increase auditing fees and be
embarrassing to the financial management of a company if they result in audit
adjustments. Practitioners should, whenever possible, assist management in
preventing these errors which may indicate underlying weaknesses in a client's
accounting systems and may cast doubt on the reliability of other financial
reports prepared for internal use.
In this paper I review selected results of a study, "Audit Detection of
Financial Statement Errors" , that I co-authored with Robert H . Ashton,
Associate Professor of Accounting at New York University. The study focuses
on errors that led to a financial statement adjustment. It suggests certain
implications for the practitioner, both for designing and applying auditing
procedures, and for ways of preventing accounting errors.
Due to the study's broad scope, the results are somewhat tentative.
Future research is necessary to further explore the issues and questions raised
and to validate any interpretations of these findings.
2

Study Method
The study analyzed errors uncovered during audits by Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. of different-sized companies in a variety of industries. Audit
team members reported the dollar amounts and account classifications of up to
five audit adjustments for each company. They were also asked to describe the
circumstances that led to the discovery of each error and their perception of
the underlying causes of the error, including whether they believed it was
intentional. We reviewed and classified 281 adjustments reported for 152
companies. Selected results appear throughout this paper.
Auditing Implications
The study results illuminate three important issues: How auditors find
errors, why they occur, and where they occur. The most interesting result is
the large number of errors found using analytical review and various "infor
mal" audit procedures compared with the small number found by traditional
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procedures. This rinding is particularly surprising in light of the emphasis
placed on these procedures in the audit literature and raises questions about
the relative cost-effectiveness of audit procedures.
Not so surprising, but of potential importance to the auditor, is that most
errors are unintended and due to random human error rather than to systems
or procedural problems. The participating auditors attributed a great many
errors to various personnel problems, including employee turnover and
inexperience, time pressure, carelessness and even incompetence. Other
related causes they noted included a lack of knowledge in accounting, and
errors made in judgmental amounts. Relatively few errors were due to poor
controls, a lack of follow-up or review, and other pervasive problems. Finally,
errors tend to be concentrated into selected audit areas which vary somewhat
by industry; more errors seem to occur in small companies; and detected
errors typically understate income almost as frequently as they overstate it.
These findings, discussed in more detail below, have important implications for
the design of audits and for preventing errors.
How Auditors Find Errors
During an audit, a variety of different events or circumstances can lead the
auditor to detect an error, ranging from formal audit procedures such as
confirmation or inventory counts, to casual remarks by client personnel. We
summarize these "initial events" and the error percentages detected by each
in Tables 1 and 2.
As Table 1 indicates, analytical review and "informal" audit procedures,
including client discussions and expectations from prior years, uncovered 45.6
percent of the errors reported in this study, and 54.9 percent of the large
errors; that is, errors greater than 0.6 percent of a company's assets.
Table 1
How Errors Were Detected

3

Initial Events

Expectations from Prior Years
Client Discussions
Analytical Review
General Procedures
Tests of Detail
Estimates of Value
a

b

a

All Errors

Small Errors

Large Errors

10.3%
8.2
27.1
2.1
47.3
5.0

3.7%
7.3
31.7
1.2
49.9
6.1

15.9%
8.5
30.5
4.9
35.3
4.9

b

Less than or equal to 0.1 percent of total assets.
Greater than or equal to 0.6 percent of total assets.

Tests of detail also detected a large percentage of errors (47.3 percent),
although these procedures tended to detect small errors more frequently than
large ones. Of the various types of detailed tests, confirmation and physical
inspection in combination detected only 2.9 percent of the errors as indicated
on Table 2. In contrast, detailed tests using client-supplied documentation,
including both internally- and externally-prepared documents, detected 36.8
percent of the errors ("Obtaining Supporting Documentation," which led to
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detection of 19.4 percent of the errors, and "Analysis and Review," which led
to detection of 17.4 percent).
Analytical Review and Informal Procedures
Analytical review is a catch-all term for a group of techniques of growing
importance in auditing. In our study it included comparisons of current
unaudited balances with prior years, predictions of current balances based on
exogenous data, analyses of interrelationships among account balances, rea
sonableness tests, estimates of account balances and initial review.
Together with informal procedures such as discussions with client person
nel and expectations from prior years based on a knowledge of the company,
analytical review detected almost half of the errors resulting in an adjustment
(45.6 percent). This figure may be somewhat misleading, though, because
auditors normally use these methods before beginning detailed testing,
uncovering errors that later procedures might also have turned up. However,
this high percentage does underscore that analytical review, combined with
various informal procedures, is at least as worthwhile as detailed tests, and is
perhaps more cost effective since it requires less time to perform.
Although prior year expectations and discussions with clients turned up
mostly large errors (about 25 percent of them), analytical review by itself
detected both large and small errors in almost equal proportions. As Table 1
indicates, auditors using analytical review found 31.7 percent of the small
errors they reported, and 30.5 percent of the large errors. They found most
small errors by using analytical review procedures on small subsidiary trial
balances and other balances supporting aggregate financial statements. Since
analytical review takes little time while finding a large proportion of both large
and small errors, practitioners designing and conducting audits should empha
size these procedures where possible, in lieu of detailed testing, to reduce
audit costs.
Analytical review and informal procedures are already required for limited
reviews of interim and other unaudited financial statements. Professional
standards require auditors to conduct inquiries, obtain a familiarity with a
client's accounting practices, and apply analytical review and other general
audit procedures (SAS No. 10). The study findings seem to validate the
effectiveness of limited review procedures for unauditedfinancialstatements.
Confirmation and Physical Inspection
The study findings show that confirmation and physical inspection pro
cedures detect few errors. As Table 2 indicates, out of the 281 errors
reported, these procedures found only 2.9 percent, or 8 errors. Additionally,
of the seven errors detected through confirmation procedures, three of them
were identified before the confirmations were actually sent.
Other research studies have also cast doubt on the effectiveness of
confirmation procedures. In these studies, researchers manipulated the dollar
amounts they asked recipients to confirm. Although these confirmation
requests contained incorrect amounts, many recipients nonetheless confirmed
them. Because confirmation and physical inspection procedures do not appear
4
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Table 2
Errors Detected by Tests of Detail
Percentage

Physical Inspection Procedures
Confirmation Procedures
Test Footings and Extensions
Obtaining Supporting Documentation:
Externally Prepared
Internally Prepared
Legal Documents
Combinations of Above
Prior Years' Workpapers

11.4
3.2
2.5
1.4
0.7
19.4
17.4
3.2
1.8
47.3%

a

Analysis and Review
Scan
Other
TOTAL

133

Number of Errors
a

0.4%
2.5
2.8

Analysis and review of internal information including account balance details, account balance
detail activity, client work-ups, account classification and data consistency.

to detect most errors and are quite time consuming, these procedures may not
be very cost effective.
The questions raised about the value of confirmation and physical inspection
in this and other studies should spur practitioners to re-evaluate the objective
of using these procedures. For instance, are confirmation and physical
inspection actually most useful in detecting and preventing fraud? These
procedures, in fact, first became required in response to the massive
McKesson & Robbinsfraudin the 1930's, which went undetected despite an
audit. Unfortunately, the results of our study show little about detection of
frauds, since only 10 of the reported errors were considered intentional, and
they were not necessarily fraudulent.
If the primary audit objective in performing confirmation and physical
inspection is indeed not to detect unintended errors but rather to prevent and
detect fraud, different standards may be appropriate in selecting sample sizes
for these procedures. For instance, merely performing limited confirmation
and physical inspection procedures in and of themselves may be sufficient to
deter frauds of certain types, regardless of the sample sizes used. Also,
because fraud is relatively infrequent in comparison to unintended errors, as
demonstrated by this study, sample sizes might be reduced.
Other Tests of Detail
A significant number of errors were detected by tests of detail other than
confirmation and physical inspection procedures. These test procedures found
44.4 percent, or almost half of the errors. Almost all of these detailed test
procedures relied on client-supplied documentation.
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One interesting result is the large percentage of these errors detected
through detailed tests that used internally-prepared documentation. This
category includes at least the 17.4 percent of the errors detected through
analysis and review, the 3.2 percent resulting from obtaining internallyprepared supporting documentation and perhaps portions of other categories
not specifically broken out. In contrast, obtaining externally-prepared docu
mentation led to detection of only 11.4 percent of the errors.
For the audit practitioner, thesefindingsindicate that externally-prepared
documentation is no more likely to be a source for detecting errors than
internally-prepared documentation. Assuming that most errors are unintended,
internal documents should be no less reliable than external documents and may
indeed be a more direct means to uncover errors. This result seems to
contradict the emphasis in the auditing literature on externally-prepared
documentation.
Overall, thefindingsfor detailed tests show that these procedures detect a
large number of errors and they should continue to be emphasized. Auditors
should, however, closely consider the appropriate mix of detailed test
procedures in light of results of this study. These tests also seem to detect
more small errors than large errors, indicating they may be effective in finding
errors that informal procedures do not detect.
Why Errors Occur
Most errors that auditors discover appear to be unintentional. Auditors
participating in the study considered fewer than 4 percent, or 10 out of 281, of
the reported errors to be made purposefully. Another importantfindingis that
errors discovered tend to understate as often as they overstate company
income. Further, most errors did not seem to be the result of major systems or
procedural problems, but rather resulted from various personnel and related
problems including inexperience, inadequate knowledge of accounting and
errors in judgmental amounts.
Personnel Problems
Personnel problems, as defined in this study, included turnover and the
resulting inexperience of new employees, incompetent or poorly-trained
employees, and excessive time pressures on employees. These problems
(Table 3) accounted for 26.3 percent of the errors, many of them leading to
major audit adjustments. Two related causes were lack of knowledge of
accounting, including basic accounting concepts, new pronouncements, and
other principles. Auditors cited this problem as a cause of 15.0 percent of the
errors, and judgment errors as causing 15.3 percent of the errors. (These
percentages cannot be added because multiple causes were cited for some
errors).
Practitioners should be aware that personnel factors can affect the
reliability of financial statements. Auditors should consider, for instance,
reviewing the experience of accounting personnel in light of their current
responsibilities, the rate of turnover among accounting personnel, and the
provisions for replacing terminated or vacationing employees. They could look
93

Table 3
Causes of Errors
Categories
Percentages

Average
Dollar Size

26.3
15.0
15.3
38.1
12.5

$180
$143
$627
$236
$67

9.3
19.2

$135
$53

a

Personnel Problems
Insufficient Accounting Knowledge
Judgment Errors
Cut-off or Accrual Errors
Mechanical Errors
Inadequate Control, Follow-up or
Review
Miscellaneous
a

.72%
.58%

Percentages add to more than 100% due to double counting of some errors attributed to more
than one cause.

at personnel factors as part of their regular review of a client's internal
controls. If they note significant personnel problems, it may indicate a need for
more testing of the affected audit areas, and procedures directed towards
specific transactions handled by new or inexperienced personnel.
Cut-Off and Accrual Errors
Another important cause of the errors cited was improper cut-off and
accrual of accounts at year-end. These errors, which comprised 38.1 percent
of total error, averaged about 1 percent of company assets. The findings
indicate that the traditional emphasis placed on verifying year-end balances by
examining transaction cut-offs and accruals is justified. Since most of these
errors occurred in small companies, auditors may wish to perform a balance
sheet audit on these companies stressing substantive tests on year-end
balances rather than reviews of on-going controls. This is, in fact, the approach
often taken for small companies.
Mechanical Errors
This category includes posting, coding, footing and extension errors.
Although the study found that 12.5 percent of the errors reported were
mechanical errors, many were small, averaging only 0.35 percent of company
assets. Audit procedures specifically intended to detect a subset of these
mechanical errors, footing and extension errors, actually found very few errors
(2.8 percent of the total errors reported). Thesefindingsmay suggest that less
time should be devoted to uncovering these relatively small mechanical errors,
particularly in large companies where material errors of this type are rare.
Where Errors Occur
We have summarized those auditing areas in which errors most frequently
occur in Table 4. Auditors reported the majority of the errors (56 percent) in
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five audit areas: (1) sales & receivables, (2) purchases & payables, (3)
inventory and production, (4) other assets, and (5) fixed assets. These
concentrations of errors differ somewhat by industry. For industrial com
panies, for instance, 31.7 percent of the errors involved inventory and
production, while for wholesale and retail companies, 44.9 percent of the
errors occurred in the sales and purchases cycle combined. The distribution of
errors also differs forfinancialand service industries.
A concentration of errors into specific audit areas may suggest that auditors
should devote more time to these areas during an examination than to those
where few errors are expected. In fact, most auditing firms already identify
critical areas of particular importance before beginning actualfieldwork,and
perform additional testing and review in these areas. The results of this study
confirm the worth of this policy for planning an audit.
Table 4
Where Errors Occur
Audit Area

All
Companies Industrial

Cash
2.1%
Securities &
Investments
3.2
Sales & Receivables
15.7
Notes Receivable
5.7
Inventory & Production 11.3
Other Assets
7.5
Fixed Assets
10.0
Long-Term Debt
3.9
Purchases & Payables
11.0
Income Taxes
4.2
Other Liabilities
7.8
Stockholder's Equity
3.5
Commitments &
Contingencies
3.9
Labor Costs and
Benefits
5.0
Other Income
3.6
Other
2.1
Total Percentage
100.0%
Number of Errors
281
a

b

c

d

SIC
SIC
SIC
SIC

Nos.
Nos.
Nos.
Nos.

a

1.6%
—

6

b

Wholesale
& Retail
—

4.7%

d

Service

2.3%
2.3
38.6

—

4.7
5.9
16.4
4.7
7.1
8.2
5.9
5.9
4.7
18.4
1.2

7.9

—

1.2

6.8

4.8
3.2

5.3
5.3

—

—

100.0%
63

100.0%
38

7.1
2.4
1.2
100.0%
85

2.3
2.3
2.3
100.0%
44

11.2
1.6
31.7
4.8
3.2
1.6
15.8
4.8
1.6
6.3

2.6%
18.4
2.6
7.9
5.3
15.8
2.6
26.3
5.3
2.6

c

Financial

—

4.5
6.8
18.2
4.5
4.5
—

2.3
2.3

2 and 3
5
6
7 and 8.

The studyfindingsalso indicate that errors tend to occur more frequently in
smaller companies. Although companies included in the study were broken into
three categories of almost equal size, containing approximately 50 companies
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each, many more errors were reported for companies in the small size
category than for either the large- or medium-sized category (see Table 5).
These results may indicate that controls to prevent errors are lacking in small
companies and that auditors should be more concerned with the possibility of
unintended errors when examining small companies.

Table 5
Company Sizes
Number of errors
Number of Companies
No-Error Companies
a

b

c

6

Large

Medium

66
49
23

92
52
22

a

b

c

Small

123
51
12

Assets greater than $50 million.
Assets of $10 to 50 million.
Assets less than $10 million.

Preventing Errors
Beyond the auditing implications offinancialstatement errors, practitioners
have an opportunity to assist their clients in preventing errors that might show
up in financial statements. The study results indicate certain areas where
improvements in management practices could potentially reduce accounting
errors.
Pre-Audit Review
The apparent effectiveness of analytical review and "informal" auditing
procedures suggests that clients can benefit from using similar techniques to
uncover and correct potential accounting errors before a year-end audit begins.
Comparable internal procedures might include reviews of internal budgeting,
planning, and other financial data using various analytical techniques such as
ratio and trend analysis. Comparison of recorded financial data to budgeted
amounts, for instance, often uncovers errors. Also, companies can use
statistical techniques similar to audit tests to estimate expected account
balances.
Client internal auditors can perform pre-audit reviews through discussions
with preparers and users of accounting records. Discussions lead to detection
of a surprising number of errors and identification of likely potential sources of
errors. Employees who are aware of possible errors often are not given the
opportunity to report or correct them and may have no specific responsibility to
do so. Procedures and policies encouraging accounting and operating personnel
to help correct known or potential errors can be an effective preventive
measure.
Personnel Policies
Clients can take steps to reduce errors caused by personnel problems and
other related causes. Improvements in personnel policies may reduce turnover
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in the accounting staff. Hiring and promotion practices, employee pay scales,
benefits programs, and staffing levels all have an impact on turnover. Also,
screening of new employees during hiring and promotion should ensure that all
accounting employees possess a basic understanding of accounting concepts
and principles.
Accounting Department Organization
The proper organization and delegation of accounting department respon
sibilities may help clients to eliminate potential personnel problems that cause
errors. Employee errors may be reduced if the department has clearly-defined
job responsibilities, written job descriptions, and standardized procedures.
Information about the organization and definition of duties may be particularly
useful to employees who are unfamiliar with new responsibilities. Adequate
department staffing is also important.
Accounting Expertise
Improvements in accounting expertise among accounting personnel can
eliminate potential sources of errors. Companies can improve training, intro
duce self-study courses, and circulate current accounting pronouncements and
other literature to accounting personnel to increase their knowledge of
advanced accounting concepts and new pronouncements.
Conclusions
The study findings and implications may suggest the following scenario for a
more effective and efficient audit:
The audit team members plan the examination to emphasize areas where
errors are most likely. During a review of internal accounting controls, the
auditors assess the level of experience and competence of client personnel to
determine where errors are more likely despite adequate internal accounting
controls. The client's industry may also indicate likely sources of error.
In the interim phase, members of the audit team review prior-year
workpapers and other documentation, conduct analytical reviews, and discuss
areas of concern with the client. The auditor can feel assured that these
relatively easy procedures will uncover a major portion of any errors. These
initial steps will also help further define those areas that warrant additional
detailed tests.
During the year-end audit, the time needed and cost for detailed testing
require the auditor to apply these techniques selectively. Wherever possible,
analytical review procedures are applied to small accounts and areas where
errors are not likely, supplemented only by limited detailed testing and
compliance tests. Tests of detail are applied extensively only where errors are
considered to be a distinct possibility. These tests include extensive analysis
and review of client records and comparison of recorded balances and
transactions to supporting documentation. Extensive tests of detail are also
applied to year-end transactions to uncover errors in cut-offs and accruals,
particularly for small companies. Tests of footings and extensions are held to a
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minimum and are performed only to verify the basic integrity of client supplied
documentation. As a precaution against fraud, the audit team sends a limited
number of confirmations and, where appropriate, inspects inventory for a small
sample of items at each company location.
Upon completion of the examination, the audit team will know the potential
sources and causes of accounting errors and can assist the client to prevent the
recurrence of similar errors. Such assistance might include improving person
nel policies, accounting department organization, and expertise of accounting
employees. At the conclusion of the engagement the practitioner will have
made a significant contribution towards preventing the recurrence of similar
accounting errors and has also helped to reduce future audit costs as a result.
This scenario is, of course, speculative. It is intended only to project some
possible implications of the study and to stimulate further discussion into the
issues raised. I hope that this research will lead to further study that will be
beneficial both to practitioners and to client financial executives.

Footnotes
1. I wish to acknowledge the contributions of Janet Lewis, of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
who assisted in preparing this paper.
2. See R.E. Hylas, and R.H. Ashton, "Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors," The
Accounting Review (forthcoming).
3. Categories in Table 1 include the following quoted from the article referenced in (2).
Our definition of analytical review was broad. It included procedures such as comparisons of current unaudited balances with balances of prior years, predictions of current
balances based on exogenous data, and analyses of interrelationships among account
balances. It also included what the auditors referred to as "reasonableness tests,"
"estimates" of account balances, and "initial review." The latter term refers to a
cursory review of financial statements in the early planning stages of an audit.
The category "Tests of Detail" is further categorized in Table 2: Analysis and review
involves the examination of transaction or balance components of data produced by or
contained in the client's accounting system. It involves examination of transaction
amounts and descriptions, account balance details, "work-ups" to support account
balances, and data appearing on various types of reconciliations. Supporting Documentation—Externally Prepared involves comparisons of accounting data with evidence
obtained outside the client's accounting system. It includes reference to confirmations,
invoices, cancelled checks, test counts, and checks of mathematical accuracy. Scan
involves a cursory review of transactions or the details supporting balances, in a search
for unusual items or obvious errors. This category may be contrasted with analytical
review, which involves entire account balances or other aspects of overall activity.
The category "General Procedures" includes reviews of accounting policies and
procedures, legal letters, and minutes of boards of directors' meetings. "Estimates of
value" includes both auditors' estimates and their evaluations of clients' estimates
involving, for example, uncollectible accounts, net realizable value of inventory, losses
on discontinued operations, and contingent losses.
4. See Davis et al. [1967], Hubbard and Bullington [1972], Sauls [1970, 1972], Sorkin [1978],
and Warren [1974, 1975].
5. From article referenced in footnote (2). Nine errors excluded where no specific cause was
identified, and ten additional errors excluded which were considered to be intentional. The
following comments apply to the categories.
The first category, Personnel Problems, refers to such things as turnover, new or
inexperienced client employees, carelessness, incompetence, and time pressures. A
related category, Insufficient Accounting Knowledge, includes errors caused by insufficient awareness of general accounting concepts, promulgated accounting principles, and
specific accounting policies of the client. The category of Judgment Errors refers to
items that had to be estimated because exact dollar amounts could not be determined,
e.g., estimates of uncollectible accounts, obsolete inventory, and contingencies.
Insufficient information at year-end, as well as "poor" or "unreasonable" estimates
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based on adequate information, were cited by the auditors as the major causes of
problems in this category. Cut-off or Accrual errors refers to incomplete, poorlyexecuted, or omitted cut-off or accrual procedures at year-end. The Mechanical Errors
category refers to procedural errors—e.g., posting, coding, keypunching, footing and
calculation—made by employees considered normally to be competent and conscientious. Inadequate Control, Follow-up or Review procedures includes errors caused by
failure to perform, for example, reviews of old account balances for collectibility, followups of reconciliation differences, and established internal control procedures. The
Miscellaneous causes category includes, for example, errors that the auditors ascribed
to coordination or communication problems, the use of outside service bureaus, the use
of estimated amounts instead of actual amounts, differences between client accounting
policies and generally accepted accounting principles, misunderstanding of contract
terms, and inability to handle unusual items properly.
Of the above errors, the ten classified as intentional were considered by the auditors
to have been purposely caused by client management or employees. In some cases the
auditors were confident of this interpretation; in others, they only suspected that the
errors were intentional.
6. From the article referenced in footnote 2.
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Discussant's Response to
Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors
William F. Messier, Jr.
University of Florida
The recent competition among public accountingfirmsfor clients has forced
them to find more efficient ways to conduct audits. The methods chosen to
improve efficiency, however, must be as effective as the old methods in
detecting error or auditors must be willing to accept higher levels of risk on
their engagements. The results reported in Hylas' paper (and which are based
on the study by Hylas and Ashton ) provide many insights for practitioners and
present some interesting areas of research for academicians. In particular, this
study provides valuable information on how auditors can more efficiently and
effectively conduct audits.
In my discussion I will first address some specific areas of the study that are
particularly interesting and informative. Secondly, I would like to comment on
Hylas' scenario for an effective and efficient audit.
1

Specific Areas of Interest
In this section I would first like to address two specific results that may
have a significant impact on the way audits are presently conducted. I will folow
this with a subsection which contains a number of miscellaneous comments.
Personnel Related Problems
The result that surprised me the most was that the auditors who
participated in the study "attributed a great many errors to various personnel
problems, including employee turnover and inexperience, time pressure,
carelessness, and even incompetence." Relatedly, a large number of errors
resulted from a lack of accounting knowledge by client personnel. There are
some serious implications for accounting control from such findings. SAS
Section 320.30-.48 outlines the basic concepts or elements of internal control.
Of all the concepts listed in those standards, the most critical element to the
internal control system is competent and trustworthy personnel. This results
from the fact that even if all of the other concepts of internal control (e.g.
segregation of duties, execution and recording of transactions, etc.) are
present, incompetent personnel can destroy their effectiveness.
Does the fact that a large percentage of errors are caused by personnel
problems pose difficulties for the auditor? My inclination is that it does. This is
based on the belief that it is difficult for auditors to assess personnel related
problems ex ante (i.e. early in the audit). Certainly, employee turnover and
inexperience should be "red flags" to the auditor, but judging the competence
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of client personnel may be very difficult. In fact, auditors may only get a "feel''
for this after performing tests of transactions. Of course, prior experience with
the client may help.
While I have not surveyed any public accounting firms, I suspect that
auditors currently do not make "formal" assessments of client personnel.
Given the results of this study, auditors should consider refining their
approaches to personnel evaluation and/or develop new ways of identifying
"problem" personnel early in the audit and allocate audit resources in their
areas of responsibility.
Analytical Review Procedures
The result that analytical review procedures (ARPs) identified a high
percentage of errors should be very encouraging to auditors because it
provides empirical support for current auditing standards (SAS Section 318).
These results are also encouraging because these procedures appear to be as
effective as tests of details in detecting errors and probably can be conducted at
a lower cost. I assume from reading the paper that the ARPs reported on did
not include formal quantitative approaches such as regression analysis which
may be more costly.
I have two comments about this result that require clarification. First, we
normally think of ARPs as being useful in detecting unusual fluctuations. The
implication to me is that this means "large errors." The results of the study
indicates that ARPs were equally effective at finding "small errors." My
concern here is why auditors would be investigating fluctuations that result in
"small errors." The only explanation that appears reasonable was that these
"small" errors were still material. Further research along these lines (i.e.
investigation rules) would be helpful.
Secondly, the study provides no information on the state of the sample
companies' internal control systems. Kinney has pointed out that "The
marginal effectiveness of preliminary analytical review in predicting error
depends in part upon the effectiveness of internal control subsystems . . . " In
the current study we have no way of determining whether ARPs were effective
in and of themselves or because the auditors knew of internal control
weaknesses from prior experience and therefore knew where to suspect
errors. Future studies of this type need to examine the evaluation of internal
control on the effectiveness of ARPs.
I think thefindingsthat ARPs and other informal procedures were effective
in detecting errors is important for another reason that was given only casual
comment in the paper. This relates to the use of ARPs for reviews of financial
statements for non-public companies. The main procedures required by
Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Services No. 1 for a
review engagement are inquiry and ARPs. My discussions with individuals
from both large and small public accountingfirmsindicate that there is a great
deal of diversity in howfirmsapproach review engagements. I have been told
by a number of CPAs that the type and amount of evidence gathered on review
engagements often approaches the amount gathered on an audit (e.g. confirma
tions of accounts receivable, vouching of selected accounts, etc.). These same
CPAs indicate that one of the reasons this occurs is that they are just not
satisfied with the effectiveness of inquiry and ARPs. The results reported in
2

3
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this paper should relieve some of their fears in relying on these evidence
gathering procedures.
Miscellaneous Comments
The study contained a number of otherfindingsthat are worth mentioning.
First, is the result that a small percentage (4%) of errors were intentional. This
is noteworthy but we must be very careful not to place too much reliance on
such a result. If the client or client personnel have "strategically manipulated"
accounting information, traditional audit procedures may not be effective in
finding them.
Second, is the result "that externally-prepared documentation is no more
likely to be a source for detecting errors than internally-prepared documenta
tion." This result would be more meaningful if we knew what percentage of
total documentary evidence was in each category. For example, if 80% of the
documentary evidence that auditors examine on an engagement is internal,
then we would expect internally-prepared documents to detect a high percent
age of errors. In other words, I am suggesting we not dispose of the idea that
external evidence is more reliable until we have more data.
4

A Revised Audit Scenario
Hylas' scenario for an effective and efficient audit is somewhat different
from what auditors are currently doing, although I think competitive pressures
are pushing them in that direction. I agree with him that auditors should
allocate their resources where they expect errors. There are two points in the
audit process where such an approach will prove most beneficial: (1) where
auditors use ARPs early in an engagement for planning purposes and (2) in the
study and evaluation of internal control. In the first instance the auditor will
have to identify unusualfluctuationsand then allocate resources to investigate
their causes. In the second instance the auditor must "anticipate" what types
of errors can result from a particular control weakness before allocating audit
resources. Unfortunately, we have little evidence on how well auditors
perform these tasks.
A second comment on Hylas' scenario concerns the audit work at the test
of details stage. He suggests that tests of details should be "applied
extensively only where errors are considered a distinct possibility." If we
assume that auditors are able to anticipate errors, then the current approach of
taking large random samples could be modified. If auditors design audit
procedures to assess the effect of specific types of errors then there is no need
to take large random samples. At this point auditors would only be interested in
the presence of "unanticipated" types of errors. In such instances some type
of discovery sampling might be more appropriate.
5

6

Conclusion
I view auditing as an evolutionary process where auditfirmsmust adapt to a
changing environment. Studies like Hylas and Ashton's provide valuable
information which can assist audit firms in this adaptation process. I hope that
the future will see further collaboration between practitioners and academics in
studies similar to the one discussed today.
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A Multi-Attribute Model for Audit Evaluation*
Theodore J. Mock
University of Southern California

Michael G. Samet
Decisionetics, Inc.
Introduction
This paper concerns research directed at the development of a general
procedure for assessing an overall, meaningful measure of the quality of an
audit engagement from a systematic integration of several evaluative charac
teristics. Such a measure can serve as a key input for audit planning and costbenefit analysis in complex assessment situations. The technical approach is
based upon the creation and application of a hierarchical multi-attribute
evaluation (MAE) model that decomposes an audit into manageable parts which
can be analytically assessed and combined.
The importance of the need to parameterize and measure the quality of
various audit procedures and their role in the overall process of evaluating audit
evidence is widely recognized in the field. Accountingfirmsand their clients are
continually striving to develop and refine useful criteria for assessing audit
effectiveness. For example, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1976, p. 150)
highlight a research opportunity objective to develop:
. . . measures of effectiveness for individual and related sets of auditing
procedures that take into account . . . the anticipated quality of
evidence derived from their use.
Such auditing procedures include (p. 9):
. . . all of the tools, techniques and procedures used to examine
information . . . The methods for reporting the results of the examina
tion, because, no matter how thorough and effective the examination, in
the end a user can only rely on the assurance that is actually
communicated by the auditor's report. Additionally, audit methods
encompass all of the supporting functions and procedures used to plan,
control, and carry out an audit.
At a more general level, the American Institute of CPAs has shown a
continuing interest in audit quality and firm quality control practices. For
* The research underlying this paper was supported, in part, by the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
Foundation through its Research Opportunities in Auditing Program. Helpful suggestions and
assistance on this project have been provided by Deanna Daniels, William Holder and Valerie
Milliron.
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example, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 4, "Quality Control
Considerations for a Firm of Independent Auditors" established nine elements
of quality control which were subsequently incorporated into Statement on
Quality Control Standards (SQCS) No. 1. In addition, most SASs contain
explicit references to evaluative criteria and attributes which may be expected
to impact on the quality of individual audit engagements.
Because of the disparate nature of the many different features of audit
quality, a need exists for judging and expressing the overall procedural quality
of an audit in an integrated, meaningful and useful manner. Toward meeting
this need, a number of attempts have been made to condense and codify the
vast literature on auditing know-how into a set of specific guidelines or
evaluative criteria (i.e., the "do's" and "don'ts" of good procedures). These
efforts have mostly taken the form of itemized considerations and check lists,
such as are found in firm quality control review manuals and in related
documents (Milliron and Mock, 1981). The different schemes suggested vary
considerably in the degree to which they are comprehensive and well
organized. For the most part, however, these schemes are loosely structured,
and their originators rarely claim that they have employed a thorough/
systematic/expert-consensus-based approach for specifying evaluative dimen
sions which are mutually exclusive and relatively exhaustive. Furthermore, the
techniques do not usually provide quantitatively meaningful measures of audit
quality. What appears to be needed, therefore, is a much more formal approach
to establishing and configuring evaluative dimensions or attributes into a wellstructured model that can provide traceable and dependable quantitative
estimates of audit quality.
However, the evaluation of the quality of an entire audit is a difficult
intellectual exercise which requires the combination of a number of evaluative
factors into an overall measure of quality. This analysis is usually done using
extensive review forms or quality control review manuals, and the complex set
of qualitative judgments must be informally aggregated into one vaguelyspecified audit evaluation. Although the informal approach may lead to a
satisfactory evaluation, this method has numerous potential failings. Among
these are that it may lack: (1) reliability and validity, since evaluators are often
unable to combine so much information in a consistent, repeatable, accurate
manner; (2) generality and systematization, since different audits cannot be
compared and contrasted by the same evaluation model; (3) intelligibility and
communicability, since the logic by which judgments are made often cannot be
adequately explained; (4) diagnosticity, since it offers little or no information
about the relative contributions of the various evaluation factors; and (5) costeffectiveness, since most review processes require extensive lists of factors to
be evaluated (see Milliron and Mock, 1981). Therefore, a more objective and
standardized evaluation methodology which corrects these deficiencies may be
desirable.
A recently popularized methodology known as multi-attribute evaluation
(MAE) offers such an approach to making quantitative assessments involving
multiple criteria (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Edwards, 1977). M A E
methods can decompose a complex overall evaluation problem into more
manageable sub-problems through scaling, weighting, and combining opera
tions applied to specific criteria. With respect to audit evaluation, the MAE
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approach offers to improve upon current, intuitive techniques of audit-practice
assessment in the following ways: (1) making explicit what are conventionally
implicit considerations; (2) quantifying what are usually qualitative descriptions;
(3) simplifying the representation and integration of what are often complex
configurations and interrelations among relevant information; and (4) providing
an objective and general method for rating the overall quality of an audit. In
sum, the MAE method is designed to provide a useful framework for evaluative
analysis, discussion, and feedback.
Method and Results
The identification and definition of appropriate evaluative attributes for
audit quality and their configuration into attribute clusters or categories (i.e.,
an MAE model) is a challenging task. The problem results from the fact that
the attributes and their classification are arbitrary; they are subject to
differences of opinion and there is probably no such thing as a "best" set. The
approach taken here, therefore, was to use a systematic, iterative procedure
to distill a "good" set of general evaluative criteria which are broad in scope
yet are meaningful, practical, and internally consistent. This multi-phase
approach involved repeated consultation with relevant literature and expert
opinion, attribute content analysis, and empirical verification studies. In
general, an attempt was made to satisfy the desirable properties of an attribute
set as suggested by the framework of MAE theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976);
namely, that it be complete, so that it covers all aspects of the problem;
operational, so that it can be meaningfully used in analysis; decomposable, so
that the evaluation process is simplified by breaking it down into parts;
nonredundant, so that double counting of attribute impact is avoided, and
minimal, so that evaluation dimensions are kept to a minimum. These
guidelines were followed in the development of a cohesive set of attributes for
evaluating the quality of an audit.
As a first stage of the attribute-definition process, the basic professional
and authoritative sources (e.g., SASs, SQCSs, the AICPA Peer Review
Manual (1978), PMM's Quality Controls (1980), AY's "Perspectives on
Quality" (1980), etc.) were reviewed. In addition, suggestions for evaluative
considerations were obtained from many auditing references such as Roberts'
(1978) treatment of statistical auditing, and research studies such as Mock and
Turner (1981) which focus on the evaluation of internal accounting controls.
This process generated 110 initial considerations or factors. Working with an
experienced auditor, these considerations were organized into a loosely
structured list which was then presented to several practicing audit experts.
These experts were interviewed, on a one-to-one basis, and they provided
valuable comments for each consideration concerning its meaning (i.e., is it
really different from some other consideration?), relevance (i.e., does it reflect
significantly upon audit quality?), and scope (i.e., should it be combined with
another audit consideration or perhaps decomposed into two or more separate
considerations?).
Based on the first phase of attribute definition, 32 evaluative considerations
were specified. Each consideration was phrased in the form of a specific
question; for example, "Were appropriate critical audit areas identified?" A
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tentative organizational or classification scheme for these considerations was
then developed as a conceptual hierarchy in terms of attributes and attribute
categories. Each attribute was defined by a set of a few related evaluative
questions; and the attributes were grouped according to five major categories
relating to audit performance (PLAN, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURES,
EVALUATION, CONDUCT). Attributes within the PLAN category, for
example, are "Objectives," "Research," and "Strategy."
As the second phase of attribute-set development, a set of simple paperand-pencil sorting tasks was constructed that required the classification of
question elements into attribute categories. These tasks were then presented,
in the form of a pilot study, to ten faculty members and doctoral students in the
School of Accounting at the University of Southern California. On one task, for
example, participants were asked to sort questions (presented in random order
without labels) into major categories (e.g., PLAN, ADMINISTRATION, etc.).
In another task, the questions had to be sorted according to only attribute
labels (e.g., "Objectives," "Research," . . .) without reference to the name
of the major category to which each attribute belonged. In a third task, both
attribute category names and attribute labels were presented in a hierarchically
structured manner (i.e., PLAN—"Objectives," "Research," "Strategy;"
ADMINISTRATION—"Personnel,'' "Budgeting," "Management;" etc.).
For each sorting task, each question had to be placed into only one category or
attribute as appropriate. Participants were instructed that the purpose of the
exercise was to assess levels of agreement/disagreement—among people
knowledgeable about auditing—concerning where specific issues related to
audit quality fit into an overall schema. They were asked to respond in
accordance with their individual subjective opinions since there were really no
"right" answers.
The conduct and results of the pilot study demonstrated the success of the
sorting-task technique for providing data that could be gainfully used toward
the refinement of both specific attribute definitions (i.e., evaluative questions)
and the organizational structure into which they are placed. A "confusion
matrix,'' showing the frequency with which each question was assigned to each
attribute category, was generated to represent the results for each sorting
task; these matrices highlighted apparent difficulties that participants had in
interpreting and appropriately classifying specific questions. Based on a
systematic analysis of these data, modifications were made in the way certain
questions were phrased or worded; and some changes were also effected in
the labeling and organization of the attribute categories. In addition, it was
determined from the data that the most diagnostic task (in terms of suggesting
potential problems with the attribute scheme) was the one requiring partici
pants to classify questions into attributes when both the names of the attributes
and corresponding attribute categories were indicated. As a result of this latter
finding, which is supported by other research (Beach, Townes, Campbell, and
Keating, 1976), this particular structured sorting task was employed in the
third phase of attribute-set verification.
The participants in this third phase of verification were 34 auditors who
were taking part in a special program of advanced audit training. As mentioned
above, these participants also performed a sorting task that utilized the latest
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version, available at the time, of the attribute definitions (i.e., specific
evaluative questions) and the categorization scheme (major category and
attribute labels). Figure 1 provides an illustration of the format in which the
task was presented; randomly ordered questions (like those shown in the
table) appeared on the left side of a matrix, and participants were required to
check the one column (i.e., attribute name) which they felt was most likely to
contain the given question within its domain.
As in the case of the pilot study, the data obtained from this latter exercise
were then carefully analyzed for each question in terms of the distribution of
participant responses across the possible classification columns. The results
are portrayed in Tables 1 through 5. Each table corresponds to a major
category label (e.g., PLAN), and the attributes and questions within this
category have been reorganized according to the intended attribute headings.
For each question, the percent frequency distribution of classification re
sponses (among the 34 participants) is given across the attributes belonging to
the major category which contains the given question.
As an example of the results format consider Table 1. The first question
listed, "Were all audit objectives explicit and clearly specified?", belongs to the
attribute "Objectives." Of the 34 participants, 63% placed the question into
the appropriate ("correct") attribute and 3% placed it into the aligned attribute
"Strategy." Thus, 66% of the participants assigned the question to the
appropriate ("correct") major category, " P L A N ; " and 34% of the sample put
the question into various inappropriate ("incorrect") attributes distributed
across the remaining four major categories. For the second question, 56%,
23%, and 3% of the participants placed it into the "Objectives," "Strategy,"
and "Research" attributes, respectively; consequently, 82% of the responders classified the question into the appropriate major category (PLAN)
and 18% put it elsewhere. The circled number on each line of the table
represents the modal classification response (i.e., highest frequency of
assignment) among all possible attribute labels (not just those in PLAN).
Hence, for every question in the PLAN category, the correct attribute was
assigned more often than any other attribute identified in Tables 1 through 5.
The classification matrices shown in the tables provide an index of relative
classification accuracy (i.e., adherence to the expected classification) as well a
measure of inter-rater agreement with respect to question classification.
Examination of the tables shows that the classification accuracy or agreement
rate is reasonably high. For 29 of the 32 questions, the correct attribute and
major category were selected by a greater number of participants than any
other attribute or major category, respectively. In fact, across all 32 questions,
the median modal selection frequency for the correct attribute was 56%
compared to a chance value of 14%; for the correct major category, the median
modal selectionfrequencywas 73% compared to a chance value of 20%. For
eight of the questions (i.e., ¼of all questions) for which a classification problem
was still evidenced in the latter data, additional modifications were made in
their wording so as to make them better fit the intended attribute/category.
For example, the question "Were appropriate statistical techniques correctly
applied and interpreted?" was more often classified under "nature" within
"PROCEDURES" (26%) rather than under "analysis" within "EVALUA
TION" (21%). Consequently, the wording of the question was changed to read
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FIGURE 1 ILLUSTRATION OF FORMAT FOR SORTING TASK [The auditor was asked to check only one box in each row.]

TABLE 1
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION:
CATEGORY I, PLAN

ATTRIBUTE
ATTRIBUTE

QUESTION

Objectives

Were a l l a u d i t o b j e c t i v e s
e x p l i c i t and c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d ?

(63%)

Strategy

Research

CATEGORY
TOTAL

3%

0%

66%

23%

3%

82%

29%

88%

3%

58%

0%

50%

Objectives
Were s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s a p p r o p r i a t e l y t a i l o r e d to the o v e r a l l
a u d i t purpose?
Were a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t i c a l
areas i d e n t i f i e d ?

Strategy

56%

audit

27%

32%

Was o v e r a l l a u d i t s t r a t e g y a p p r o p r i a t e f o r c r i t i c a l audit areas?

3%

Were t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e a u d i t
strategy appropriately integrated
( e . g . , b a l a n c e m a i n t a i n e d between
p l a n n e d d e g r e e o f c o m p l i a n c e and
planned s u b s t a n t i v e t e s t s ) ?

0%

Were c l i e n t ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s a d e q u a t e l y r e s e a r c h e d and i n c o r p o r a t e d
i n t o the a u d i t ?

0%

30%

59%

89%

Were r e l e v a n t b u s i n e s s / i n d u s t r y
f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s and government r e g u l a t i o n s ,
adequately researched?

0%

0%

91%

91%

52%

52%

Research

Median F r e q u e n c y

of Correct C l a s s i f i c a t i o n

56%

111

82%

TABLE 2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION:
CATEGORY II, ADMINISTRATION

ATTRIBUTE
ATTRIBUTE

Personnel

QUESTION
D i d a u d i t s t a f f have t h e l e v e l o f
experience/training/capability
required f o r t h i s audit (given r i s k s ,
needs, e t c . ) ?

Personnel

Was a u d i t budget a p p r o p r i a t e l y
a l l o c a t e d among a u d i t t a s k s ( e . g . ,
were c r i t i c a l a u d i t a r e a s a p p r o p r i a t e l y emphasized)?
Were t h e a u d i t t a s k s s c h e d u l e d
and implemented i n an e f f e c t i v e
and e f f i c i e n t manner?

Management

Was t h e a u d i t team e f f e c t i v e l y
managed t o a l l o w f o r s u f f i c i e n t
l e v e l s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,
communicatlon, feedback, etc?
Was an e f f e c t i v e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p and c o m m u n i c a t i o n c h a n n e l
maintained with c l i e n t representatives (e.g., chief financial
o f f i c e r , a u d i t committee)?

Median Frequency

972

0%

32

832

62

152

922

0%

82%

32

852

0%

82%

62

882

62

21%

29%

562

122

32

212

02

752

of Correct C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
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CATEGORY
TOTAL

32

Were team members a p p r o p r i a t e l y
assigned to s p e c i f i c tasks ( e . g . ,
were key p e r s o n n e l i n v o l v e d w i t h
c r i t i c a l audit areas)?

Budgeting

Management

0%

Were t h e r e q u i r e d s p e c i a l s k i l l s
a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e
a u d i t team?

Were budget e s t i m a t e s f o r work
appropriate?

Budgeting

69%

54%

842

752

852

TABLE 3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION:
CATEGORY III, PROCEDURES

ATTRIBUTE
ATTRIBUTE

Nature

Scope

Timing

CATEGORY
TOTAL

30%

152

02

452

47%

92

02

562

02

742

02

18%

Nature

QUESTION
Was t h e n a t u r e o f s p e c i f i c p r o c e d u r e s
appropriate given the c r i t i c a l audit
areas?
Were p r o c e d u r e s d e s i g n e d t o p r o d u c e
c o m p e t e n t and r e l i a b l e a u d i t I n f o r mation?
Was t h e s c o p e ( e . g . , l e v e l o f d e t a i l ,
sample s i z e , e t c . ) f o r e a c h i n d i v i dual procedure s u f f i c i e n t ?

02

Was e x t e n t o f p r o c e d u r e s , t a k e n
together, appropriate f o r i n v e s t i gating a l l c r i t i c a l audit areas?

32

152

Were i n d i v i d u a l p r o c e d u r e s
i m p l e m e n t e d 1n a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e
sequence?

0%

0%

65%

652

02

02

77%

772

74%

Scope

Timing
Was e a c h p r o c e d u r e a c c o m p l i s h e d
at the c o r r e c t p o i n t i n time
( e . g . , during the appropriate
stage of f i s c a l year)?

Median F r e q u e n c y o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n

512

113

612

TABLE 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION:
CATEGORY IV, EVALUATION

ATTRIBUTE
ATTRIBUTE

Analysis

QUESTION

Judgment

Were a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t i s t i c a l
techniques c o r r e c t l y applied
and i n t e r p r e t e d ?

CATEGORY
TOTAL

12%

32%

21%

30%

26%

70%

©

74%

Analysis
Were a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t i c a l l e v e l s
s e l e c t e d and a p p l i e d w i t h
respect to m a t e r i a l i t y , r i s k ,
and r e l i a b i l i t y ?

9%

Were c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n t i a l
m a t t e r c o n s i d e r e d and i n t e r p r e t e d i n a s u i t a b l e manner?
Judgment
Were c r i t i c a l a u d i t judgments
adequately reasoned?

18%

24%

Median F r e q u e n c y o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
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51%

TABLE 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR QUESTION CLASSIFICATION:
CATEGORY V, CONDUCT

ATTRIBUTE
ATTRIBUTE

Compliance

QUESTION
Was t h e d e g r e e o f c o m p l i a n c e w i t h
o p e r a t i n g p o l i c i e s and p r o c e d u r e s
of f i r m s u f f i c i e n t ?

59%

Review

Follow-up

CATEGORY
TOTAL

18%

0%

76%

9X

0%

33%

3X

68X

6%

59X

Compliance
Were s t a n d a r d i z e d f o r m s ( f l o w c h a r t s ,
ICQs, c h e c k l i s t s , s t a t i s t i c a l
approval forms, e t c . ) a p p r o p r i a t e l y
employed?

Review

Were a p p r o p r i a t e t y p e s o f r e v i e w s
conducted ( e . g . , working-paper
r e v i e w ; r e v i e w by t a x , EDP,
industry or other s p e c i a l i s t s ; etc)?
Were r e v i e w p r o c e d u r e s p e r f o r m e d
a t i m e l y manner?

Follow-Up

in

24%

18%
47%
0%
53%

Were a p p r o p r i a t e d e c i s i o n s and
actions exercised to follow-up audit
t e s t and r e v i e w f i n d i n g s ?

0%

Were p r o b l e m s and c o n f l i c t s , i f
f o l l o w e d - u p and r e s o l v e d i n a
t i m e l y and a p p r o p r i a t e manner?

0%

24%

65%
41%

any,

Did f o l l o w - u p a c t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e l y
adapt to changing circumstances i n
a f l e x i b l e , e f f i c i e n t manner?
Median F r e q u e n c y o f C o r r e c t C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
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18X

(65%)

83%

64%
0%

4X

68%

53%

68%

as follows: "Were audit findings (in particular, results of statistical tests)
correctly analyzed?" In fact, the specific questions in the EVALUATION
category were the most difficult for participants to classify, and the wording of
all four questions in this major category was altered. As a result of this further
iteration of modifications, additional refinements in attribute definitions were
thus made.
The refined set of questions, attributes, and categories that resulted as a
product of the third phase of empirical verification was then fashioned into a
rating instrument called the Audit Quality Evaluation (AQE) form, which is
presented in its entirety in the Appendix. The form includes a cover sheet (for
evaluator and audit identification), instructions for evaluators, and a complete
list of the rating scales that compose the AQE. A full description of the
structure of the AQE is provided including major attribute category names,
attribute labels, and specific attribute definitions (i.e., evaluative questions). In
addition, the rating procedure used in completing the form is explained. It is
worth noting that the AQE contains both qualitative, category rating scales
(sometimes referred to as the "equivalence grouping" method) as well as
direct, numerical rating scales (which are double anchored). The former scales
are used for rating individual attributes (i.e., for answering specific questions
about audit quality), whereas the latter are used to provide global ratings for
attribute categories and the overall audit. The AQE might, therefore, be called
a hybrid scale since it combines two different kinds of rating mechanisms. By
having the individual qualitative judgments within an attribute category precede
the quantitative, global judgment for the category, the rating procedure
subscribes to the principles of MAE theory by imposing a "divide and
conquer" technique upon the evaluator's thought process.
Discussion
The Audit Quality Evaluation (AQE) form was developed with the goal of
improving upon current, intuitive techniques of audit evaluation in the following
ways: (1) making explicit what are conventionally implicit considerations; (2)
quantifying what are usually qualitative descriptions; (3) simplifying the
representation and integration of what are often complex configurations and
interrelations among relevant information; and (4) providing an objective and
general method for rating the overall quality of an audit. To satisfy these
criteria, the AQE was designed through a systematic and thorough application
of the principles and methods of multi-attribute evaluation. However, although
the current version of the AQE may be conceptually sound, it is certain to
require refinements, and its ultimate effectiveness as an evaluation tool must
be demonstrated before it can be advocated for general implementation.
In general, the specific content of the attributes that compose the AQE
were empirically verified. The verification task, performed by a sample of 34
auditors, required each evaluative question to be classified according to an
attribute label (name) and an associated attribute category. The modal
classification responses from the auditor sample matched the expected
(intended) classification for all but a few of the 32 basic questions in the AQE,
indicating that the level of subjective agreement among auditors was reasona
bly high. These findings suggest that the AQE possesses considerable face
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validity with respect to the definition and categorization of evaluative attributes
that contribute to the quality of an audit. In other words, the multi-attribute
evaluation model in which the AQE is couched appears to be acceptable.
The development of the AQE is not yet complete. Toward the process of
validating the practicality and usefulness of the AQE, a comprehensive field
study, and corresponding set of data analysis, are needed. The study should be
designed to provide the information necessary for revising and improving the
AQE components, structure, and rating procedures so that the overall form
can better serve its intended purpose. Basically, the field study should require
different raters to actually use the AQE to evaluate several audits performed
by accounting offices. However, the success of such an evaluation will depend
upon the cooperative response of qualified evaluators who are asked to
participate in providing the necessary data. The results of such an investigation
will enable a determination of how reliable, valid and useful the AQE may be in
a variety of different audit situations.
In addition, research efforts should continue toward the systematic evalua
tion and refinement of the form so that it might become a valuable and generally
applicable scheme for assessing the quality of an audit. The evaluation process
should include an investigation of the necessity for, and development of, a
differential weighting system for normatively combining component ratings into
derived, higher-order quality scores (e.g., individual question ratings into
attribute-category scores, or attribute-category ratings into a composite
(overall) audit score). Similar research efforts applied to a comparable multiattribute evaluation form developed in another context have been quite
successful (e.g., Samet and Levine, 1978). Overall, these developments are
expected to hold wide implications for improving the utilization of audit
information and management decision making based on this information. For
example, the audit evaluation model will provide a necessary initial step toward
the larger problem of logically including subjective evaluations into a quantita
tive determination of the cost-effectiveness of various audit elements (e.g.,
Shakun, 1978) and of an overall audit. Furthermore, the model could be turned
around so as to be employed prescriptively as a management aid for planning
an effective audit.
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Appendix
AUDIT QUALITY EVALUATION (AQE) FORM*
* Copyright © Theodore J. Mock and Michael G. Samet

Audit Title and/or Identification No.:

Evaluator's Name:
Office:
Telephone:
Date:
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR EVALUATORS

The Audit Quality Evaluation (AQE) form represents a systematic
technique for evaluating the q u a l i t y o f an audit engagement.
The AQE i s
geared to a high-level evaluation o f an a u d i t . The approach i s b u i l t
upon a decomposition o f an engagement into many d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
or attributes which r e f l e c t audit q u a l i t y . The a t t r i b u t e s are l o g i c a l l y
clustered into categories so that the q u a l i t y of various components o f
the audit can be independently assessed. The attributes a r e , in t u r n ,
composed o f a few b r i e f questions which address associated aspects o f
audit q u a l i t y .
As shown below, each category i s composed o f a set o f related
attributes.
For example, the f i r s t category, "PLAN," is composed o f three
attributes labeled "Objectives," "Strategy," and "Research." A separate
rating sheet i s provided for each a t t r i b u t e category which l i s t s the
constituent a t t r i b u t e s , along with the corresponding s p e c i f i c questions
used to evaluate audit q u a l i t y . Your source o f information f o r answering
these questions would normally be the contents o f audit work papers and
relevant summary documents ( e . g . , practice review memo).

STRUCTURE OF AUDIT QUALITY EVALUATION (AQE) FORM

I.

PLAN
A.
B.
C.

II.

Objectives
Strategy
Research

ADMINISTRATION
A.
B.
C.

III.

IV.

V.

A.

Analysis

B.

Judgment

CONDUCT
A.
B.
C.

Personnel
Budgeting
Management

PROCEDURES
A.
B.
C.

EVALUATION

Nature
Scope
Timing
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Compliance
Review
Follow-up

The AQE rating procedure is identical for each of the attribute
categories:
each attribute-related question within a category is answered
separately, then a single overall assessment i s given for the entire
category.
You are required to respond to each question with respect to
the p a r t i c u l a r audit under evaluation. The rating is made on a 3-point
scale as either "Yes," "Yes, except f o r . . . , " or " N o . . . , " and the appropriate box is checked. This evaluation reflects how well you feel the
audit measures UP on the respective question. Whenever the "Yes, except
f o r . . . " or "No..." box is checked, you are required to explain the basis
for this rating by commenting on the exceptions, evidence of inadequacy
f a i l u r e in the performance of the audit, etc.
For this purpose, space has
been provided on the right-hand side of the rating sheet.
In certain s i t u a t i o n s , you may be unable to meaningfully answer
a given question because of i n s u f f i c i e n t information. Thus, a box (to
the right of the quality r a t i n g ) , labeled "Poor Documentation," is
provided that should be checked when you feel that the necessary documentation i s either unavailable, unclear, or inadequate.
Even when you have
made a quality rating in response to the attribute question, you can s t i l l
check the "Poor Documentation" box to indicate that you think the relevant
documentation is poor. Whenever you do check the "Poor Documentation" box,
you should b r i e f l y state your j u s t i f i c a t i o n in the space provided to the
right.
Once you have completed ratings for each question belonging to the
attribute category, a global rating is c a l l e d for that represents your
assessment of the overall quality or "goodness" of the entire category.
As shown on the bottom of each rating sheet, this rating is made on a 1
to 5 scale as follows:
1 - "Major Problems", 2 - "Minor Problems",
3 - "Average", 4 - "Good", and 5 - "Excellent"; you may use decimal
ratings such as 1.5 or 3.5.
Above the global rating scale, space is
available to enable your free-form comments about the global rating for
the category.
You can also use this space for additional comments about
individual attribute ratings.
After the assessments have been completed for the five attribute
categories, you are asked to make a f i n a l rating for the overall quality
or "goodness" of the entire audit engagement. This rating is also made
on a 1 to 5 scale extending from "Major Problems" (1) to "Excellent" (5),
with decimal ratings permitted. Again, on this l a s t rating sheet, your
comments are encouraged.
F i n a l l y , you are asked to indicate about how
much time you spent to complete the AQE form.
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I. PLAN
ANSWER

QUESTION
A.

3.

C.

Yes

Yes
Except
for...

Poor
Documentation |

No.

EXPLANATION

OBJECTIVES
(1)

Were a l l a u d i t o b j e c t i v e :
e x p l i c i t and c l e a r l y
specified?

(2)

Were s p e c i f i c o b j e c tives appropriately
t a i l o r e d to the o v e r a l l a u d i t purpose?

STRATEGY
(1)

Were a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t i c a l a u d i t areas
identified?

(2)

Was o v e r a l l a u d i t
strategy appropriate
for c r i t i c a l audit
areas?

(3)

Were the elements o f
the a u d i t s t r a t e g y
appropriately integrated ( e . g . , balance
maintained between
planned degree o f
compliance and planned
substantive tests)?

RESEARCH
(1)

Were c l i e n t ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and
o p e r a t i n g procedures
adequately researched
and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o
the a u d i t ?

(2)

Were r e l e v a n t business/
industry f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s and government
r e g u l a t i o n s , adequately
researched?

Comments

GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY

1

Major
Problems

2

Minor
Problems

3
Average

4
Good
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5
Excellent

Table

II.

ADMINISTRATION

ANSWER
Yes

Yes

QUESTION
A.

3.

C.

Except
for...

No..

Poor
Documentation

EXPLANATION

PERSONNEL
(1)

Old a u d i t s t a f f have the
l e v e l of experience/
training/capability
required for this audit
(given r i s k s , needs,
etc.)?

(2)

Were the r e q u i r e d
s p e c i a l s k i l l s approp r i a t e l y represented on
the a u d i t team?

(3)

Were team members approp r i a t e l y assigned to
s p e c i f i c tasks ( e . g . ,
were key personnel
involved with c r i t i c a l
audit areas)?

BUDGETING
(1)

Were budget e s t i m a t e s
for work a p p r o p r i a t e ?

(2)

Was a u d i t budget approp r i a t e l y a l l o c a t e d among
a u d i t t a s k s ( e . g . , were
c r i t i c a l a u d i t areas
a p p r o p r i a t e l y emphasized)?

MANAGEMENT
(1)

Were the a u d i t tasks
managed ( s c h e d u l e d ,
implemented, e t c . ) i n
an e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t manner?

(2)

Was the a u d i t team
e f f e c t i v e l y managed to
allow for s u f f i c i e n t
l e v e l s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , communication,
feedback, e t c . ?

(3)

Was an e f f e c t i v e
working r e l a t i o n s h i p
and communication
channel maintained
with c l i e n t representatives ( e . g . ,
chief financial
o f f i c e r , audit
committee)?

Comments

GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY

I

I

1
Major
Problems

2
Minor
Problems

i
4
Good

3
Average
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5
Excellent

III.

PROCEDURES
ANSWER

Yes

QUESTION
A.

3.

C.

Yes
Except
for...

No.

Poor
Documentation

EXPLANATION

NATURE
(1)

Was the nature of s p e c i f i c
procedures a p p r o p r i a t e
given the c r i t i c a l a u d i t
areas?

(2)

Were procedures e f f e c t i v e
i n producing competent
and r e l i a b l e a u d i t i n f o r mation?

SCOPE
(1)

Was the scope ( e . g . ,
l e v e l o f d e t a i l , sample
s i z e , e t c . ) f o r each
i n d i v i d u a l procedure
sufficient?

(2)

Was extent o f procedures,
taken t o g e t h e r , a p p r o p r i a t e
for investigating a l l
c r i t i c a l a u d i t areas?

TIMING
(1)

Were i n d i v i d u a l procedures
implemented i n a p p r o p r i a t e
time sequence?

(2)

Was each procedure accomp l i s h e d a t the c o r r e c t
p o i n t i n time ( e . g . ,
d u r i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e
stage o f f i s c a l y e a r ) ?

Comments

GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY

1
Major
Problems

2
Minor
Problems

3

4

5

Average

Good

Excellent
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IV. EVALUATION
ANSWER

QUESTIONS

A.

3.

Yes

Yes
Except
for...

No.

ANALYSIS
(1)

Were audit findings (in
p a r t i c u l a r , r e s u l t s of
s t a t i s t i c a l tests)
c o r r e c t l y analyzed?

(2)

Were the c r i t e r i a
levels (with respect
to m a t e r i a l i t y , r i s k ,
and r e l i a b i l i t y )
appropriately u t i l i z e d ?

JUDGMENT
(1)

Was the audit evidence
interpreted in a s u i t a b l e
manner?

(2)

Were c r i t i c a l audit
judgments reasoned
adequately?

Comments

GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY

Major
Problems

Minor
Problems
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Poor
Documentation

EXPLANATION

V. CONDUCT
ANSWER

res

QUESTION
A.

8.

C.

res
Except
for...

No.

Poor
Documentation

COMPLIANCE
(1)

Was the degree o f comp l i a n c e w i t h operating
p o l i c i e s and procedures
of f i r m s u f f i c i e n t ?

(2)

Were standardized forms
( f l o w c h a r t s , ICQs, checkl i s t s , s t a t i s t i c a l approval
forms, review forms, e t c . )
a p p r o p r i a t e l y used in
compliance with g u i d e l i n e s
of firm?

REVIEW
(1)

Were a p p r o p r i a t e types o f
reviews conducted ( e . g . ,
working-paper review;
review by t a x , EDP, i n d u s t r y
o r other s p e c i a l i s t s ; e t c . ) ?

(2)

Were review procedures
performed i n an e f f e c t i v e
and timely manner?

FOLLOW-UP
(1)

Were a p p r o p r i a t e d e c i s i o n s
and a c t i o n s e x e r c i s e d to
f o l l o w - u p a u d i t t e s t and
review f i n d i n g s ?

............

(2)

Were problems and c o n f l i c t s ,
i f any, followed-up and r e salved i n a timely and
a p p r o p r i a t e manner?

(3)

Did f o l l o w - u p a c t i o n s
a p p r o p r i a t e l y adapt to
changing a u d i t circumstances
in a f l e x i b l e , e f f i c i e n t
manner?
|

Comments

GLOBAL RATING FOR CATEGORY

1
Major
Problems

2
Minor
Problems

3
Average

4
Good
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5
Excellent

EXPLANATION

OVERALL QUALITY OF AUDIT

1
Major
Problems

2
Minor
Problems

3
Average

OVERALL RATING

COMMENTS
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4
Good

5
Excellent

Discussant's Response to
A Multi-Attribute Model for Audit Evaluation
Joseph X. Loftus
Price Waterhouse
The ability to objectively determine the quality of an audit engagement has
thus far eluded accounting firms and others interested in auditing. It has been
suggested that if the annual report does not contain any typos, the auditor is
not sued, obtains full realization of fees and is reappointed, the audit, at least in
the eyes of the auditor, is of high quality. That assessment is somewhat
cynical. Ted Mock and Michael Samet in their paper bring to bear a much more
reasonable approach for determining a meaningful measure of the quality of an
audit.
I concur with the authors that multi-attribute evaluation (MAE) provides a
framework for evaluative analysis. However, I submit it is only a framework.
Any evaluation analysis—any attempt to conclude as to quality—ultimately
rests on the judgments, subjective judgments, of the evaluator. Yes, there are
exceptions. We would all agree that the more famous auditing busts over the
years were indeed audits with major problems. We have all reviewed audit
workpapers which under any test would support calling the audit "excellent."
Most audits would fall within the extremes and it is here that subjective
elements are important. KNOW THY RATER is crucial in analyzing any results
of any evaluation, whether it be the evaluation of an audit, evaluation of
personnel or an evaluation of an auditing textbook.
Peer Review Experience
To date, the peer review committee of the AICPA SEC Practice Section
has reviewed and accepted some 400 peer review reports. The objective of a
peer review is to determine whether the quality control system of a firm met
the objectives of the AICPA quality control standards and was being complied
with so as to provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming with
professional standards. Crucial to any such determination is the review of the
firm's auditing and accounting engagements. As a result of the review, the
reviewers issue a report and, if they note matters which would result in
substantial improvement in the reviewed firm's quality control policies or
procedures, the reviewers issue a letter of comments. The most difficult
problem confronting the peer review committee is the unevenness of reporting
resulting from this process. Some reviewers will consider an item so serious as
to cause a modified report, while others, confronted with the identical
situation, would issue an unqualified report but mention this matter in the letter
of comments. We had our first peer review under the aegis of the SEC Practice
Section in 1978. We have tinkered with the process ever since in a futile
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attempt to resolve the "unevenness" problem. We have one consolation—the
profession has been trying for a substantially longer time to define materiality.
The Mock/Samet AQE Form
The Audit Quality Evaluation form developed by Ted and his co-author
would minimize the subjective element inherent in an evaluation process. It is
certainly a vast improvement over the approaches currently in vogue. For
example, after reviewing a set of audit or accounting workpapers a peer
reviewer is asked to conclude with respect to two broad questions—whether
he believed that (1) the firm had a "reasonable basis under professional
standards for the opinion it expressed" and (2) the financial statements
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles.
As to the methodology, I certainly have no quibble with the methodology
followed by the authors in developing the AQE form. Indeed, I'm impressed.
However, in the classical auditor's fashion, I must hedge by pointing out I'm
not an expert in developing or testing a multi-attribute evaluation model.
Nevertheless, the major categories—Plan, Administration, etc. seem appropri
ate as do the attributes and questions within the individual categories.
Allow me one personal bias in regard to the form itself. My limited
experience indicates that forcing an evaluator to conclude "yes" or "no" to a
given question is generally better than allowing a "yes but" or a "yes, except
for." Too often evaluators use the "yes, except" option as an escape from
making a hard, perhaps distasteful, call. The "except for" can be so
overwhelming, so significant, that it negates the yes answer and the reviewer
of the form is left to make the judgment as to whether the true answer is
"yes" or "no."
The accommodation in the form to allow a conclusion on the sufficiency of
audit documentation is a sound idea. In the peer review process, we have been
plagued by the lack of documentation of key audit judgments. The lack of
adequate documentation is the most frequent weakness found in a review. An
observation that documentation is inadequate leads to the obvious question as
to whether the work was really performed. In some cases, collaborating
evidence is available. In other cases, one wonders. A quick review of a
compendium of peer review comments compiled from letters of comments
accepted by the SECPS peer review committee during the nine-month period
ended in March 1982 indicates well over half of the comments are connected
with the question of documentation. As a result of the findings of the peer
review process, both the Auditing Standards Board and the Quality Control
Standards Committee of the AICPA have issued guidance in the area of
documentation. The ASB recently issued SAS No. 41 entitled Working Papers.
The Quality Control Committee issued an interpretation in April specifying the
level of documentation required for the nine elements of quality control
enumerated in Statement on Quality Controls No. 1. For example, among the
reports accepted at the peer review meeting earlier this week was a report and
letter of comments covering a peer review of one of the larger firms. All of the
matters noted in the letter of comments related to documentation:
• The firm should document procedures followed in resolving independ
ence questions;
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• The following areas were not adequately documented in accordance
with firm policies:
—Auditing procedures followed in the areas of related party transac
tions;
—Procedures performed in connection with the acceptance of new
clients and the decision to retain existing clients;
—Disagreements with clients and resolution thereof;
—Procedures performed between balance sheet date and report date.
• Firm policy should be amended to provide guidelines for the extent of
audit consultation and the related documentation;
• Document the evaluation of the adequacy of the client's internal
controls, including EDP controls.
It would be interesting to see how evaluators using the AQE form will react
to the documentation questions.
To wrap up this part of the discussion, I agree with the authors that
research efforts should continue in this area. The AQE has the potential for
being a useful technique in evaluating an audit. The technique also has potential
in other areas of concern to auditors, for example, promotion of staff to
partner. The authors have developed a tool which could be of benefit to
auditors and the users of their product.
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6
Some Thoughts on Materiality
Kenneth W. Stringer
New York University
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Retired
Introduction
The invitation for this paper resulted from discussions with Professor
Stettler at and subsequent to the 1981 Deloitte Haskins & Sells AuditSCOPE
Update Seminar. The purpose of that seminar was to stimulate academic
interest and research on the subject of materiality. That subject was chosen
because the author and his associates involved in planning the seminar believe
materiality is a pervasive problem that needs further attention by those who
have responsibilities forfinancialreporting.
Management is forced to make decisions about materiality in preparing
financial statements and auditors are forced to make similar decisions in
planning, performing and reporting on audits of such statements. Both
management and auditors face the potential need to defend their decisions in
the event of challenges by those who usefinancialstatements and audit reports
as one of the various sources of information used in making investment
decisions. Although not a pleasing prospect to either management or auditors,
this potential is reasonable because the underlying concept of materiality is
oriented toward the influence offinancialinformation on users' decisions.
Yet no quantitative standards or guidelines have been developed by
professional organizations in the U.S. and, in my view, relatively little useful
results have been provided by user-oriented academic research. Research to
date that relates, directly or indirectly, to materiality has consisted largely of
behavioral experiments and opinion surveys based on hypothetical situations,
and studies of the impact of accounting information on stock market prices. The
latter, however, have been concerned more directly with the efficient market
hypothesis and with policy questions concerning the establishment of account
ing principles than with questions about materiality with reference to the
financial statements of individual companies. Therefore, I believe management
and auditors are sailing the uncharted waters of investors decisions without
taking soundings to map the decision-making process and the parameters that
lie below the surface.
I think the hazard and the challenge arising from this situation are obvious.
From this perspective, I will comment briefly on the efforts of the FASB to deal
with materiality, and make a few observations and suggestions for considera
tion by others.
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FASB Actions
The FASB included a project on materiality on its initial agenda and
assigned a relatively high priority to the project for some time thereafter. As a
result, a comprehensive Discussion Memorandum was issued, substantial
effort was expended by various organizations in performing research and
preparing written responses, and public hearings were held for oral presenta
tions to and discussions with the Board. From this encouraging beginning, the
mountain labored and brought forth a mouse in the form of a few paragraphs
dealing with materiality in Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 2, "Qualita
tive Characteristics of Accounting Information." In these paragraphs the
Board reiterated the usual generalities that are expressed when the subject is
discussed, but did little or nothing to add to or clarify existing concepts and
provided no quantitative guidance. It included the obvious comments about the
need for judgment in dealing with unusual situations, but said nothing about
points of departure or benchmarks for the usual situations. In declining to do
so, the Board indicated that those respondents who wanted it to issue
quantitative guidelines were in the minority. Without knowing the Board's
rules for weighing responses, it is interesting to observe that the three
organizations that represent the preparers, the auditors, and a major segment
of users offinancialstatements all endorsed the issuance of such guidelines by
the Board. Excerpts from the responses of the Financial Executives Institute,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the Financial
Analysts Federation are attached as Appendix A to this paper.
Appendix B is a report on a research study, "The Impact of Earnings on
Stock Prices," which I conducted at the request of the AICPA and submitted
to the FASB in response to its Discussion Memorandum. The premise
underlying this research was that knowledge of the sensitivity of stock prices
to reported earnings is relevant to materiality decisions in view of the useroriented concept of materiality. Although this study was described in the
Discussion Memorandum and commented upon favorably by several Board
members at the public hearing, it was buried without the dignity of even a
footnote reference in Statement No. 2. Instead, the Board described the
general approach and referenced it to an article that was written by two
professors who had been given a research grant by my firm's Foundation to
review the approach and other aspects of the subject while the research was in
progress. The board concluded that the approach was "too blunt an instrument
to be depended on to set materiality guidelines."
Without challenging the Board's conclusion concerning this particular
study, the report is being exhumed for an autopsy with the hope that a post
mortem will suggest ways to sharpen the instrument so that it can serve a
useful purpose. I remain optimistic that this can be done if academic re
searchers or research-oriented practitioners study the problem seriously. Such
study is particularly timely now because the subject of Materiality and Audit
Risk is currently on the agenda of the Auditing Standards Board. With this view
in mind, I set forth in the remainder of this paper a brief summary of my
observations concerning the research results, some suggestions for further
research, and some comments on other matters.
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Research Results
The relative correlation between stock prices and the various earnings
models summarized in Table 2 of the report conformed generally to my prior
expectations, although the lower correlations with the five-year models
presumably would not conform with the expectations of those who emphasize
the importance of trends and growth rates. The other results in the first phase
of the study which conformed to my expectations were the fact that the
correlations were better for ordinary earnings than for earnings after extraordi
nary items or for cash flow. The most surprising result to me was the slightly
higher correlation for historical earnings than for forecasted earnings. I had
expected the latter to be significantly higher and, as indicated in the report,
was unable to explain this result.
The results of the second phase conformed generally to my expectations in
that the use of additional variables improved the correlation with stock prices,
and that no single variable among those added was predominant, as shown in
Table 6. I was surprised, however, that earnings were excluded from the set of
significant variables for slightly more than half of the companies, as shown also
in Table 6. For 18 of the excluded companies, however, thefive-yearearnings
growth rate was a significant variable. Thus, either earnings or an earnings
growth rate was significant for about two-thirds of the companies.
Further Research
As readers may reasonably infer from my earlier comments, I believe
further research along the general lines indicated in the accompanying paper
would be useful. With the passage of time, quarterly historical and forecasted
earnings are now available for more years and such additional data offer the
potential for better results.
The variables used in my study included both the levels of stock prices and
earnings and the changes in those levels. However, the accompanying paper
presented results in terms of levels only because those results appeared to be
more significant. Nevertheless, I suggest that changes be studied further in
any additional research that is performed. In addition, I suggest that dif
ferences between actual changes and expected changes, as indicated by
historical standard errors or by variations from forecasts, be considered as
possible explanatory variables.
I also suggest further study of both the underlying concept and the
parameters of the decision model presented in the accompanying paper.
Although I am convinced that the cost of making changes in investment
portfolios is one constraint on the sensitivity of changes in stock prices to
changes in earnings as discussed in the accompanying paper, there may be
other and possibly more important constraints that should also be considered.
For example, the cost of analyzing financial information for use in making
investment decisions may be more important than the cost of executing the
related transactions. Further, behavioral limitations on decision-making proc
esses may be another form of constraint that should be considered. The report
of my study focused entirely on composite results for the 100 companies for
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each of the models considered. This was done in the interest of simplicity and
what I then considered would be most useful for the FASB's purposes.
However, the reported results could be improved substantially by using for
each company the model that gave the best correlation for that company. This
methodology as a starting point for applying judgment in individual situations
may be worthy of further consideration in lieu of generalized quantitative
guidelines.
Other Matters
The effect of an item on the trend of earnings is mentioned frequently in
discussions of materiality, with the implication that this is a more stringent
consideration than those that apply in determining the effect of an item on
earnings for the current period. I believe these implications have resulted in an
overemphasis or possible misunderstanding, because the effect on the current
period will equal or exceed the effect on a projection of a trend to the next
period with the limited exception of projections of a trend computed from either
two or three periods only.* These exceptions, of course, should be considered
in any situation in which users might reasonably be expected to rely on trends
for two or three periods only, which presumably would be rare.
Some discussions of materiality also attribute additional significance to an
item that changes a loss to a profit, or a downward trend to an upward trend.
Beyond the actual effect of trends on projections as explained above, I believe
this perception is more subjective than substantive.
The research study focused entirely on public companies, and primarily on
earnings as the critical component or primary interest of the external users of
financial statements of such companies. The primary interest of such users,
however, is likely to shift from earnings to financial position if there is a
significant concern about the liquidity or solvency of the company. Further, the
principal external users offinancialstatements of private entities ordinarily are
the present or prospective creditors and their primary interet is likely to be in
liquidity or solvency, with earnings being of interest primarily in that context.
When liquidity or solvency is the principal matter of concern, the primary
interest of creditors and owners is likely to center on their claims and their
equity, respectively. Creditors, however, are likely to be interested also in
owners' equity as one measure of the margin of security for their claims. Both
groups are likely to be interested also in current assets as a primary source of
funds to provide liquidity. Therefore, current assets and owners' equity are
likely to be the more critical components when liquidity or solvency is the
principal matter of concern to external users of financial statements.
My last comments on specific matters relate to the problem that may be
described as one of nominal amounts or differences. The significance of
earnings and of any related measure of materiality obviously diminishes as
* The projected effect on the next period (P) of a change in an item in the current period (C), based
on the trend for a given number of periods (N) may be computed from the following formula:
P = C(4/N). Thus the projected effect of an item based on a trend computed from two or three
periods would be 2 or 1.33, respectively, times the current effect.
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earnings approach zero. In these circumstances, the matter of primary interest
to investors is that the results of operations are substantially below normal
expectations, rather than whether they are above or below the breakeven
point by some nominal amount. I think the same rationale can reasonably be
applied as the excess of working capital, or some other specified component of
financial statements, over the minimum required under a loan agreement
approaches zero. Although a nominal decline below such requirements tech
nically would be a default, I doubt seriously that the practical consequences
resulting solely from such a default ordinarily would differ materially from those
where the requirements were exceeded by a nominal amount.
In addition to the above perceptions of the practical needs of users in such
circumstances, two other considerations are relevant from the perspective of
auditors. The first of these is that it is impracticable from a cost/benefit
viewpoint to expand the scope of audit tests to the degree necessary to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting errors that would be material if measured in
relation to the foregoing amounts or differences as they approach zero. The
second consideration is that the customary type of auditor's report relating to
compliance with loan agreements is in the form negative assurance, and
explicitly states that the examination was not directed primarily toward
obtaining knowledge of noncompliance. I want to emphasize that both of these
considerations are related solely to the scope of the auditor's examination, and
are not intended to imply that special attention need not be given to known or
reasonably estimated errors or to questions concerning disclosures in the
circumstances described above.
I hope my comments on the matters mentioned in this paper will be helpful
in stimulating consideration of materiality by the Auditing Standards Board and
by academic researchers. The present situation which requires management
and auditors to apply a clearly quantitative concept of materiality without the
benefit of authoritative quantitative guidelines or methodology invites, and
indeed requires the courts to fill this void on an after-the-fact, case-by-case
basis when litigation arises. More important in the public interest however, is
the need for professional guidance in the multitude of day-to-day decisions that
are required but never involve litigation.

Appendix A
Excerpts from Responses to
FASB Discussion Memorandum on Criteria for Determining
Materiality by Representatives of Preparers,
Auditors and Users of Financial Statements
Committee on Corporate Reporting of the Financial Executives Institute (CCR
Committee)
The CCR Committee concurs that there is a need for materiality criteria,
and we recommend that the FASB proceed with its deliberations and that the
statement be issued with the explicit recognition that the statement of criteria
will be subject to reexamination upon completion of the Board's project on the
conceptual framework for accounting and reporting.
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While we believe that a standard which establishes criteria for determining
materiality cannot be finalized until the FASB adopts a statement on the
objectives of financial reporting (a statement which we recognize must, of
necessity, be subjected to lengthy FASB due process procedures), we are not
suggesting postponement. On the contrary, we believe that the issuance of a
statement on materiality at this time will enhance the credibility of financial
reporting, even though the Board may announce its intention to reexamine and
possibly amend the criteria after the "objectives" have been adopted.
We recommend that the Board establish a point of departure or threshold
for the materiality decision process. We believe that a threshold of 5% of net
income has support, since it seems to be the lower end of the issuer range and
the upper end of the user range. While the need for a threshold for balance
sheet items appears to be less urgent, we would anticipate that a threshold for
the balance sheet would be higher than 5%, with the possible exception of
situations relating to liquidity concerns and in the case of accounting changes.
The adoption of quantitative criteria accompanied by logic and illustrative
examples by the FASB would probably have an important influence on the
courts in future litigation. The FASB statement should provide financial
executives with a more authoritative basis for materiality decisions, as well as
enhance the credibility of publishedfinancialreports.
Accounting Standards Task Force on Materiality of the Accounting Standards
Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (The Division)
The Division believes that an FASB Statement establishing materiality
criteria should be issued. Such a Statement would, perhaps, need to be
reconsidered upon issuance of a Statement on the objectives of financial
statements. Nevertheless, it is believed that a Statement at this time on
materiality would provide guidance to the preparers of financial statements
which would enhance the utility offinancialstatements and contribute to the
understanding of users.
The Division was guided by practical considerations in recommending the
criteria discussed below. The Division believes that quantitative criteria should
be established and should be based on the assumption that an amount that is
5% or more of an appropriate denominator may reasonably be presumed to be
material. The Division believes that this perception of the threshold of
materiality could gain general acceptance and would be workable in practice.
However, a minority within the Division believes the quantitative criteria
should be a percentage greater than 5%. . . .
There should be a presumption that a matter is material if its current or
potential effect is 5% or more of income or loss from continuing operations (i.e.
income or loss before discontinued operations, extraordinary items and
cumulative effect of an accounting change). Where necessary to prevent the
use of an unreasonably low amount as a denominator, average income if greater
than the current year's income (or loss) should generally be used. The Division
recommends using an appropriate period (e.g., five years) to calculate average
income, and loss years or "abnormal" years should be excluded from the
calculation if the result would be to distort the average. The Division believes
that income from continuing operations is a more useful base for decision
making than net income, because this amount is more representative of the
ongoing operations of the enterprise.
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In certain unusual circumstances, even the use of average income would
result in an overly stringent determination of materiality. For example, if a
company's income from continuing operations for the past five years is near
zero, 5% of this amount would not usually result in an amount which could
reasonably be considered material. Where the quantitative criteria would
clearly result in an overly stringent requirement, judgment is essential and a
more appropriate base upon which to make the calculation should be selected.
For example, in some circumstances 5% of net worth might serve as a
substitute for income, and items which are 5% or more of this substitute would
be presumed to be material. In other situations, published sources of average
rates of return for particular industries might serve as a guide for selecting an
income substitute.
The Division has concluded that it is not feasible to formulate quantitative
materiality criteria based on earnings trends, since these trends vary so widely
among companies. For example, a 5% increase in income over the prior year
might be considered "normal" in one company, "significantly better than
average" in another, and "significantly worse than average" in a third. In
addition, if income increased 3% over the prior year and a "trend of earnings''
factor was part of the criteria, the materiality level would be extremely low.
Further, it is not known whether or not the treatment of an item which affected
income by less than 5% but affected the "trend of earnings" by a higher
percentage would have an effect on an investment or lending decision of a user
in the majority of circumstances.
There should be a presumption that a matter is material if its current or
potential effect is 5% or more of the appropriate balance sheet caption as
follows: current assets—5% or more of total current assets; current lia
bilities—5% or more of total current liabilities; noncurrent assets or liabilities—
5% or more of total assets. . . .
The Financial Analysts Federation
With regard to the income statement, thefinancialeffect of a matter should
be viewed in the context of its relationship to the change in net income. For
example, items might be deemed material if they exceeded 5 percent of net
income or 20 percent of the change in net income from the prior-period. In no
case shall an amount less than 2 percent of the average net income for the most
recent three years be considered material. Thus, materiality criteria would not
only be related to a level of net income, but also to the change in net income.
Balance sheet matters could be handled in a similar manner. For example,
items could be deemed material if they account for more than 5 percent of net
quick assets, net working capital, or shareholders' equity.
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Appendix B
The Impact of Earnings on Stock Prices*
Introduction
The research study described in this report was conducted at the request
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and is being
submitted to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in response to
the FASB Discussion Memorandum dated March 21, 1975 relating to "Criteria
for Determining Materiality." As contemplated in the AICPA's request, the
research was conducted by the author and this report has not been reviewed or
endorsed by any committee or representative of the AICPA.
Chapter II of the Discussion Memorandum discusses the concept of
materiality in accounting and includes various definitions that have been
promulgated or proposed for implementation of this concept. The central
theme common to these definitions is that something is material if it would
influence an investor's decision. In recognition of this decision-oriented
formulation of the concept of materiality, Chapters V and VI set forth the
results of interviews and other research concerning investors' decision
processes. The interviews and other research underlying those chapters
provided the basis for a comprehensive general description of investors'
decision processes, but not for a definitive formulation of decision models with
quantification of the variables comprehended in the models.
Such models are necessary if standards for materiality are to be related
effectively to the impact of accounting information on investors' decisions. This
may be illustrated by two oversimplified and extreme examples. Assume first,
that the price of a particular stock was known to be exactly a given multiple of
earnings; and second, that its price was known to be exactly a given multiple of
the S & P average. In the first case, a change of 1% in earnings would cause a
change of 1% in price, but in the second case the same change in earnings
would not cause any change in price. If materiality is to be related to the effect
on investors' decisions, the materiality of a given change in earnings clearly
would be different under the two assumed models.
The purpose of the research described in this report was to determine
whether a useful composite decision model might be derived from a study of
the correlation between earnings and stock prices for reasonable sample of
companies for a period of several years. The premise underlying this approach
is that, given a general description of the principal factors considered in the
decision process, the relative weight given to the respective factors may be
inferred from the pattern of behavior suggested by such correlations.
This study was not conducted under any illusion that it would produce a
precise or conclusive model, but only to determine whether it could provide
information that would be useful in considering possible standards for mate
riality. To whatever extent the study may provide insight into investors'
* The author gratefully acknowledges the services of his partner, Dr. Maurice S. Newman, in
providing mathematical consultation and computer prograrnming; and of his research assistants,
Mr. Steven Gillingham and Miss Swati Desai, in maintaining files, processing data, and assisting in
other respects.

138

behavior, it may also be relevant to the FASB's consideration of the objectives
of financial statements and the conceptual framework of accounting.
If, however, this study or other information furnished to the FASB does not
provide a basis for inferring a decision model that is considered sufficiently
definitive to be useful in establishing criteria for accounting materiality, this
would appear to leave two remaining alternatives. The first alternative would
be to establish quantitative criteria with appropriate flexibility based on the
subjective perceptions of users, preparers, and auditors as to reasonable levels
of sensitivity and practicability. The first alternative was advocated in the
response to the Discussion Memorandum which was submitted by the
AICPA's Accounting Standards Task Force on Materiality. The second
alternative would appear to be a conclusion by the FASB that quantitative
criteria are not feasible.
Data and Methodology
This study was described on page 44 of the Discussion Memorandum as
follows:
The study focuses principally on earnings per share in relation to the
market prices of securities. It seeks to establish the extent of the
relationship of those factors and, in turn, to determine whether any
general inferences can be drawn about the sensitivity of investment
decisions to earnings per share.
The analysis comprehends 300 enterprises selected from the
COMPUSTAT tapes of data for 1800 enterprises. Preliminary analysis
has been confined to 100 enterprises, but will be extended to 300.
In the first phase of the study, various earnings per share amounts
are being correlated through regression analysis with average stock
prices for each enterprise over a period offifteenyears. The earnings
per share amounts included in the study are the five-year moving
average, the five-year trend line (both exponential and linear), and
various current measurements, combined in some cases with growth
rates. The results of these analyses are expected to give indications of
the most significant earnings per share amounts, insofar as it may be
inferred that such information influences investment decisions.
The second phase of the study introduces other factors to ascertain
those that are significant in combination with earnings per share. These
other factors include changes in earnings per share, dividends, changes
in dividends, book value, the Standard & Poor's Industrial Stock Price
Index, price stability, interest rates, enterprise sales, changes in sales,
non-recurring income statement items, earnings variability, growth
rates, turning points in growth rates, and changes in trends.
The final phase of the study will attempt to determine whether
inferences can be drawn concerning the sensitivity of stock prices to
earnings per share that would provide any useful basis for establishing a
materiality standard.
Data
The study was based primarily on annual data for the twenty years ended
December 31, 1972. In order to permit the use of averages, trends, and other
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data based on prior periods, the latestfifteenof the twenty years of annual data
were used directly in the regression analyses.
The companies selected were from among those included in the Standard &
Poor's Industrial Classification. The data files were screened using two criteria
before making the final seletion systematically with a random start. The
screening criteria used were (1) a full set of data for the periods covered and
(2) fiscal years ending December 31.
Methodology
As mentioned earlier, the mathematical technique used for this research
was regression analysis, which was applied through use of a stepwise multiple
regression computer program. This methodology is generally accepted for use
in studies having characteristics similar to those involved in this research. Any
extensive explanation of regression analysis is beyond the scope of this report
but may be found in standard textbooks on the subject or to a more limited
extent in those on statistics or quantitative methods generally. The following
brief explanation is considered sufficient for this report.
The purpose of regression analysis is to compute a mathematical function
or equation that will best express the pattern or relationship existing between
two or more sets of quantitative data (variables). The variable of primary
interest is referred to as the "dependent" variable, and those whose
relationship to the dependent variable is to be studied are referred to as the
"independent" variables. In this study, average stock prices (the annual highlow average as carried on the COMPUSTAT tapes, adjusted for stock
dividends and splits) were used as the dependent variable, and earnings and
other data described in more detail later were used as the independent
variables. "Simple" regression refers to the use of only one independent
variable, while "multiple" regression refers to use of more than one independ
ent variable.
The regression function derived from a regression analysis may be in the
form of a linear or a non-linear equation. The form of a simple linear function is
as follows:
Y'j = a + bX

i

Where:
Y' = estimated value of dependent variable.
a = a constant value computed in the regression analysis.
b = a coefficient (multiplier) computed in the regression analysis.
X = the actual value of the independent variable.
i = a subscript indicating a particular value included in the set of
values of the respective variable; for example, i = 1,2, . . .15
if annual values of X and Y for 15 years are used in the
regression analysis.
The form of a multiple linear function is the same as that described above for a
simple function except for the addition of a separate coefficient (b) for each
additional independent variable (X).
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The actual value of each of the dependent variables (Y ) will differ from the
corresponding estimated values (Y'i) by an amount referred to as the
"residual" or "individual error of estimate" (e ) and the relation between the
actual and estimated values of the dependent variable may be expressed as
follows:
i

i

Yi - Y ' i = e

i

The computations by which the regression function is determined are
designed to provide the "best fit" by minimizing the sum of the squares of the
individual errors of estimate. The quantity minimized for this purpose is the
sum of the squares, rather than of the actual amounts of the individual errors,
because the actual errors will be both positive and negative and their sum will
always be zero. A statistic commonly used as a measure of the closeness of the
relationship between the variables, or the "goodness of fit" of the regression
function, is the "coefficient of correlation." The range of values for this
coefficient is from 1 to 0, indicating perfect correlation or the lack of any
correlation, respectively.
The details from one of the analyses made in the course of the study are
presented to illustrate the matters discussed above in Table 1.

Table 1

Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Average

Actual Data*
Price (Y)
EPS (X)
.474
8.185
9.169
.326
.698
9.469
11.888
.615
10.641
.831
13.660
.906
1.414
18.391
23.285
1.800
24.916
2.377
24.878
1.935
2.520
36.950
38.150
3.420
3.160
28.650
22.450
1.720
20.400
1.840
1.602
20.072

Regression
Estimate of
Price (Y')
9.380
7.977
11.502
10.715
12.762
13.473
18.287
21.945
27.412
23.224
28.767
37.296
34.832
21.186
22.324
20.072

Error of
Estimate (e)
-1.195
1.192
- 2.033
1.173
-2.121
.187
.104
1.340
- 2.496
1.654
8.183
.854
-6.182
1.264
-1.924
-0-

The regression function for this example is a constant of 4.888 and a coefficient of 9.476, and the
coefficient of correlation is .95.
* The actual data used in this example and throughout the study have been adjusted for stock
dividends and splits.

The foregoing example is presented graphically in two forms. In Chart A
each point represents the actual EPS and the actual average price for a
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particular year as shown in Table 1 above. The solid line represents the
regression estimates, and the distance between the line and the individual
points plotted represents the errors of estimate. This form of graph illustrates
the linearity of the regression estimates, but does not show the data by years
and cannot be used where more than one independent variable is included in
the regression function.
Chart B shows the same information in a form that obscures the linearity of
the regression function but overcomes the two objections mentioned above. In
this chart the points connected by the dotted line represent the actual prices
and those connected by the solid line represent the estimated prices for the
particular years, and the distances between the respective points represent
the errors of estimate.
The foregoing example may also be used to illustrate the distinction
between the regression coefficient for EPS, the price-earnings ratio, and the
price-earnings sensitivity. The price-earnings ratio is discussed because of its
common usage but it was not used in this study for the reasons given below.
The price-earnings ratio is itself a variable, and may be used in either a
historical or a prospective sense. Historically, it represents the ratio between
actual or average price for a particular date or period and actual earnings for a
particular period. Prospectively, it may refer to the ratio of current price to
estimated earnings for a period ending in the future, or to an estimated ratio of
future price to future earnings. Mathematically, the price-earnings ratio would
be equivalent to the regression coefficient if and only if the constant term in the
regression function is 0 and no independent variables other than EPS are used.
Because of these exceptions, the use of an average price-earnings ratio to
compute ratio estimates will not provide as good correlation with actual prices
as that provided by regression estimates.
In the foregoing example, the average historical price-earning ratio would
be 12.529 [20.072/1.602], in contrast to the regression coefficient of 9.476
shown in Table 1; and the correlation of ratio estimates would be .88, in
contrast to .95 for the regression estimates.
In this report, "price-earnings sensitivity" (PES) refers to the estimated
average percentage change in price associated with a 1% change in earnings
based on the regression function. It is clear from the form of the simple and
multiple regression functions discussed earlier that the PES factor would be 1 if
and only if the constant and any terms other than the one for EPS are 0. If the
net effect of such terms is positive the PES factor will be less than 1, and if the
net effect is negative the factor will be greater than 1. It should be noted that
the sensitivity depends on the relationship of the EPS term to the other terms
in the regression function, rather than on the magnitude of the EPS coefficient.
In the foregoing example the PES factor is .76 [(9.476 x 1.602)/20.072].
A final point concerning the methodology deserves emphasis. This is that
regression analysis identifies and measures a mathematical relationship, but
does not necessarily establish a logical cause-and-effect relationship between
the dependent and the independent variable(s). As one example, a close
correlation might be established between rainfall and floods using either as the
dependent variable; in this event it would be logical to infer that rainfall causes
floods, but not thatfloodscause rainfall. Another classic example is that a high
correlation was once found between increases in teachers' salaries and
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increases in sales of liquor, but this does not establish that the latter is caused
by the former; the more logical inference is that both of the increases are
caused by one or more common factors not included as variables in the
analysis. The simple examples are given to emphasize the need for logical
analysis and judgment in interpreting the results of regression analysis. For
this reason the variables used in this study have been restricted to those for
which it is plausible to expect that a meaningful relationship may exist, based on
the description of the investors' decision processes and the other research
referred to in the Discussion Memorandum.
Earnings
Since decision models may use earnings data from various periods and in
various ways, the first phase of the study was designed to determine which of
various assumed earnings models provided the best correlation with stock
prices before considering any other variables. The Discussion Memorandum
and accepted investment concepts indicate that the earnings with which
investors are primarily concerned are those expected in the future. Conse
quently, the assumed models used in this study are considered surrogates for
expected earnings.
The Discussion Memorandum and accepted investment concepts also
indicate that the primary interest of investors is in ordinary or recurring
earnings. For this reason, references to earnings or EPS in this report
exclude, unless otherwise noted, amounts identified as extraordinary in the
COMPUSTAT tapes from which the data were obtained for this study. It
should be noted that the amounts so designated may not necessarily conform
with accounting practices prevailing during the respective years or at the
present time.
The various ordinary earnings models used in the study and the results
obtained are discussed in the following section, and extraordinary items are
considered separately in the next section of this report.
Ordinary Earnings
Because of the requirements for five-year summaries of earnings in
prospectuses and annual reports, several models based onfive-yearperiods
were used. These models were included because of the frequent references in
accounting and investment literature to average earnings, trends, and growth
rates. These models are described more specifically below.
Five-Year Average—This model assumes that the average annual EPS
for the most recent five fiscal years is the surrogate for expected
EPS for the current year.
Five-Year Linear Trend—This model assumes that the trend of EPS for
the most recent five fiscal years, projected through the current
year, is the surrogate for expected EPS for the current year.
Five-Year Exponential Trend—This model is similar to the previous one
except that it is based on an exponential rather than a linear
function.
Five-Year Linear Growth Rate—This model assumes that EPS for the
preceding fiscal year, projected on the basis of the average annual
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growth rate in EPS for the most recent five fiscal years, is the
surrogate for expected EPS for the current year.
The following additional models involving earnings for the current and prior
year were also used. In these, as well as in those discussed above, a clear
identification of the respective periods referred to is important. Throughout
this report the "current" period refers to the period for which the average
stock prices are determined and in which the financial statements for the
"prior" period are issued; at the present time, for example, 1976 is the
current year and 1975 is the prior year. Discussion of the additional models
follows:
Prior Year—This model assumes that the EPS for the prior year is the
surrogate for expected EPS for the current year. It should be noted
that this is the latest fiscal-year EPS on which materiality and
investment decisions may be focused.
Current Year—This model assumes that the actual EPS for the current
year is the surrogate for the expected EPS for that year. Since the
actual EPS for the current year, of course, cannot be known during
that year this model is tantamount to assuming perfect foresight.
Although this assumption is unrealistic, it appears useful for analyti
cal and comparative purposes.
Average of Prior and Current Years—This model assumes that the
average of the EPS for the prior and current years (referred to
hereinafter as the "average EPS") is the surrogate for the
expected EPS for the current year. This model attempts to
compensate in a simplistic way for the decreasing relevance of the
prior information, and the increasing availability and relevance of the
current information from quarterly reports and other sources, as
the current year progresses.
For each of the models described above, time-series regression analyses
were prepared for each of the 100 selected companies for the 15 years ended
December 31, 1972, using data for those 15 years and for the preceding 5
years for those models that required such data. The results are summarized in
Table 2.

Earnings Model
Five-year models:
Average
Trends:
Exponential
Linear
Growth rates—linear
Prior year
Current year
Average (prior and cur
rent)

Table 2
Average
Correlation*

Number
Significant*

.33

43

.50
.55
.62
.63
.66

62
68
77
78
80

.70

84

* In this table and elsewhere in this report, unless otherwise noted, the statistical significance of
correlations has been determined at the .05 level and average correlation has been computed for
100 companies, with those that were not significant being treated as zeros.
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The pattern shown in Table 2 suggests clearly that the most recent
earnings information available is the most closely related to stock prices. This
suggests also that information about prior averages, trends, and growth rates
may be overemphasized. Based on the results shown in Table 2, average EPS
for the prior and current periods is used as the variable for ordinary earnings in
the analyses discussed in the remainder of this report unless otherwise
indicated.
An analysis was also prepared using average EPS to determine whether an
exponential function would provide a better correlation than that obtained from
the linear function as reported above. The form used for this purpose was: log
Y' = a + bX. This form was used to the exclusion of those that involve log X
because logarithms do not exist for negative values and average EPS (X) was
negative for various companies for various years. The average correlation from
this exponential function was .65 with 78 significant correlations, as compared
with .70 and 84 respectively from the linear function as shown in Table 2. This
suggests that the latter is more relevant for the purpose of this study.
To complement the time-series analyses reported above, cross-sectional
analyses were prepared for each of the 15 years using average stock prices and
average EPS for each of the 100 companies in each of the 15 years. The
average of the correlations obtained for each of the 15 years was .80.
Because of the widespread interest in forecasts of earnings, analyses were
run to determine the correlation of forecasted earnings with stock prices and to
compare such correlation with that of historical earnings. The source of the
forecasts used for this purpose was the Standard & Poor's Earnings Forecaster
from 1967, the earliest calendar year available, through 1972. This publication
lists the most recently available forecasts of EPS for the current fiscal year by
various analysts. The data used in this study were compiled generally as
follows. For each calendar year, the issue used was the one dated nearest the
mid-point of each calendar quarter. Where forecasts from several analysts
were given, any which appeared to be extreme in relation to the others were
eliminated and the average of the remainder was used for the particular
quarter. The average of the forecasts so determined for each quarter was used
for the year.
The results obtained from using forecasted earnings determined on this
basis for each of the 100 companies for the six years indicated above, and from
using the historical average EPS for the same six years are shown in Table 3.
Table 3

Forecasts
Historical

Average
Correlation
.41
.44

Number
Significant
45
48

The results shown above are substantially lower than those shown in Table 2
for historical earnings. This appears to be caused primarily by the effect of the
lower number of years used in the tests of significance. To eliminate this effect,
analyses were run using the same data, but with the significance tests
suppressed. These analyses showed average correlations of .60 for forecasts
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and .69 for historical, with the latter being more comparable to the results in
Table 2. Apart from the level of correlation, however, the more important
result is that both sets of analyses show lower correlation for forecasts than for
historical earnings.
This somewhat surprising comparison suggests that either (1) the relative
weight given to forecasts versus historical earnings in investment decision may
be less than the popular belief, or (2) the analysis is faulty in some respect. As
to the latter possibility, several observations seem pertinent. Insofar as the
author was able to determine, the publication used is the most comprehensive
compilation publicly available. The average of quarterly forecasts for the
current year should provide a more timely measure of expectations throughout
the year than the average of the earnings of the current and prior years as used
in the historical analysis; otherwise the time frames are the same in the
respective analyses. Three possible sources of bias in the data used are as
follows: (1) forecasts not included in the publication used, (2) differences
between the relative number of investors who may have been influenced by the
different forecasts included and the relative number implicit in the averages
used, and (3) the extremes eliminated in computing the averages as discussed
earlier. The author doubts that any of these possible sources of bias is
significant.
Extraordinary Earnings
As indicated earlier, the foregoing analyses were based on the assumption
that the earnings of primary interest to investors exclude extraordinary items.
To test the validity of this assumption, an analysis was prepared for the 100
companies for 15 years using the average total EPS (including extraordinary
items) as the independent variable. The average coefficient of correlation from
this analysis was .65 as compared with that of .70 obtained by using average
ordinary EPS. This result, combined with the evidence cited in the Discussion
Memorandum and other sources, seems to confirm the validity of the
assumption that ordinary earnings are of primary interest to investors.
Cash Flow
There have been suggestions that investors may give more attention to
cash flow than to earnings, either because they consider it more important,
more objective, or more comparable between companies. For this reason, an
analysis was prepared using average cash flow as the independent variable.
This analysis showed an average correlation of .58 as compared with .70 for
average earnings. This comparison suggests that investors do not consider
cash flow more significant than earnings, and accordingly cash flow was not
used further in this study.
Other Variables
In the second phase of this study, the other variables mentioned earlier
under "Data and Methodology" as quoted from the Discussion Memorandum
were used in various combinations. Those for which the results were
considered of interest are discussed in this section.
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In addition to the level of ordinary earnings as discussed above, the fiveyear growth rate and variability of such earnings, and extraordinary earnings
were used because of their possible relevance to earnings expectations.
Dividends were used because of the general presumption that the distinction
between distributed and undistributed earnings is significant to investors. The
average of the dividends for the prior and current years was used for the
reason explained earlier with respect to the use of average earnings. Book
value was used primarily to test the prevalent presumption that it is not
significant to investors. The market-related variables used were the Standard
& Poor's average of stock prices for 425 industrial companies and an index of
price stability (or variability). It was assumed that the S&P average would
appropriately measure the combined effect of external factors affecting the
market generally, and accordingly no effort was made to analyze any such
factors individually. The use of average prices by industry classifications was
considered impracticable because of the difficulty of establishing consistency in
such classifications for the number of years covered, and was considered
unnecessary because of the limited effect of such classifications indicated by
earlier studies. The price stability index was computed for each company for
each year by dividing the high-low price range by the corresponding price
average.
Three of the variables mentioned in the preceding paragraph—dividends,
book value, and the S&P average—appear to be of sufficient interest to
consider individually. The average correlation obtained from the respective
analyses in which these variables were used was as shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Variables
Average dividends
S & P average
Book value

Average
Correlation
.53
.36
.39

Number
Significant
67
53
48

A multiple set of variables, consisting of average EPS and all of those
mentioned in the second preceding paragraph, was used in (1) time-series
analyses covering 15 years for each of 100 companies and (2) cross-sectional
analyses covering 100 companies for each of 15 years. The results obtained
from these analyses and a comparison with those obtained from using average
EPS only are presented in Table 5.
Table 5

Time-series analyses:
Number significant
Average correlation
Cross-section analyses:
Number significant
Average correlation
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Multiple
Variables

Average
EPS Only

95
.85

84
.70

15
.82

15
.80

As was expected, the use of multiple variables improved the overall results of
the time-series analyses by companies but reduced the number of companies
for which average EPS was a significant variable. This reduction was from 84 to
45.
The following summary shows the number of companies for which
significant correlations were obtained and the number of such companies for
which the respective variables were included in the significant set of variables,
with an analysis indicating whether average EPS was included or excluded from
the significant set:
Table 6
Total
Significant
95

Companies
Variables:*
Average EPS
S&P average
Book value (beginning)
Average dividends
Five-year earnings:
Growth rate
Variability (standard error)
Extraordinary earnings
Price stability index

Average EPS
Included
Excluded
45
50

45
24
22
21

45
7
8
7

17
14
14

20
14
11
9

2
10
2
3

18
4
9
6

-

* The total of the variables listed exceeds the number of companies because of the cases in which
more than one variable was significant for a particular company.

The number of years for which the respective variables were significant in
the cross-sectional analyses is shown below:
Table 7
Variables
Average EPS
S&P average
Book value (beginning)
Average dividends
Five-year earnings:
Growth rate
Variability (standard error)
Extraordinary earnings
Price stability

Years
15
0
1
9
0
6
0
8

Price-Earnings Sensitivity
The average price-earnings sensitivity factors computed as stated pre
viously from the principal analyses are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8

Time-series analysesAverage sensitivity based on:
Total companies (100)
Number of companies for
which average EPS was
a significant variable
(45 and 84, respectively)
Cross-sectional analysesAverage sensitivity based
on total companies

Multiple
Variables

Average
EPS Only

.46

.78

1.02

.93

.83

.99

With the foregoing presentation of data concerning price-earnings sen
sitivity, we move to the more difficult problem of evaluation of the possible
implications for establishing criteria for materiality in accounting. For this
purpose, we consider first the time-series vs. cross-sectional analyses, and
second the use of multiple variables vs. average EPS only.
In considering the relative merits of time-series and cross-sectional
analyses for the purposes of this study, it appears that the advantages of one
are the disadvantages of the other and vice versa. The time-series analyses for
individual companies eliminate the effect of differences between companies,
while the individual cross-sectional analyses eliminate the effect of differences
between years. Consequently, the results of the respective analyses are
somewhat complementary. On balance, however, it appears that the timeseries analyses may be more meaningful for this study because the variability
between companies is greater than that between years. This is indicated by the
fact that the average of the relative standard errors of estimate for the
multiple-variable cross-sectional analyses was .48 as compared with .14 for the
corresponding time-series analyses.
Conceptually, the results from using multiple variables are preferable to
those from using only average EPS for two reasons. First, the plausibility of
significant variables other than EPS is established in the Discussion Memoran
dum and investment literature. Second, the correlation obtained from the use
of multiple variables is higher. However, it is difficult to discern significant
patterns or in some cases a rationale for the regression functions developed
from the multiple variables for individual companies.
The multiple-variable analyses present a dilemma in that they show average
EPS as being significant for only 45 of the 100 companies. For this reason, any
use of the average from such a skewed distribution of the 100 companies would
be questionable. Conversely, any use of the average for the 45 significant cases
could result in unduly restrictive criteria for companies as to which EPS may
not be significant. However, the latter appears to be the more acceptable of the
two unattractive alternatives offered by the multiple-variable analyses.
Another possibility is to discount the conceptual preferability of the
multiple-variable analyses and assume that EPS data were the only significant
variable. Pragmatically, the difference between this approach and the alterna150

tive suggested in the preceding paragraph would not be very great (1.02 vs.
.93) as shown in Table 8.
Materiality Decision Model
Given any level of price-earnings sensitivity, further consideration is
required to translate such information into logical criteria for accounting
materiality. The considerations required for this purpose are referred to herein
as a materiality decision model.
Any change in earnings could be considered material at any level of
sensitivity if changes in investment portfolios could be made without incurring
costs. This is not the case, however, and consequently such costs should be
included in the decision model. Further, since changes in investments involve
two transactions, the model should include the costs of both.
The principal costs to be considered are commissions and the price effects
of blockage (size of blocks traded). A recent report by the SEC (Second Report
to Congress on The Effect of the Absence of Fixed Rates of Commission,
dated March 29, 1976.) indicates that the average commission as a percentage
of the principal value of all trades is approximately 1.6% for individuals and .6%
for institutions. Discussions with investment personnel familiar with "best
execution" trading strategy, which is designed to minimize the total of
commission and blockage costs, indicate that the latter ordinarily are signifi
cantly greater than the differential between the average commission costs of
individuals and of institutions. Consequently, it seems reasonable for the
purpose of this study to consider that the average cost of changing from one
investment to another is at least 3.2% (1.6 x 2).
An important consideration in the decision model is that incurrence of
transaction costs is certain, while realization of the expected benefits is
uncertain. Consequently, the cost-benefit inequality inherent in the model
requires that the expected benefits be expressed in terms of a high degree of
assurance. This can be accomplished by using the standard error associated
with the sensitivity factor to compute a "lower sensitivity limit" for compari
son with the transaction costs. Since a range of three standard errors around a
statistical estimate provides virtual certainty where a normal distribution of
such estimates may reasonably be assumed, a lower sensitivity limit computed
on this basis seems appropriate for use in the model being discussed here.
Such a limit represents the maximum change in price that could be considered
virtually certain from a 1% change in earnings—in contrast to the estimated
change based on the sensitivity level, as to which there is an equal risk of
variation in either direction. Based on the average standard error applicable to
the sensitivity factor of 1.02 shown in Table 8 the lower sensitivity limit
computed as suggested above is .50.
The materiality decision model described above can be summarized as
follows:
M = C/S
Where:
M = Materiality limit—the maximum effect on ordinary earn
ings that would be immaterial.
C = Cost of change in investments.
S = Lower limit of price-earnings sensitivity.
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Based on this model and the data presented earlier, a reasonable materiality
limit in relation to effect on ordinary earnings for a year would be 6.4%
(3.2/.5).
The data and rationale culminating in the foregoing computation should be
evaluated in the context of the caveat expressed earlier: "This study was not
conducted under any illusion that it would produce a precise or conclusive
model, but only to determine whether it could provide information that would
be useful in considering possible standards for materiality." Two considera
tions seem particularly relevant in evaluating the usefulness of this study.
First, insofar as known to the author, it is the only approach that has been
developed for considering materiality criteria analytically rather than subjec
tively. Second, the results of the study tend to corroborate the general range
of subjective judgments expressed by many practicing accountants. For
example, the response by the AICPA's Accounting Standards Task Force on
Materiality recommended a level of 5% of ordinary earnings, with appropriate
flexibility for unusual circumstances, which compares with 6.4% developed in
this study. (The author of this study was a member of the AICPA Task Force
but the study had not been completed, no preliminary conclusions had been
formed, and no consideration was given to the study at the time the
recommendations of the Task Force were formulated.)
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Discussant's Response to
Some Thoughts on Materiality
Joseph J. Schultz, Jr.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
In addition to it being a real pleasure to be here at Kansas and to have the
opportunity to exchange ideas with you, I am particularly honored to have the
distinction of discussing the paper by Ken Stringer. I know of no other
individual who is more responsible for moving the technical aspect of audit
practice along more than Ken. I suspect that Ken would be the first to admit
that progress is not always achieved without a few detours along the way. I
think we would all acknowledge that without taking a few side trips down these
unchartered roads, life would become static and dull. My remarks today center
on the proposition that once again Ken is moving us in the right direction, but
not necessarily along the four-lane. My remarks today will be divided into
issues related to the paper and ideas on materiality generally.
The Paper
The concept of materiality is a threshold concept that relates to the users of
information who make a myriad of decisions. In our society, a major group of
these decisions are made by investors who buy, sell or hold securities based on
this information. We, as accountants and auditors, are interested particularly in
the role thatfinancialstatements play in that set of information. Society gives
us general direction in carrying out our role as auditors. An indication of some
of this direction is evidenced in the following excerpts.
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters about which an average prudent investor ought
reasonably to be informed. Regulation S-X, Rule 1-02. (Emphasis
added.)
. . . A fact which if it has been correctly stated or disclosed would have
deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing
the securities in question. Escott, et al. v. BarChris Construction
Corporation. 283 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y.) 849 (1968). (Emphasis added.)
The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a reasonable man would
attach importance . . . in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question . . . (and the above test would encompass any
fact) which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the
value of the corporation's stock or securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. 401 F2d 849 (1968). (Emphasis added.)
There must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
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significantly altered the "Total mix" of information made available.
TSC Industries, Inc., et al. v. Northway, Inc. 426 US 438 (1976).
(Emphasis added.)
These guidelines provide us with some direction that is unambiguous.
• Materiality is user oriented.
• Materiality is part of a total mix of information.
• The item subject to a materiality decision must have a substantial
likelihood of significantly altering the total mix of information.
The excerpts, however helpful in their direction, fail to clarify a number of
issues. For example:
• Should the auditor look solely to the investment community in judging
materiality?
• How can the auditor identify the users' mix of information?
• Furthermore, how can the auditor assess the current state of the
users in order to know what change would represent a substantial
likelihood of significantly altering the user's mix?
• Should attention focus on the market value of the security or on the
reasonably prudent investor?
This last point is subtle. Beaver (1968, pp. 69-70) differentiates between
two types of market reaction to information—individual reaction within the
market place (volume change) and aggregate market reaction (price change).
Notice that only the guidance from the Texas Gulf Sulphur case directly
mentions the market price and it is mentioned in conjunction with the individual
orientation. Yet, the other three—including the most recent—still cling to the
individual orientation. While this differentiation may not be terribly important in
determining damages from an investors' standpoint, as such damage is based
on changes in market price, it presents a problem for the auditor in assessing
other users' needs and for basing his or her materiality judgments on any
individual's judgments—even a reasonably prudent investor's.
The Market Data Approach
By adopting a market data based approach, Ken chooses to address the
investment community, to consider the total mix of information that affects the
prices, and to measure the sensitivity of the price to movements in several
accounting variables (particularly net income). Finally, Ken elects to ignore the
individual and focus instead on the market value of the security. Ken's paper
represents a serious attempt to deal effectively with each of these major
issues. In that regard, it is exemplary. However, as Dyckman, Downes, and
Magee (1975) point out, this market based approach is not without peril.
Indeed, as all researchers who have filtered through study after study know,
there is no one project that is significantly likely to provide the answer to
serious problems. Ken's paper and materiality fall into this category.
Perhaps the most serious problem with Ken's approach is that the time
series of earnings levels and security price levels are probably nonstationary.
Because they are not stationary their relationship, as expressed by a
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correlation coefficient, is likely to be overstated. The accompanyingfiguremay
help us gain some insight into this problem. Chart A in Ken's paper gives us a
picture of two variables which are highly dependent. Indeed, Ken reports a
correlation of 0.95. However, one may justifiably raise several questions. Is
there some underlying variable creating a trend in each of these variables?
Also, is there some trend that each of these variables follows as a result of this
other variable? Francis (1976, p. 587) cites a study that indicates that New
York Stock Exchange stock prices rose about 6.8 percent per year from 1926
through 1965. It is likely that EPS also rose during this period. Indeed, it is
likely that both have continued to rise generally until I invested about a year
ago.
Let us examine Figure 1, which represents the data from Table 1
rearranged against time. The X's on the diagram represent EPS. The 0's
represent price. I believe the impact of time is evident and generally consistent
with an increasing trend for both of these variables.
How then can we get away from this problem? One way may be to fit
various models to the data as they stand, which could compensate for the drift.
Another way is to use a first difference model. That is, contrast the changes in
EPS with the comparable changes in price. Figure 2 represents these first
differences plotted against one another. The correlation coefficient of this
series is .60. Notice that the amount of "explained" association has fallen from
about 90% using Ken's approach to about 36% using a statistically more
correct approach. This rearrangement points out a major problem with looking
at the raw data—namely that the strength of the relationships is overstated and
the significant number of relationships is overstated. Neter and Wasserman
(1974, pp. 352 ff.) point out other problems. Francis (1976, pp. 587-588) points
out that even the distribution of first differences is unstable. Since this
evidence regarding the first difference is not as compelling, one might try to
construct a measure based on first differences. One potential model may take
the following form.
Price + 3 + Dividends - Price - 9 = a + b EPS
t

t

year ended
month t

-EPS
year ended
month t - 1 2

This model would help the nonstationary problem, recognize the prepon
derance offindingsregarding the time patterns of earnings, and assist with the
problem of getting the amount of return matched to the period affected by the
earnings' release time. One may also wish to try to use quarterly data (Foster,
1978, pp. 106 ff.). However, I feel that both these approaches are rather
crude, and it seems to me that a model based on returns is a better approach.
Francis (1976, pp. 588 ff.) indicates that such an approach may be better—at
least given the statistical properties of security prices over time. Furthermore,
using return data as the dependent variable would more closely relate to
existing investment theory and practice models as I understand them.
The cross sectional analyses in the paper are subject to some rigorous
statistical assumptions. With this in mind, I shall not discuss them, but merely
refer interested parties to work by Johnston (1972).
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Figure 1
P r i c e and EPS P l o t t e d A g a i n s t Time
Data from S t r i n g e r ' s Table 1
Price

EPS

Year
1960

1965

x = EPS
o = Price
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1970

Figure 2
Price versus ΔEPS Data
from Stringer's Table 1
ΔPrice
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Some Specific Observations
The key point that should come out of my remarks is that Ken's work
attempted to establish a paradigm that did describe behavior of prices as
related to accounting data while considering many of the relevant issues. Since
some of the problems that I have cited came into the literature after Ken's
work, it should not bear adversely on his study. Rather, it should advance the
challenge to those among us who are equipped to. perform such research. I
should also add that Dopuch and Watts (1972, p. 184) have proposed using
time-series methodology to assist the auditor in making materiality decisions.
Kaplan (1978) has cited some problems with these approaches, but Foster
(1978b, pp. 47-48) has observed that they may not be insurmountable. The
Dopuch-Watts' proposal would acknowledge a significant change in net income
brought on by an item subject to a materiality decision as one criterion. I think
we must remember that any of these models are merely surrogates for true
materiality.
If we pursue a market-based approach, we should bear in mind several
problems. First, it is unlikely to yield a model that is sufficiently sensitive to
potential changes in accounting numbers that will help us much. This may be
judged by some to imply the immateriality of such potential changes. Secondly,
while it could be arguably better than the individual approach in assessing the
impact of potential changes in an accounting number in a mix of information, it is
not without problems in that such a model must be forward looking and
necessarily depend on estimates. Thirdly, while it may better approach the
social welfare paradigm than the individual approach, it does not, per se,
constitute an appropriate measure for such paradigm (cf. Gonedes and Dopuch,
1974). Finally, it is not readily apparent that the courts would accept this
approach even though one might conjecture that it would be acceptable based
on some interpretations of market-based theory and the prudent man rule
applicable to decisions of pension fund trustees under ERISA (Pozen, 1977).
Foster (1980) points out some other issues that should be considered before
attacking the topic using this approach.
The User Approach
Let me change orientation now and discuss the individual user approach to
determination of materiality levels. Ken's paper implied that some materiality
guidelines should be proposed for the "usual'' situation. I am not sure that I
understand this term. It seems to me that financial statements are likely to be
used for a given company at a given point in time primarily for either equity
investment decisions or credit decisions. There is implied support in this use
specificity in professional standards. SAS No. 39 "Audit Sampling" (1981)
indicates that the auditor should consider the effect of any potential misstate
ment on the expected use of such financial statements in determining ultimate
risk. If the auditor knows a client well, then it should be possible to assess the
intended principal use of the statements in most cases. Where there appears to
be an "ordinary" situation, the auditor should be able to adequately assess the
materiality bounds pretty well. I base this conclusion on the proposition that
very, very few audits result in any serious allegations of misstatement. Thus,
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the cost of the variability in materiality levels on the audit may be measured on
a societal basis primarily by a misallocation of resources. In an "ordinary"
case, this misallocation may take the form of an interest rate that differs from
optimal or a security price that differs from optimal. Both of these differentials
are probably minor. For, when trying to measure this misallocation, notice that
financial statement numbers are only part of a complex set of other information
on which interested parties base their decisions. Other components might
include product development prospects, market share, quality of management,
etc. Note also that these decisions are primarily based on future states of these
variables and therefore are likely to contain a considerable degree of variation
and subjectivity. Therefore, I see no immediate cost justification for imple
menting an unduly rigid materiality rule for "ordinary" audits.
What is an "ordinary" audit? I am not sure that I know, but I can offer a
few under-developed guidelines. An ordinary audit involves an auditee who is
not infinancialdistress, who is not an apparent merger target, who is not intent
on spinning off subsidiaries, who is not registering securities, who is not
blessed with management of doubtful integrity and who is not encumbered with
a lousy internal accounting control system. These characteristics are meant to
represent potential criteria that would have to be combined in some unknown
manner to identify "extraordinary" audits. I feel sure that members of the
AICPA Task Force on Materiality and Audit Risk as well as Albrecht, Romney,
and others (cf. Albrecht, et al., 1982) could suggest other danger signals. The
key point I want to make is to have these types of clients bear the cost of more
stringent materiality bounds and more auditor time.
In such situations the prudent audit firm may wish to alter the nature of the
audit procedures, involve more senior audit personnel, and push the timing of
such procedures back as far as practicable. Thus, the extent of testing, which
would be the primary variable affected by a quantitative guideline, would be
only one dimension triggered by auditees in this unusual category. A broader
view of materiality in conjunction with audit risk should increase the real audit
quality associated with thesefinancialstatements. The risk would lie primarily
with the accounting firm to do the job. Failures on its part could be expected to
lead to market pressures that would diminish the reputation of the firm—even
to the point of ruin.
Since the profession will also be damaged to an extent with any audit
failure, it should provide guidance on characteristics that denote an extraordi
nary audit. For example, it could propose the assistance of one or more outside
specialists in such audits. This action would raise the auditor's loss function if
he ignored such guidance and thefinancialstatements subsequently proved to
be materially in error. On the other hand, the auditor who followed such
guidance should have gone a long way toward establishing a good faith defense
in the event that the statements were determined to be materially in error. At
the present time, the auditor alone assesses the users' decision models, their
current portfolio state, their attitudes toward risk, and so on. For a single
unknown user in society, accurate assessment is impossible. Thus, the auditor
could call in an expert financial analyst for the client's industry or an expert
lending analyst familiar with the client's industry or some combination of one or
more of each of these. The auditor could have him, her, or them assess the
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critical assertions in the financial statements. I personally believe that some
type of multiple attribute utility function could then be developed to assist the
auditor in determining which numbers or disclosures in the statements were in
the critical, threshold range. This in turn would allow the auditor to address
those areas with the appropriate intensity to meet his or her own utility
function.
An alternative approach would be to set some percentage of some earnings
figure for an overall materiality bound. My understanding of firm valuation
research (e.g., Miller and Modigliani, 1961) and other research findings (cf.
Foster, 1978) including those from behavioral decision theory research (cf.
Libby, 1981) leads me to believe that this referent is the most reasonable
single candidate. Furthermore, it could satisfy the need that any specific
guidance in any Statement on Auditing Standards at the current time must be
relatively straight-forward and simplistic. Therefore, I believe this one would
be as good or better than any other based on current knowledge.
More Finite Guidance?
If, however, more finite guidance is deemed necessary and appropriate, I
feel the materiality bound should be set at one percent of net income. Such a
bound would undoubtedly create an increased demand for auditors and tend to
place upward pressure on my salary level. Of course, I am not serious about
such a stringent bound. Rather, I wish to make the point that as auditors we
should not let our strong desire for a quality product from a profession that is
dear to many of us assembled here, lead us to standards that are apparently too
costly for any reasonable benefit to our society. This proposition holds even if
we perceive that that same society has unleashed some competitive forces
upon us recently that, in my opinion, tend to reduce audit quality. One minor
encouraging sign in this matter currently lies in my desk drawer in my desk
back in Urbana. That is, someone has done a paper that strongly suggests that
the perceived prestige and quality of members of the traditional Big Eight are
positively related to the perceived cost of their services. If this perception
carries over to actions (including increased quality of audit with increased cost)
then audit clients with "better" audit firms may benefit by lower costs of
borrowing, because the subjects of this study were the chieffinancialofficers at
the nation's 25 largest banks.
I have not discussed any specific research projects, but I feel we could do
research at the individual level to help with generating an appropriate
methodology for eliciting the outside specialists' multiple attribute utility
function or contribute some studies that could assist the task force in
determining if setting a selected percent of income for planning materiality
would increase the consensus of judgments among auditors.
Before I end, I thank Ken for writing a paper that made me think about this
important issue. I also thank Howard and Don for asking me to be a discussant
which undoubtedly piqued my own utility function. Finally, I hope my ideas
further the progress on the issue of materiality judgments in auditing.
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7
SAS 34 Procedures vs. Forecast Reviews:
The Gap in GAAS
Robert S. Kay
Touche Ross & Co.
Overview of the Paper
This paper explores the guidance given to auditors in early 1981 in SAS 34,
"The Auditor's Considerations when a Question Arises About an Entity's
Continued Existence," in comparison with procedures contained in the
AICPA's 1980 Guide for a Review of a Financial Forecast ("forecast guide").
In the author's opinion, there is little differentiation in the satisfaction the
auditor/reviewer is to obtain under these two forms of guidance, and the result
may be that the auditor will be called upon for failure to have performed at the
level of the forecast guide. Neither document has been in existence long
enough for such problems to have matured, but based on the evolution of
accountants' liability, the author foresees significant challenges in court unless
the auditing profession promptly reconciles the two documents.
It is important to recognize that the forecast guide calls for a display of the
most probable future result, which could be considerably more difficult to
achieve than the prediction implied by SAS 34—that is, that a company will
have zero or better net cash inflow, without identifying any specific amount
thereof. To this extent, one would expect the forecast guide procedures to be
more penetrating. Accordingly, this paper knowingly makes a more aggressive
case than probably is applicable for audits today.
The views expressed in this paper are a priori, fortified by experience with
several practice cases where the auditor recognized the problem and aimed at
the forecast guide levels of attainment, believing this was the prudent approach
in the clients' circumstances. In this sense, the author offers thoughts on what
he perceives to be an emerging problem facing the auditing profession.
Experienced accountants can be expected to disagree on whether a problem is
emerging, and if so, how to solve it.
A Gathering Storm
In the current economic environment, businesses face an unprecedented
and sustained liquidity crisis; failures are common and increasing. Consider for
example the thrift industry, which in an unregulated environment (without
FSLIC or FDIC assistance) would be faced with cataclysmic disaster through
having lent long and borrowed short. Should the auditor be exceptionally alert
in these circumstances? How much responsibility will have to be borne for
these failures?
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The authoritative auditing literature is liberally sprinkled with exculpations
declaring that the auditor is not a fortune teller. For example, SAS 34,
paragraph 9, says:
The auditor's function, however, does not include predicting the
outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on the financial
statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the auditor
that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period
beyond the date of his opinion.
Experience shows that auditors should not take too much comfort in soothing
passages of this type. The litigable issue will not be identified as the future
orientation, but rather as the proper assessment of available facts (with
"available" meaning discoverable through the "right" inquiries and investiga
tion).
Legal Framework
Legal precedent over the years has developed to a point that auditors can
expect to be called to task in the event a company fails. This is especially so for
publicly held companies, given the opportunity to assert misrepresentations in
the financial statements and the accompanying auditor's report under Section
11 of the 1933 Securities Act. This puts the burden of proof on the auditor as
not being a party to whatever is alleged to be wrong with the financial
statements (i.e., the auditor did not determine that the company was about to
fail); and the test for auditor non-culpability is stringent:
After making reasonable investigation (i.e., exercising "due dili
gence"), he had reasonable ground to believe, and did in fact believe,
that the statements in his audit opinion were true; in effect, the auditor
will be held liable unless he can prove that he exercised due care, i.e.,
was not negligent either in the performance of his audit or in the
expression of his audit opinion (which is indeed a rigorous standard
though not insurmountable).
1

When considering going concern situations, the focus is on the future, or
the post-balance-sheet period. If a company files a registration statement,
Section 11(a) of the 1933 Securities Act is unique in continuing the audit opinion
responsibility to the effective date of the registration statement, rather than
only to the date of the audit opinion. "It is possible that the information
available to the auditor at the audit opinion date might justify one audit opinion,
but that additional information available to the auditor at or near the effective
date might then require a different audit opinion." The professional literature
does not require a post-balance-sheet investigation to be as rigorous as the
audit examination, but how much should have been enough is always debatable
in the aftermath of a collapse.
Admittedly, companies in a noticeably precarious financial position and
therefore candidates for going concern qualification are not likely to be filing
1933 Act registration statements. But there is, as ever, an easy route that
plaintiffs may take strictly based on periodic filings under the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. Section 10(b) prohibits the making of any untrue statement of a
material fact or omission of a statement of material fact necessary in order to
2

3
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make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading. Rule 10b-5 deals with any offer or sale of
securities, and has been interpreted to apply to any action taken in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. Thus, the rule has been construed
broadly enough so that auditors' opinions on auditedfinancialstatements, and
unaudited financial statements with which auditors have become associated,
may be statements in connection with purchases and sales of the corporation's
securities. The auditor is clearly "in the soup" even though he is not in the
securities brokerage business.
The auditor is also not required to actively participate in or know about the
presentation of misleading statements. The profession's euphoria over the
Hochfelder decision, requiring the auditor to have scienter or "knowledge" to
be held responsible, has rapidly dissipated. Scienter has been transmogrified
into recklessness, a form of negligence, a prevalent definition of which is found
in McLean vs. Alexander :
4

Reckless conduct may be defined as . . . highly unreasonable [conduct],
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
This may sound safe—what good auditor does that?—but in terms of going
concern situations, one must at least wonder about whether some of today's
situations will be deemed after the fact to have been "so obvious that the actor
must have been aware of it."
One last bit of relevant law: a determination of failure to have made the
inquiry that might have revealed a deficiency is negligence; if it is sufficiently
extreme it could be recklessness.
It is tempting to assert that today, SEC enforcement is rapidly waning, and
that litigation for the most part is running much in the accountants' favor. That
would be, perhaps, foolhardy; the SEC retains all its powers and must be
counted on to reactivate enforcement if a serious failure of auditors is
perceived. Once the SEC "rings the gong," the litigants will swarm.
Auditors and Uncertainties
Uncertainties clearly existed in financial reporting long before auditors
came into being. Thus, the consideration of effects of uncertainties on clients'
financial statements has been an evolutionary process. An early exposition of
this subject is contained in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 32, "Qualifi
cations and Disclaimers," issued in 1962 for purposes of clarifying reporting
standards called for under what was then Rule 2.03 of the AICPA's Code of
Professional Ethics. That ethical conclusion was intended to add further
specification to the fourth standard of reporting (which was subsequently added
to the nine original Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) indicating that "the
report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's
examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking."
The language of SAP 32 was carried forward into SAP 33, "Codification of
Statement on Auditing Procedures," and, in substance, remained relatively
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intact in the recodification in SAS 1 in 1972. However, the recodification
procedure and the litigation against auditors in the early 1970's revealed a need
for further attention to the auditor's forms of reporting including uncertainties.
The result was the issuance of SAS 2, "Reports on Audited Financial
Statements," in 1974. These are essentially the reporting formats we practice
under today.
SAS 34, "The Auditor's Considerations When a Question Arises About an
Entity's Continued Existence," does not alter the basic format in SAS 2; the
SAS 34 exemplary report showing a qualification ("subject to," as contrasted
with disclaimer) in a going concern situation is built on the preexisting SASs and
gives specification to what otherwise might be a stock "fill-in-the-blanks" form
of report.
Prior to SAS 34, auditing pronouncements seemed to heavily emphasize
thefinancialstatements—much as if they were disembodied from the company.
SAS 34 appears to aim much more directly at the company itself—will it make
it, or will it not? While SAS 34 necessarily hinges the auditor's concerns to the
only outlet he controls—his audit report—and thus to thefinancialstatements,
it is apparent by reading SAS 34 that the issue of how to report is simple in
comparison with what the auditor has to consider and do in relation to future
oriented information, almost all of which is not incorporated in the client's
accounting records. Only then can a conclusion be reached about including or
not including a going concern qualification (or disclaimer) in the auditor's
report.
SAS 34 vs. the Forecasting Guide
The basic premise of SAS 34 is that, any time up to the date of the report,
once the auditor becomes aware (through what is referred to as "contrary
information"), that the going concern assumption may be in question, regard
less of the source of the information, the auditor had better investigate to determine whether (and how) the report needs to be amended to make reference
to the situation.
Let us assume that auditors today are especially conscious about and
inquire into a client's continued viability, rather than awaiting inspiration or
evidence to come marching in. Whether or not such preconditioning is true, the
focal issue is, once the auditor is concerned, what procedures should the
auditor follow in considering a client's continued viability. Further, recognizing
that prognostications could be wrong (i.e., some going concerns will become
non-going concerns), what will the courts decide about the reasonable level of
performance? Said differently, auditors make judgments and some judgments
are invariably wrong. The auditor needs to support judgment with the proper
defense, which could very well be something more penetrating than having
followed SAS 34. That "something" probably will be the AICPA's 1980 Guide
for Review of a Financial Forecast.
Some questions that might be asked about SAS 34 and the forecast guide
are:
• What "forecasting" procedures are implied by SAS 34?
• In a SAS 34 situation, can the auditor simply "throw in the towel"
and issue his "going concern" opinion after coursing through minimal
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procedures, or are there situations in which review must be con
ducted to the extent contemplated in a review of afinancialforecast?
• Under what circumstances would a prudent auditor expand SAS 34
procedures to incorporate some or all of the procedures for review of
a financial forecast?
• How large is the gap between what the auditor already knows and
does in an SAS 34 engagement and the knowledge and procedures
called for in the forecast guide?
A comparison of the relevant forecast guide requirements with SAS 34
considerations follows, stated in terms of the forecast guide procedures, with
reference to the substance of coverage in SAS 34. Particular reference should
be made to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34, reproduced in Appendix A.
Forecast Guide

SAS 34

Definitions
• A forecast is the "most probable" No definitions of forecast or proj
estimate.
ection; mentions both.
• A projection may or may not be
representative of the "most proba
ble" estimate.
Management's Responsibilities
• The forecast and underlying as • This would be a given in any en
sumptions are the responsibility of
vironment, whether in an audit ex
management, regardless of the ac
amination or review of a forecast.
countant's participation.
• The accountant may assist in the • Nothing revelationary. Just as in an
formulation of assumptions, but
audit, the auditor can assist the
management must evaluate them
company and management in se
and make decisions as to their rea
lecting accounting policies, but
sonableness.
management makes the decision.
The Accountant's Review
• In general, the forecast reviewer •
should:
-have adequate technical training
and expertise
-maintain an independence of men
tal attitude
-exercise due professional care
-adequately plan and supervise the
engagement
-understand the forecasting proc
ess
-obtain adequate support for the
conclusions reached.
• The scope of the accountant's re
view is governed by the following:
-knowledge of the business, focusing
on its operating characteristics,
the nature and condition of sales
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The Auditor's Considerations
Except for the possibility that the
level of technical expertise needed
in a forecast engagement is greater,
the remainder of these qualities are
GAAS-oriented and would be im
plicit in a SAS 34 engagement.

-This is required by SAS 1, Planning and Supervision (AU 311).

markets, unique industry charac There is nothing here that the auditor
teristics and patterns of past per shouldn't already know to a certain
degree.
formance.
-management's forecasting experi- -No specific requirement, but it is
common sense. Would an auditor
ence, including review of past fore
look at and believe a cash forecast
casts and related actual results.
without some level of inquiry
about management's forecasting
experience.
-Again, this would seem to be in
-forecast period, including consid
the area of logical inquiry by the
eration of the forecast period's
auditor.
length and extent of inclusion of
historical results.
-forecasting process, the knowledge -This is not required in SAS 34; it
requires more than inquiry by the
of which is based on inquiry, ob
auditor.
servations and review of docu
mentation.
• Procedures to evaluate assumptions:
-In view of the "knowledge bank''
-based on knowledge of the busi
possessed by the auditor, these
ness, identify key factors that in
factors should probably already be
fluence the company's financial
known, even in a non-SAS 34 en
results. This considers their rele
gagement, though undoubtedly in
vance, completeness, sensitivity
a less formalized way than con
in relation to financial results, and
templated in the forecasting guide.
pervasiveness.
-This
is not REQUIRED by SAS 34
-evaluate whether the assumptions
and would require some digging by
are suitably supported.
the auditor.
-Same under GAAS. Rule 201 of
-no conclusion can be drawn by the
accountant as to whether the fore
the AICPA Code of Professional
cast is the "most probable" out
Ethics prohibits vouching for the
come. Management's intentions
achievability of a forecast.
and inherent uncertainties of fore
casts necessarily place this conclu
sion on management's plate.
-SAS 34 emphasis is identical.
-the assumptions to be focused
upon are those that are material,
especially sensitive to variations,
deviate from historical trends, or
are uncertain.
-SAS 34 requires review and com
-the adequacy of support for as
parison of the prospective infor
sumptions is based on:
mation with past prospective
(1) existence of sufficient perti
information, historicalfinancialin
nent sources.
formation, and the accuracy of
(2) whether assumptions are con
past prospective information. Fur
sistent with their sources.
ther, omissions of relevant infor
(3) whether historical or other fi
mation and assumptions should be
nancial information and data
noted. This would encompass at
are reliable.
least points (3) and (4) at left.
(4) whether the historical financial
Further, points (5), (6) and (7)
or other data are comparable
would seem a logical extension of
or whether differences were
any review of a forecast.
factored in.
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(5) whether the assumptions are
consistent with each other.
(6) whether the logical argument
or theory, considered with the
assumptions, is reasonable.
(7) whether alternate approaches
support the reasonableness of
the assumptions.
Management Representations
• Should be in writing and acknowl • SAS 34 does not mention written
edge management's responsibility
representations. However, such
for both the forecast and underlying
representations would seem called
assumptions
for anyway in an audit engagement
representations letter, at least to
back up management's disclosures
within the financial statements
about the effect of uncertainties on
the company's future.
In a SAS 34 situation, the auditor must address all of the factors considered
in that statement prior to drawing a conclusion about an entity's continued
existence. This implies that the auditor's procedures for review of forecasts,
projections, etc. prepared in conjunction with an audit offinancialstatements
should be thorough and complete.
As the table above suggests, the detailed procedures called for in the
forecast guide can be viewed as simply a logical and necessary articulation of
the generalized procedures contained in SAS 34. In most cases, it would seem
imprudent of the auditor to ignore the guide's suggested approach and
procedures—they are formalized in an AICPA document written for account
ants, not management consultants, and arguably should serve as the basis for
the general procedures described in paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34.
The only procedures stated in the forecast guide that are not direct and
logical articulations of the SAS 34 approach are (a) knowledge of the forecasting
process, and (b) evaluation as to whether the forecast assumptions are suitably
supported. Something to keep in mind—the forecast guide implies the auditor
should possess a certain level of knowledge about the entity and about
forecasting. With the possible exception of a technical aptitude for forecast
reviews based on experience, the knowledge required of an auditor in a
forecasting engagement is not different from the knowledge required by GAAS
in a SAS 34 engagement (or, for that matter, any audit).
5

Analysis of Differences
The dimensions of the difference between SAS 34 and the forecast guide
can be classified into four areas:
1. Nature of procedures
2. Extent of procedures (degree and quality of evidence obtained)
3. Severity of opinion (or lack thereof)
4. Extent of client disclosures.
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Overall, the nature of procedures in either document is not that different,
but SAS 34 is sufficiently non-imperative (i.e., "consider this; consider that")
to permit a sincere case to be made by an auditor that reasonable procedural
compliance with SAS 34 consists simply of a grasp of the situation and oral
management representations.
Nature of Procedures. Differences between SAS 34 coverage and the
nature of forecast review guide procedures lie in, (i) knowledge of the client's
forecasting system, and (ii) the extent of articulation of the assumptions.
The audit client may not even have thought about having a forecasting or
projection system, having no intention of ever publishing any such prospective
data. Given that the auditor likewise is not planning on publicly reporting on the
client's forecast, the extent (or lack) of sophistication of the forecasting
"system" is probably secondary. What has to be of most concern to the
auditor is the thoroughness, logic and credibility of the assumptions, and the
correctness of calculations. While these are more difficult to deal with absent a
formal system, they are nevertheless susceptible of analysis and understand
ing. Hopefully, the courts will not hold an auditor (or the company) deficient for
the company's failure to have developed a formal forecasting system that
generates data designed to show that the company will or will not go out of
business. Being on the brink of disaster does not usually warrant the
expenditure to establish and run a forecasting system. Thus, we will leave this
issue, simply recognizing that without a system, the numbers and assumptions
become more subjective.
To be able to better understand the client's conclusion, a good deal more
articulation of assumptions might be needed. Though management may intuit
an assumption, the numerous subassumptions must be communicated to an
auditor, explicitly or implicitly, to permit focusing on their reasonableness and
the type of evidence that may be available.
Extent of Procedures. SAS 34 identifies its procedures as "considerations.''
Most are listed in terms of "may" rather than "should." The exception lies in
paragraph 9, requiring discussion with management about available forecasts,
projections, budgets or other prospective data, particularly data relating to
future cash flows. However, this paragraph does not require management to
actually produce this information; the only standard is that it must be
information that can reasonably be developed and that whatever is proffered is
relevant. "Reasonable" will remain undefined except when a situation is
litigated to a conclusion.
Paragraph 9 addresses the auditor thus: "The auditor should consider the
support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective data and should
give particular attention to assumptions that are material to the relevant
forecasts or projections, [are] especially uncertain or sensitive to variations,
[and that deviate] from historical trends." This sounds imperative, but it is
immediately diluted by directing the auditor to base his considerations on:
a. Reading,
b. Knowledge of the entity, its business and its management, and
c. Analytical comparison of past, present and future data.
Even after doing these minimal procedures, the only admonition is this: "If
the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors, the effects of which are not
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reflected in such prospective data, he should also take those factors into
account."
The forecast guide is much more specific about what the accountant must
do. He must consider the following matters (page 9):
1. Whether sufficient pertinent sources of information about the as
sumptions have been considered. Examples of external sources the
accountant might consider are government publications, industry
publications, economic forecasts, existing or proposed legislation,
and reports of changing technology. Examples of internal sources are
budgets, labor agreements, patents, royalty agreements, engineer
ing studies, historicalfinancialstatements and records, sales backlog
records, debt agreements, and board of directors actions involving
entity plans.
2. Whether the assumptions are consistent with the sources from
which they are derived.
3. Whether the assumptions are consistent with each other.
The remaining three considerations (not listed above) are equivalent to those in
SAS 34.
After this list of considerations in the forecast guide, there are two
particularly incisive paragraphs about items probably infrequently considered in
performing SAS 34 procedures. These state (page 10):
Support for assumptions may include market surveys, engineering
studies, general economic indicators, industry statistics, trends and
patterns developed from an entity's operating history, and internal data
and analyses, accompanied by their supporting logical argument or
theory. The accountant may also obtain support during the evaluation of
the forecasting process. Support for a forecast can range from informa
tion based on informed opinion (such as economists' estimates of the
inflation rate) to data that can be tested in traditional ways (such as
completed transactions).
In addition to evaluating management's assumptions and their sources
of information, the accountant should consider using alternative ap
proaches to the development of assumptions in evaluating the fore
casted amounts. For example, to test management's forecast of
aggregate sales developed from individual salesmen's estimates, the
accountant may employ a historical trend estimate.
The forecast guide also contains detailed illustrative procedures, many of
which would be most apropos in a going concern situation.
It is almost obvious that SAS 34 studiously avoided a requirement that
evidence be obtained. There are striking similarities between the going
concern discussion in Auditing Research Monograph 1 and the content of SAS
34, but ARM 1 ". . . deals almost entirely with the going-concern concept as it
affected the evidence-gathering aspects of the examination." A typical
passage about evidence reads:
6

Evidence thatfinancingor operating problems have been mitigated may
remove the immediate threat to the continued existence of a company.
Financing problems may be mitigated by a waiver or default or an
anticipated influx of funds. If there is sufficient competent evidential
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matter that the terms of indebtedness will be adjusted or if an
arrangement actually deferring payment is obtained, the peril to the
continued existence of the company may be removed. An anticipated
influx of funds—if supported by evidential matter—may also remove the
peril of liquidation. The influx may be from a variety of sources, such as
demonstrated ability to continue borrowing, the obligation or desire of a
related entity not to allow liquidation, or viable alternatives open to
management infinancingoperations.
Evidence indicating successful future operations may be in the form of
reliable company plans or budgets, or operational or management
changes essential to a "turn-around" of operations. To a large extent
the auditor's ability to evaluate operating problems will depend on the
extent of his past experience with the company's operations. The
auditor's ability to determine the reasonableness of management's
estimates will be influenced both by the company's experience and his
own evaluation of management's objectivity and knowledgeability con
cerning the subject of estimation.
7

Accountant's Forecast Report Vs. Auditor's Report. It is logical that the
major difference between SAS 34 procedures and forecast guide procedures
lies in the extent of evidentiary support obtained, because the form of forecast
report does not allow for degrees of related uncertainty to be reflected in the
wording. The forecast guide states (page 25):
Limitations on the scope of the review, whether imposed by the client
or by other circumstances, may require the accountant to state in his
report that he cannot evaluate the presentation of the forecast or assess
whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's
forecast.
Further, a scope limitation includes one that is imposed "by circumstances,
such as the accountant's inability to evaluate significant assumption(s) because
they are not suitably supported." What this effectively amounts to is a
disclaimer of opinion on the forecast—no "subject to" opinions.
When this condition occurs, the accountant is required to state:
Since, as described in the preceding paragraph, we are unable to
evaluate management's assumption regarding . . . and other assump
tions that depend thereon, we express no conclusion with respect to
the presentation of the accompanyingfinancialforecast.
If this is where the auditor would end up after applying the forecast guide
procedures in an audit going concern situation, should he say so, in addition to
expressing a qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion?
It could be asserted (perhaps it was even intended) that the auditor's SAS
34 approach in reporting on the examination offinancialstatements affords an
appropriate opportunity to do less—because the auditor of historical financial
statements seems to have more options about how much uncertainty he should
accept before expressing other than an unqualified opinion.
SAS 34 seems to excuse the auditor from doing a great deal of work before
considering the effects of going concern conditions on his report. Paragraph 11
states: "After making any substantive tests that the auditor considers
necessary and practicable to assess such information, factors, and plans" the
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auditor could reach a conclusion that the audit report need not be modified;
then again, modification might not be necessary. Further, paragraph 11 alludes
to what the auditor might do upon concluding that the company is not a going
concern: "Identifying the point at which uncertainties about recoverability,
classifications, and amounts require the auditor to modify his report is a
complex professional judgment." An example follows in paragraph 12 of an
opinion qualified for going-concern reasons, perhaps hinting at that course of
action.
SAS 34 is silent on whether a disclaimer of opinion might be appropriate
because of the magnitude of uncertainties, but defers, by reference to SAS 2
(including the particular paragraph that [by footnote] does not prohibit the
auditor from expressing a disclaimer). SAS 2 indicates:
The committee believes that the explanation of the uncertainties and
the qualification of the auditor's opinion contemplated by this section
should serve adequately to inform the users of financial statements.
Nothing in this section, however, is intended to preclude an auditor
from declining to express an opinion in cases involving uncertainties. If
he disclaims an opinion, the uncertainties and their possible effects on
the financial statements should be disclosed in an appropriate manner,
and the auditor's report should give all the substantive reasons for his
disclaimer of opinion. (AU 509.25, footnote 8.)
Thus, there is absolutely nothing in the professional literature demanding a
disclaimer of opinion as a signal for increasing the user's perception of the
severity of the situation.
Assume that following SAS 34 procedures, the auditor does not gather a
great deal of independent evidence about the veracity of the client's assump
tions used in a projection that indicates a workout of the going concern
situation. Also assume that the auditor issues a "subject to going concern"
opinion as exemplified in SAS 34. After all, SAS 34 does not contain mandates.
Will it be sustainable by the auditor, should the company shortly thereafter
enter bankruptcy, that all professional standards applicable to the audit were
fully adhered to? Would this be true if inquiry outside the company, such as
with suppliers, customers, trade associations, etc., or analysis of competitors'
strengths, could have indicated rather clearly that the company was going to be
unable to achieve the assumptions indicated in its projections? Would, in such a
circumstance, it be a better defense to have expressed a disclaimer of opinion?
A disclaimer may not serve to further insulate the accountant if procedures
were, under the circumstances, less than might have been expected (i.e., "the
Standard of practice in the community"). Said differently, the auditor could
argue the impossibility of objectively auditing the future (so why try too hard?);
and that therefore there was justification for expressing such inability through a
stronger form of negative opinion—i.e., a disclaimer.
If indeed the major assumptions are opaque—for example, a certain level of
interest rate must be achieved on the company's borrowings orfinancingneeds
in the future, or the company's new product needs to be a success in order for
the company to survive, the auditor is well advised to spell out these problems
in his report, regardless of which kind of opinion or non-opinion is expressed. It
is not as though the courts would hold the auditor responsible for having
attested to such items if there was a failure to express the inability to do so, but
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it could be held that readers were not sufficiently informed of the sensitivity of
the assumptions to have been able to reason along with the auditor towards the
conclusion reached. In the end, failure to have adequately communicated to
users can be as fatal as the unlikely determination that the auditor should have
used a crystal ball.
Extent of Disclosure
Naturally, the client should make all the necessary disclosures attendant to
its circumstances. In those situations where neither the company nor the
auditor express any concern about ability to continue to operate, and the
company shortly thereafter fails, both are undoubtedly in jeopardy. What if,
however, the company expresses (in its Management Discussion and Analysis
portion of the annual report) that it foresees serious problems in the future, and
while not being fatalistic about it in detail, puts in enough clues about dangers to
continuation of the business? If under those circumstances the auditor
addresses the situation via SAS 34 and concludes that a going concern
qualification is not necessary, the auditor could be targeted in the event of
business failure. It would seem that the auditor's opinion should be no better
than the company's representations wherever made, even if it takes some
effort to sort out exactly what the company is saying.
Sometimes the auditor in reviewing the company's situation may decide it
is in sufficient danger to merit a going concern qualification, but the company
does not agree, and refuses to paint the picture nearly so black as does the
auditor's report. In the event of subsequent failure, presumably the company
would then be in greater jeopardy than the auditor.
Forecasting has evolved a great deal in the past 10 years, commencing with
the SEC's removal of its fiat against forward-looking information. Despite SEC
allurements (e.g., safe harbor provisions) to companies to publish forecasts or
prospectivefinancialinformation, very few companies have done so. The SEC
recently came at it in other ways, by encouraging companies to put prospective
data in the MD&A section, as well as by permitting prospective information in
pro forma statements.
A question worth asking is whether companies should regularly begin
publishing, or at least preparing, forecasts in a uniform manner, making it
possible for the auditor to apply a consistent set of procedures. Given the
current economic malaise, most corporate managers must be thinking as far
forward as possible, even if on scraps of paper. It would be far better that these
be formalized.
Conclusion
Under today's conditions, is it reasonable for an auditor, when considering
a client's going concern status, to do less than the "maximum" for which the
profession has provided guidance? I believe there is a significant chance the
auditor will be held responsible for not doing this, and it is time for the
profession to close the gap.
There are numerous faltering companies today, whose entire asset/liability
structure may be inconsequential in view of the risks involved in noncontinuation as a going concern in the future. It seems the auditor is in a
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precarious position if the forecast guide procedures are not performed—
complete with market research, use of outside economists, industry data, etc.
Admittedly, an auditor would not be in a position to report on the forecast
because the reporting requirements thereunder allow only positive opinions or
no opinions. But perhaps the auditor should be permitted to report, using a
qualified forecast opinion, when in an audit framework. Such an approach might
even qualify for SEC safe-harbor treatment—far preferable to the expertised
status of an accountant's report containing merely a going-concern qualifica
tion. Likewise, forecasts need not be updated if there is no stated undertaking
to do so. Perhaps this feature could somehow blunt the impact of the auditor's
responsibility for subsequent events.
The auditing profession indeed faces a gap in GAAS. At a minimum, a
pronouncement is needed explaining the difference between SAS 34 and the
forecast guide; the situation is not clear to auditors as it now stands.
8

Footnotes
1. This annotated excerpt from Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act is taken from Cormley, R.
James, "Auditing and the Law," Chapter 46 in Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, edited by
John C. Burton, Russell E . Palmer and Robert S. Kay. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1981,
p. 46-26. Several other thoughts in this brief overview of legal considerations also come from this
source.
2. Ibid., p. 46-29.
3. ASR 115 excludes companies that have an imminent threat of failure from offering securities
under the 1933 Act. Yet, firms not reported to be in immediate danger can (and do) register for
"shelf" purposes even though they might not be strong enough to have a public offering for cash.
4. 599 F.2d 1190, 1196-1197 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. For example, SAS 22, Planning and Supervision, states that:
The auditor should obtain a level of knowledge of an entity's business that will enable him
to conduct his examination in accordance with GAAS. That level should enable him to
understand events, transactions and practices that may significantly affect the financial
statements. Knowledge of an entity's business helps the auditor in evaluating the
reasonableness of estimates and management representations. In addition, the auditor
should have knowledge of the nature of the entity's business, organization and operating
characteristics and matters affecting the entity's industry. Sources of this knowledge
encompass data internal and external to the entity (AU 311.06-.08). [Emphasis added.]
6. Carmichael, D. R. Chapter 6, "Pervasive Uncertainties—Going Concern Problems," in The
Auditor's Reporting Obligation, Auditing Research Monograph 1. New York: AICPA, p. 109.
7. Ibid., p. 99.
8. Kent St. Pierre and James Anderson, in "An Analysis of Audit Failures Based on
Documented Legal Cases," Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Spring 1982, state (p.
243):
The [Cohen] Commission's staff concluded that audit failures were not a result of
deficiencies in auditing standards. Fifteen percent of the errors classified in this study
pertained to the interpretation of auditing standards. Although the interpretation of
accounting principles and the implementation of auditing procedures accounted for a
larger percentage of errors, the 15 percent figure is significant. The staff stated that
failures in this area were most frequently traceable to departures by auditors from the
standards.
The key issue seems to be whether the departure was intentional or whether the auditor
misinterpreted what the study group felt was a clear set of standards. The staff's
conclusion cannot be refuted based upon the analysis conducted here, but there is enough
available evidence to question the statement that no deficiencies exist in the standards. If
the standards are vague and open to misinterpretation, it is difficult to accept the
argument that the standards are adequate and raise the level of auditor performance. The
results of this study indicate that interpretation errors are common, even for auditors
familiar with the general standards.
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Appendix
SAS 34 Excerpt
Consideration of Contrary Information and Mitigating Factors
7. The auditor's initial consideration of contrary information focuses on the
underlying conditions that resulted in the contrary information (for example,
whether the conditions are indicative of a rapid or a gradual deterioration,
whether they are temporary or recurring, whether they are susceptible of
corrective actions solely within the entity, and whether they are applicable to
identifiable elements or segments of the entity or are pervasive). The auditor's
initial consideration of mitigating factors is based primarily on (a) knowledge of
matters that relate to the nature of the entity's business and its operating
characteristics and of matters affecting the industry in which it operates,
including an awareness of the specific effects and general influence of
international, national, and local economic conditions, (b) discussions with
principal officers having responsibility for administration, finance, operations,
and accounting activities, and (c) understanding of possible legal implications, if
any, based on discussions with appropriate legal counsel when that is deemed
necessary.
Consideration of Management Plans
8. Additional considerations often are necessary; they generally focus on
management plans that are responsive to the observed conditions that resulted
in the contrary information. The relevance of such plans to an auditor generally
decreases as the time period for planned actions and anticipated events
increases, although longer time periods may be more meaningful in industries
with a lengthy operating cycle. Particular emphasis ordinarily is placed on plans
that might have a significant effect on the entity's solvency within a period of
one year following the date of thefinancialstatements on which the auditor is
currently reporting. The auditor's considerations relating to such management
plans may include the following.
a. Plans to liquidate assets:
• Apparent marketability of the assets that management plans to sell.
• Restrictions on the disposal of assets, such as covenants limiting such
transactions in loan or similar agreements or encumbrances against
assets.
• Possible direct and indirect effects of the disposal of assets.
b. Plans to borrow money or restructure debt:
• Availability of debt financing, including existing or committed credit
arrangements, such as lines of credit and arrangements for factoring
receivables or sale-leaseback of assets.
• Existing or committed arrangements to restructure or subordinate
debt or to guarantee loans to the entity.
• Possible effects on management's borrowing plans of existing re
strictions on additional borrowing and the sufficiency of available
collateral.
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c. Plans to reduce or delay expenditures:
• Apparent feasibility of plans to reduce overhead and administrative
expenditures, to postpone maintenance or research and development
projects, or to lease rather than purchase assets.
• Possible direct and indirect effects of reduced or delayed expendi
tures.
d. Plans to increase ownership equity:
• Apparent feasibility of plans to increase ownership equity, including
existing or committed arrangements to raise additional capital.
• Existing or committed arrangements to reduce current dividend
requirements or to accelerate cash distributions from affiliates or
other investees.
9. The auditor also should discuss with management any forecasts,
projections, budgets, or other prospective data, particularly data relating to
cash flows, that are available or that can reasonably be developed and that are
relevant in relation to the plans discussed in paragraph 8. The auditor should
consider the support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective
data and should give particular attention to assumptions that are
• Material to the relevant forecasts or projections.
• Especially uncertain or sensitive to variations.
• In deviation from historical trends.
The auditor's considerations should be based on (a) reading of the prospective
data and the underlying assumptions, (b) knowledge of the entity, its business,
and its management, and (c) comparison of prospective data in prior periods
with historical results and of prospective data for the current forecast period
with results achieved to date. If the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors
the effects of which are not reflected in such prospective data, he should also
take those factors into account. The auditor's function, however, does not
include predicting the outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on
the financial statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the
auditor that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period
beyond the date of his opinion.
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Discussant's Response to
SAS 34 Procedures vs. Forecast Reviews:
The Gap in GAAS
William R. Kinney, Jr.
University of Iowa
Let me begin by reminding everyone that my comments are conditioned by
my background as a professor. I am not constrained by practical experience
with going-concern qualifications, and I do not face legal liability for audit
deficiencies with respect to going concerns. Thus, my comments may seem
naive since they are based on only my reading of SAS 34 and not on attempts to
judiciously apply it.
My interpretation of the words of SAS 34 differs from that expressed by
Bob Kay. Also, my interpretation is that SAS 34 has clarified and extended the
meaning of SAS 2.1 presume that the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) wanted
to clarify the meaning of going concern qualifications and specify desirable audit
procedures. Whether the ASB has succeeded in changing the requirements
and meaning in the accounting (and legal) practice environments is another
question.
My comments on Bob Kay's paper will be organized into three related
categories. These are:
1. An alternative interpretation of the reporting focus of SAS 34.
2. An alternative interpretation of audit procedures required or implied
by SAS 34, and
3. The elimination of the "subject to" qualified opinion as it relates to
going-concern situations.
Reporting Focus of SAS 34
The focus of the reporting requirements of SAS 34 is clearly on recoverability and classification of assets and classification of liabilities, and not on
the entity's ability to continue in existence per se. In paragraph 1, SAS 34
states "When the continued existence of an entity is imperiled, there is
heightened concern about the recoverability and classification of recorded asset
amounts and the amounts and classification of liabilities." That is, the auditor
may question the basis of accounting or whether generally accepted accounting
principles are appropriate or a liquidation basis is required. The auditor has no
responsibility to search for evidential matter relating to an entity's continued
existence. If the auditor does not become aware of any contrary information,
then under APB Statement No. 4, he or she may assume that the entity will
continue as a going concern and not question whether a liquidation basis is the
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proper basis of accounting. When the auditor is aware of contrary information
for which sufficient mitigating factors are not present, then the auditor's
opinion may be qualified as to recoverability and classification. The qualification
is not for the ability to continue in existence per se, however (see SAS 34,
paragraphs 11 and 12). In other words, under SAS 34, the going concern
question is not an end but a means to an end which is the validation of an
entity's basis of accounting.
The focus on the basis of the historical accounting of the assets and
liabilities is consistent with the view thatfinancialaccounting reflects the past.
Such reflection may require disclosure relating to the basis of accounting for
those past events and transactions or, indeed, the presence of subsequent
events relating to the past. The focus on the past is in contrast to the future
oriented thrust of Bob Kay's paper in which the auditor must predict the
future—i.e., predict whether an entity will continue to exist. This view would
require forecasting and some attestation related to future events or states.
I realize that the focus expressed by the ASB in SAS 34 may differ from the
common interpretation of a going-concern qualification (or the lack thereof) in
thefinancialcommunity. Also, the courts may indeed, in some cases, interpret
the auditor's responsibilities differently than SAS 34 seems to indicate.
Certainly, such predictions about the future of the company would be of
potential benefit to users offinancialstatements. The question is whether the
auditors are well situated to take such responsibility. Since they do not seem to
be so situated, I suggest that we should drop discussion of how the financial
community might misinterpret SAS 34 and try to reinforce its "correct"
interpretation, perhaps through an education program.
Audit Procedures Required or Implied by SAS 34
SAS's are interpretations of generally accepted auditing standards and as
such are related to the legal requirements of a "standard" quality audit
required under the securities acts and most contracts for audits. Thus, the
SAS's (and SAS 34) are important in assessing the auditor's responsibilities.
Also, according to its charge the ASB must consider the cost and benefits of
particular statements on standards. Bob Kay seems to say that 1) SAS 34 is too
vague as to required procedures; 2) the auditor may be held to a standard of
more work than is explicit in SAS 34 and, 3) the level of work is likely to be the
level indicated in the AICPAs forecast guide.
Most of the audit procedure requirements of SAS 34 are preceded by a
"should consider" modifier. The "should consider" modifier is generally used
when the ASB believes that the cost benefit test does not support the conduct
of the procedure in every case. In some cases the conditions may, indeed,
warrant the application of the forecast guide's level of procedures and the
auditor "should" apply that level. In other (and probably most) cases, the
guide's level of procedure is not needed and the auditor would be justified in
using his or her judgment to perform at a lesser level. The "should consider"
requirement places the auditor on notice that substantial work may be needed
in some cases, however.
Even if we accept the premise that audit procedures at a level greater than
that set by SAS 34 are needed, it is not clear that the forecast guide is
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particularly relevant since 1) in SAS 34, the auditor's considerations relate to
management's plans which may not include specific forecasts and, 2) the object
of prediction is different. In a SAS 34 situation, the immediate object of
prediction is the entity's "ability to continue in existence" which is much
different from a predicted number for earnings or assets. The continuation in
existence prediction is in some cases easier and in other cases harder than
prediction of a future accounting number. For example, some firms may need
to justify a prediction of positive short term cash flows—it is easier to predict
that cash flows will be greater than or equal to zero than it is to predict the
exact amount of such flows as in a forecast. In other cases, future short-term
cash flows may clearly be positive but the continued existence of a firm may
depend on the willingness of bankers and other creditors to continue to provide
a line of credit. Examples of both types of cases can be provided from the
current financial press.
If auditors are to be held to a higher level of procedure than is required for a
particular purpose by a particular pronouncement, then chaos may result. Allan
Winter has conducted an analysis of current AICPA-sanctioned services by
auditors and has found 19 different levels of assurance. These include
assurance from "full" audits, SAARS compilations and reviews, quarterly and
segment reviews, reviews of supplemental information and reviews of fore
casts and projections, among others. One could argue that an auditor
conducting a SAARS compilation is well advised to conduct "full" audit
procedures since some court may inappropriately construe such a standard
after the fact. I believe that the appropriate approach is for the standards
setting body to reason out the economical level of procedure required ex ante,
educate the users (and courts) as to the responsibility the practitioner is taking,
and then ex post vigorously defend the practitioner who has applied the
predetermined level of service.
Elimination of "Subject to" Opinions and the Non-going Concern
The ASB's current proposal to eliminate subject-to opinions for uncertain
ties would also apply to going-concern uncertainties. Basically, the proposal
says "If in the auditor's judgment the financial statements are prepared in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, including informative
disclosure of uncertainties, then he or she should give an unqualified opinion."
A lack of GAAP presentation would continue to require an "except for"
qualification. The same requirements would apply in going-concern situations.
Footnote disclosure of the question of the basis of accounting and the potential
effect on recoverability and classification of assets and classification of liabilities
would suffice.
Thus, the proposed elimination of subject-to opinions for uncertainty would
require little change in thinking for those who believe that the correct focus of
financial statements is on the past with prediction of the future only to assess
the appropriateness of the basis of accounting for the past. These persons will
not be disturbed by the proposed elimination. Those who believe that the
auditor should take more responsibility for predicting the continued existence
of firm per se will probably be quite disturbed by the proposed elimination.
In summary, I thank Bob Kay for stimulating my thinking about the
particular question at hand and the relationships between GAAS, SASs, less
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authoritative pronouncements, and the law. I believe that I have clarified some
of my own thinking about these relationships. My conclusions as to the
particular issues raised, however, differ substantially from those expressed in
Bob's paper.
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8
Developments in Governmental Auditing:
Their Impact On the Academic and Business
Communities
Richard E. Brown
Legislative Post Auditor, State of Kansas
Thank you very much for inviting me here tonight. The opportunity for a
state official to give advice to representatives of the private and university
worlds was an invitation I could not pass up! As Mark Twain was supposed to
have said: "To do good is noble; to instruct others in doing good is just as noble
and much easier."
My comments this evening will be in two parts. First, I want to tell you
about what I know best: auditing in Kansas and the developments that I have
witnessed here during the past nearly eight years. I believe you will find, as I
always tell the classes I teach in auditing, that Kansas is indeed in the
mainstream of what is happening nationally in governmental auditing. Second,
based on this experience, I want to suggest some areas of concern in
governmental auditing for all of us, problems which I believe will need our
attention in the years ahead.
The Evolutionary Changes in the Kansas Audit Operation
The audit operation in the State of Kansas gets its basic mandate from the
Legislative Post Audit Act of 1971. This is a well-researched document that
was developed and written with a great deal of care and only after considerable
expert testimony was received. That care and attention to detail shows in the
legislation.
Under the terms of the statute, the audit operation in Kansas has two key
units. The first is the Legislative Post Audit Committee. The composition of
that Committee is made up of the bipartisan leadership of the two houses of the
Kansas Legislature and includes the Speaker of the House, the President of the
Senate, the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the two houses, the
chairmen of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees, and a
minority member of each Ways and Means Committee appointed by the
Minority Leader. The duties of the Legislative Post Audit Committee include
appointing the Post Auditor to a four-year term of office, choosing performance
audit topics, and receiving and acting on all audit reports. The second main
component of the audit operation in Kansas is the Legislative Division of Post
Audit, which is the administrative arm of the audit operation. The Division is
headed by the Post Auditor, who has complete management responsibility over
the 40-member staff and all audit activity.
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The day-to-day functioning of both the committee and the Division are
guided by the Legislative Post Audit Act and by a fairly elaborate set of
Committee rules covering all major aspects of operations, including media
contacts, the release and distribution of audit reports, the availability of
working papers, etc. The Legislative Division of Post Audit in Kansas performs
financial audits, sunset audits, and performance audits.
As is true in most states, there have been a number of changes in the
operations of the Kansas Post Audit machinery throughout the last decade.
Formerly an elected State Auditor headed the operation. Many of the staff
members were hired without degrees or other professional certifications. Now
the Division of Post Audit has a diversified staff of CPAs, MBAs, lawyers,
MPAs, EDP experts, and other professionals. Formerly the Division really had
no financial audit cycle, leading to audit coverage, at best, over an extended
period of time. Now the State is basically on a two-year financial audit cycle. As
recently as just a few years ago, the Division did nofinancialauditing to satisfy
federal audit requirements. In the belief that federal revenue sharing audit
requirements might go away, they were largely ignored. Today the State is
among the leaders in implementing the new single audit concept. Using our
own staff resources, we have just completed a single audit of our Department
of Social and Rehabilitation Services. The Department is one of our largest
State agencies, spending in the neighborhood of $500 million annually. We have
contracted out to privatefirmsa number of other single audits and will continue
to do so in the future.
As recently as 1975, the Legislative Division of Post Audit did little or no
performance or sunset auditing. Now, I think it is fair to say, we are considered
a leader in the field, having completed dozens of performance audits in recent
years, including audits of social services, highway maintenance, university
construction, off-campus courses, duplication of higher education courses, the
transferability of courses from community colleges to four-year institutions,
and school district performance audits. The latter are among the first in the
nation to be completed. Kansas is also a leader in sunset auditing—auditing
which in essence examines the need for regulation, the fairness of that
regulation, and whether the regulation is being performed in the interest of the
public or in the interest of the regulated activity. Sunset audits completed
range from audits of small licensing groups like the cosmetologists and barbers,
to the larger concerns of nursing home and utility rate regulation.
Indeed, legislative interest in more and more performance and sunset audit
work, coupled with increased federal requirements for financial audits, has
created such a strain on the audit resources in the State of Kansas that, with
the approval of the Legislative Post Audit Committee and the Legislature, the
Division has arrived at a solution of contracting more financial audits. In fiscal
year 1980, our Division will contract roughly $300,000 offinancialaudit work to
help accomplish that work and to make available resources for more perfor
mance audit activity. And that figure is likely to increase in the future. It is
important to mention in passing that in the State of Kansas a decision has been
made, at least for the time being, to avoid a statewide financial audit and instead
conductfinancialaudits on an agency-by-agency basis.
These developments and changes have been significant, and to a great
extent parallel the changes in auditing in other states in the country. The time
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has not been without its anxious and even humorous moments. Let me give
you a couple of illustrations. Back in 1975, we completed our first performance
audit dealing with the regulation and use of water in Kansas. It is important to
remember, of course, that this is a topic of grave concern in what is still very
much an agricultural state. The audit was quite critical of the manner in which
the State program was being operated, generating the following letter from a
Senator:
Dear Mr. Brown:
I understand that your staff worked hard trying to understand and
evaluate the operations of the . . . Act. However, when I looked over
the members of the committee and learned the background of your
staff, I realized the problem . . .
Water is a highly emotional issue. I believe that I can best illustrate
it thus: There are three ways to get shot: (1) fool with a neighbor's
wife; (2) claim three feet of his worthless land; and (3) cut his water off.
Another elected official was equally sensitive about an audit we completed
of her operation. Actually, the report was not that critical, but she certainly
took it that way. She wrote:
Dr. Brown:
I have received a copy of your r e p o r t . . . I hereby demand . . . an
evaluation of. . . your office by an unbiased public accounting firm, free
of political control and intervention. The report is grossly incorrect. It is
malicious, prepared for purely political uses. It violates the code of
ethics of your field. It is an attempt to discredit me personally.
I remind you that although you were hired by a controlled commit
tee, you are paid by the citizens. I demand you account to them for your
actions.
But the letter was not the worst part of the whole process. When our audit
manager and I visited this official to discuss the draft report, we found that she
had invited the TV cameras and other media representatives into the meeting.
We immediately reminded her that our Committee rules prohibited discussing a
draft audit report in a public setting. At this point she literally jumped out of her
chair and shouted at us "to get out of the office and never return." As
embarrassing as this was, I was pleased that she was a woman and that she
was located on the ground floor of the building. In this business one learns to
take his blessings where he can find them. I could not help but be thankful that
the then Secretary of Transportation did not receive his audit report in the
same manner since he was a former All-American football player and has his
offices on the seventh floor of the State Office Building.
Other Changes in Government Auditing
As I have already indicated, these developments and experiences in Kansas
are virtually identical to those taking place in many other state governments.
There has been a considerable increase in the authority and visibility of audits
and of auditors. There has been a tremendous increase in the expectations for
good useful audit work. And there has been a great increase in the quality and
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influence of state audit officials and their staffs. The state auditors now meet on
a regular basis to discuss issues of professional interest including pending
legislative changes, and even have their own representative in Washington.
Intertwined with these developments are a number of other important
related changes. The U.S. General Accounting Office has recently revised its
"Yellow Book," the Comptroller General's governmental audit standards
followed by most auditors engaged in governmental audit work. The revised
standards cover many changes and place a great deal more emphasis on EDP
audit work and on fraud and abuse. While no final decisions have been made,
various proposals relating to the creation of a governmental accounting
standards board are circulating—an idea which is certainly long overdue. There
is considerable pressure on governmental jurisdictions from bond-rating firms
for government to get its accounting and auditing systems in order, including
the threat of a negative impact on bond ratings if they do not. Just a couple of
year ago, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sponsored, in
cooperation with the U . S. General Accounting Office, a conference in Cherry
Hill, New Jersey, to discuss a variety of problems including the government's
general dissatisfaction with the work quality on governmental audits by CPA
firms.
All of these developments are hopeful signs for the future. The only
question one might have is why did it take so long for all this to occur, and why
did we have to wait untilfinancialproblems in government became so pervasive
and so critical? And there is a related concern, a fear that the progress we are
now making may not be permanent and that the cycle may swing again the
other way.
Problems and Opportunities Suggested by the Kansas Experience
One senses some important questions and concerns beneath this great
record of change. With regard to the financial audit in the public sector, there
are many questions which still need to be resolved. In a State like Kansas
where there is no general obligation bonded indebtedness, what is the value of
the financial audit in such a setting—to whom does it convey information, and
what is that information? If it is for "the investor" (the taxpayer), does this
somehow suggest that the taxpayer may decide whether, on the basis of the
audited financial statements, additional "investment" (taxes) should be with
held? Are these audits in any sense cost-beneficial? In our little State we are
paying about a million dollars annually for financial audit work. The question is,
what are we accomplishing—what if anything does a financial audit tell
policymakers and the taxpayers about governmental performance? To illus
trate the dimensions of the problem, it is not lost on any of us in Kansas that
despite the fact thatfinancialaudits of the State's retirement system's financial
statements had been conducted for a period of years, it was not until we did a
performance audit of the system that we really learned anything about its then
dubious investment performance.
A related question has to do with the matter of what is the best—most
economical and effective—way to conduct afinancialaudit of state government.
What are the trade-offs of the efficiencies of a statewide financial audit such as
that conducted in states like Maryland and Minnesota vis-a-vis the value of the
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audit presence provided by Kansas' agency-based approach? What of any
importance is lost if the auditors do not conduct test work in a number of small
agencies, presumably based on materiality concerns? Indeed, the whole issue
of materiality in a government setting may need careful re-examination, since it
is a setting which places great emphasis on compliance with law and regula
tions. In so many of these areas one senses that we are simply following
tradition, piling on audit requirements instead of thinking these traditional audit
concepts through for their application in a governmental setting.
As we in our state and local jurisdictions move to contract more and more
audit work, other questions must also be addressed:
—Should the legislative or executive branch of government, the city council
or city manager, do the contracting?
—What, if any, difference does it make?
Our experience in Kansas thus far indicates that this is an important area of
concern, clearly impacting on the quality and objectivity of the final audit
report.
The old "Yellow Book," under "Organizational Impairments," had some
interesting language in it on this issue:
When independent public accountants or other independent profes
sionals are engaged to perform work that includes inquiries into
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, efficiency and economy
of operations, or achievement of program results, they should be
engaged by someone other than the officials responsible for the
direction of the effort being audited. This practice removes the
pressures that may result if the auditor must criticize the performance
of those who engaged him. To remove this obstacle to independence,
governments should arrange to have such auditors engaged by officials
not directly involved in opertions to be audited.
Unfortunately, this language has been dropped from the revised standards.
The issue as to who does the contracting with CPA firms is an important
matter because it may have a great deal to do with the difficulties that have
arisen over quality control of contracted audits in government. It is possible,
for example, that those doing the contracting at this point in time do not have a
great deal of knowledge about audit requirements or what they anticipate
receiving from an audit.
Some Educational Concerns
This leads me to my final area of concern, at least for tonight. I detect a
great lack of interest at our universities in addressing these kinds of issues in
governmental accounting and auditing. I understand that we in government are
not alone in our complaints in this regard. For example, those concerned with
internal auditing have similar difficulties in getting universities to offer course
work in their area. The business schools seem to have a preoccupation with
public accounting and withfinancialauditing, and do little or nothing for the rest
of us in accounting and auditing.
The problem takes many serious forms. The courses in governmental
accounting and auditing, if they exist at all, are small portions of other already
compressed courses. Courses in performance and operational auditing are
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lacking. A little attention may be given to management or operational auditing,
but there is almost no coverage of program results or effectiveness auditing.
Courses are almost entirely lacking in discussions of the "environment" of
government, with the understandable result that students, given their lack of
exposure and understanding, too often end up being unreasonably biased
against government. This, in turn, leads to a situation in which the chances of
students being successful in public sector work are greatly diminished.
Government loses the trained attention of countless good, young minds while
students lose considerable opportunities.
This inattention to the nonprofit sector creates enormous problems for
CPA firms which must assign such graduates to do work for them in the
governmental sector. One must question the preparation of these graduates
for such work. While some steps have been taken by accreditation bodies to
improve the curriculum in the governmental area, a great deal more needs to
be done.
In conducting the research for my book, Auditing Performance in Government(JohnWiley and Sons, 1982), I found that little help or guidance has been
given by the American Accounting Association or its committees on the
questions I have raised above about accounting and auditing in the public
sector. Again, this is very regrettable. There has been little attention given to
the entire issue of the interplay of budgeting, accounting, and audit systems in
government, or to the development of appropriate performance measures
which then become the basis forfinancialreporting and auditing in government.
For good or ill, most of the research and writing on performance auditing in
government has been done by practitioners—Felix Pomeranz of Coopers and
Lybrand, Leo Herbert, now of VPI and formerly with the U.S. General
Accounting Office, and my book on performance auditing. Indeed, the whole
development of performance auditing and evaluation in government has been
far more a spontaneous groundswell on the part of policy makers than it has
been a result of academic attention. It is clear that the profession has been
most reluctant to play a leadership role in these innovative areas, suggesting a
costly professional conservatism.
Government accounting and auditing has to date clearly not been a good
advancement path at most universities, causing many professors to avoid the
field and recognize that their careers will not be enhanced by research,
teaching, and attention to this area. Again, all of this is most costly and
regrettable for government and government finance.
Closing Comments
I recall living in Tennessee in the 1960s and reading one of Ralph McGill's
books on the South and southerners, a book about rapid changes in the racial
scene in the South at that time. McGill made a comment about that situation
which went something like this: "To be a southerner in these times is the most
magnificent agony of all."
I feel much the same way about governmental auditing and accounting in
the 1980s. Those of us in the field have great power to do good. There is at the
same time a great temptation to avoid the hard questions, questions like:
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—How much auditing is enough?
—What are its costs and benefits?
—What forms should governmental auditing take?
—Is traditional auditing by itself enough in the public sector?
—Can we demonstrate to policymakers the value of public sector auditing?
—And, finally, who will lead us in thinking through some of the old notions
about these issues?
In my judgment, while CPA firms may help find the answers to these
questions, it is not their fundamental role to do so. And it is certainly not the
role of the business community in general. But it is very much the role of the
AICPA, the GAO, the FAF and FASB, the GASB and its predecessor, the
National Council on Governmental Accounting. Most of all, the formal pro
nouncements of such groups must result from the research attention of our
universities. And, frankly, the lack of attention to date to these issues by these
groups is astounding.
If you will indulge me a moment, I will end on a light but I believe
appropriate note coming out of a song. It strikes me as being most relevant to
the fate of governmental accounting and auditing, and to the decisions that are
before us in the 1980s and beyond:
Thank you . . . for the time that is past, for all the values and
thoughts that will last. May we all stagnant tradition ignore, leaving
behind things that matter no more . . .
. . . Make us afraid of the thoughts that delay, faithful in all the
affairs of today; keep us . . . from playing it safe, thank you that now is
the time of our life!
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